By unpopular demand, a (🧵) background explainer for what a "Henry VIII clause" is (as this phrase is being bandied about a lot at the moment). #ableg#abpoli#cdnpolitics
1/16
In our system of government, the legislature (or Parliament, federally) enacts the laws. Formally, His Majesty only makes laws "by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly [of Province]."
2/16
Initially, this right was limited to the imposition of taxes, but was expanded to include funding the Crown. Finally, in 1414, Henry V acknowledged that the approval of Parliament was necessary to make all new laws.
3/16
This was a major limitation of the powers of the Sovereign, and various monarchs resisted this with greater or lesser success. Henry VIII, in particular, sought various ways to bypass or limit Parliament's authority.
4/16
One of the things Henry VIII did was cause to be passed the Statute of Proclamations (An Act that Proclamations made by the King shall be obeyed). The effect of this was that proclamations had the same legal force as Acts of Parliament.
5/16
This power, today known as a "Henry VIII clause", meant that the King, by proclamation, could make or amend laws, without having to consult or obtain the approval of Parliament.
6/16
This greatly curtailed the supremacy of Parliament, and ultimately came to a head in 1649 with Parliament regaining supremacy, although things weren't really settled until the Bill of Rights was enacted in 1689.
7/16
In our more modern era, the Government wields the executive power of the Sovereign. Ministers comprise the Government and are served by officials. Note that backbench MPs/MLAs in the governing party are not part of the Government. They are distinct, constitutionally.
8/16
Most of the Government's authority is conferred by Acts made by the Legislature. And the Government can only enact new laws by and with the advice and consent of the Legislature.
9/16
However, the Legislature can (with some caveats) delegate its authority. This is most commonly done by including the power to make regulations, which are subservient to their enacting legislation and thus limited by it and the express regulation-making provisions.
10/16
In more rare circumstances, the Legislature can delegate the power (to the Government) to make or amend laws; i.e., to change laws that were made by the Legislature itself. These provisions are called Henry VIII clauses.
11/16
Note that the Legislature can always amend or repeal the power delegating its authority. This was seen in Alberta with the Public Health Act.
12/16
In 2020, the Legislature amended the Public Health Act to expand the Henry VIII powers conferred by that statute to the Government. Facing backlash, the Legislature not only undid those amendments but fully repealed the Henry VIII clauses in that Act in 2021.
13/16
Nevertheless, Henry VIII clauses are controversial. In dissent, Côté J. argued in the Carbon Tax Reference decision that their use was unconstitutional and incompatible with the idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty.
14/16
As the majority of the SCC disagreed with Côté J., Henry VIII clauses can, at least for now, be enacted in Canada (there may still be some question as to how broad those clauses can be).
15/16
Voters also can and should demand accountability from their representatives for the use of Henry VIII clauses, and be prepared to toss out governments that seek to abuse this power and bypass the Legislature's role.
16/16
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The Saskatchewan First Act is a doozy both in terms of what it purports to do (blatantly unconstitutional) and what it actually does (mostly, generate hot air).
Namely, the Act purports to amend the Constitution of Canada, namely the Saskatchewan Act and the Constitution Act, 1867. All well and good, except this can’t be done unilaterally.
2/
Since the amendments would only affect Saskatchewan, section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982 applies. Under this provision, resolutions of both Houses of Parliament are required in addition to that of the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly.
3/
There were several options that could have been used to prevent any strike or other labour disruption, all without using the notwithstanding clause. The only problem for the government is that these other options would have most likely resulted in higher wage settlements.
2/
For instance, @fordnation could have legislated that there be binding arbitration. So, in lieu of a negotiated collective agreement (with labour action possible), an independent arbitrator would decide what the fair outcome should be.
3/
Let me save some time. The prospects for the province winning on appeal are nil. Dunlop J. made a finding of fact that Cabinet, not the CMOH, was making the decisions. There is no palpable or overriding error that would cause the Court of Appeal to reverse that.
It is also settled law that decision makers cannot unduly fetter their discretion, nor can they sub-delegate the authority given to them by statute. There is no avenue for the Court of Appeal to hold an error in law was made by Dunlop J.
2/3
The only *possible* part of the decision that could be appealed is the rejection of the Charter arguments. There, Dunlop J. sided with the province, so it’s the applicants who could win here. However, even here the likelihood of a successful appeal is (sadly) very slim.
3/3
I will disagree that the PC party successfully reinvented itself with new leaders. There were only two leaders who were really successful, each of which were premier for almost 1/3 of the period the PCs held power.
Both Peter Lougheed and Ralph Klein were Premier for 14 years (in Klein’s case, to the day; Lougheed was actually a few months longer). The other *5* PC premiers collectively governed for the remaining 15 years.
2/4
Of those 15 years, 7 were under Don Getty. His success record is dubious, given that he lost his own seat in the 1989 general election, and the party was in serious trouble when he left office.
3/4
A fairly solid win for @OrlaghOKelly1 and @Sharonadactyl, all due to their dogged persistence and smart approach to get the evidence that ultimately made the decision (IMHO) an inevitable conclusion. #ableg#abpoli
1/10
As the decision notes, the evidence (which the government initially tried to hide behind the veil of Cabinet confidence) showed that Cabinet, and not the CMOH, made the decisions. The Court says this was “unreasonable”, which is administrative law language for offside.
2/10
The Legislature, in enacting the Public Health Act, gave the power to make the decisions to the CMOH. The Legislature also permitted the CMOH to delegate to certain officials, but not to ministers or Cabinet.