| osint_east | Profile picture
Dec 2, 2022 12 tweets 9 min read Read on X
Claim: #Russian Forces are Evacuating in the #Zaporizhzhia AO.

A fact-based thread tracking communications regarding this evolving claim & related events.

Claims sorted by type & origin [ 1️⃣ , 2️⃣ ... ; 🇷🇺 🇺🇦 ]

#OSINT
#UkraineRussianWar

1/N

mapclips: @DefMon3 Area of claims observation: Russian forces "evacuating
1️⃣🇺🇦 18:00 UTC+2

On Thursday 01/12 the #GSUA stated in its daily report that individual Russian units & officials were repositioning, or evacuating, from the #Zaporizhzhia AO.

Specifically IVO settlements:

#Polohy (city)
#Mykhailivka
#Inzhenerne

s: facebook.com/GeneralStaff.u…

2/ GSUA Daily Report Statement. December 01, 2022.
1️⃣🇺🇦

The statement conveys that Russian units & occupation admin. officials are leaving positions in public & private structures & spaces. It is specific to the point of naming the buildings that units are using.

There is no *official Russian response to claim (1) on Dec 1.

3/
1️⃣🇷🇺 23:30 UTC+2

Russian TG sources assume that units are not evacuating fully. Instead, it is part of planned rotation in these areas which are near front-line activity.

In that statement is a response to another claim regarding the #ZNPP [2️⃣] .

s: t.me/RSaponkov/4096

4/ December 01, 2022.
2️⃣🇺🇦

On 28/11 Ukrainian sources circulated a claim that an evacuation of Russian forces from #ZNPP was imminent, possibly driven by claims of a proposed IAEA 'safe zone' deal. However, it was interpreted from a statement and immediately disputed.

s: t.me/Tsaplienko/214…

5/ November 28, 2022.
2️⃣🇷🇺

This claim may have also originated due to change in upper occupation leadership at ZNPP. The press representative for Rosenergoatom (utility managing the occupied plant) and Dmitry Peskov state the claim is false.

s: interfax.ru/russia/874774
s: interfax.ru/russia/874491

6/ Rosenergoatom via Interfax. November 30, 2022.Dmitry Peskov via Interfax. November 28, 2022.
Despite the closeness of these two claims in type, we can presume they are likely separate.

Additional occupation administration officials may leave areas IVO ZNPP along with others near front-line areas, but no source confirms this as of Dec 1.

7/
1️⃣🇺🇦

Operationally, it is highly unlikely that Russian forces will retreat as far as Tokmak, or further south, as this fully exposes the GLOCs leading to Melitopol, exposes all East/West MSRs along the southern front, and risks splitting forces there in half.

8/
1️⃣🇺🇦

There is evidence to support the rationale for Russia to rotate forces, or consolidation positions, in the Zaporizhzhia AO.

#Polohy and other frontline areas have been subject to intense AFU shelling & counter-battery fires for months.

9/
1⃣🇷🇺 02/12 22:00 UTC+2

There is no new evidence support claims of Russian forces withdrawal in #Zaporizhzhia AO.

New articles have been posted on Dec. 2 which cite previous day's claims.

A Russian source claims direct evidence of force rotation.

s: t.me/RSaponkov/4098

9/
1️⃣🇺🇦/🇷🇺

There have been no new updates to the claim that #Russian forces are withdrawing in the Zaporizhzhia AO in the last 24 hours, as monitored.

The first claim will be tracked for approx. two more days until an assessment is made.

10/
2⃣ 🇷🇺

An update to the claim RAF are leaving the #ZNPP is added context that discussions between IAEA and Rosatom included "withdrawal of heavy weapons in exchange for no shelling by AFU"

This is considered separate from events IVO Polohy.

s: t.me/swodki/198126

11/

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More from @osint_east

Jan 3, 2023
It's worth noting this occurred 1) on a holiday, and 2) during a holiday celebration, making the strike perhaps more psychologically devastating.

If the same event occurred in, say, November I'm not clear outrage would be as great (though anger over incompetence would be).

1|4
They also did not die in battle...not even during rear area operations. They were just vaporized in a building while partying.

2|
From what I've gathered the mobilized are called to revive (concretely) a failing operation. Embedded is hope (of/for Russians) that they serve some patriotic capacity (abstractly-speaking), but there is likely an implicit "limit" to that...it's just not clear where.

3|
Read 5 tweets
Jan 2, 2023
On casualty estimates and their impact:

Regardless of the actual figure: 63 as "official" toll from Russian MoD, "600" from A. Shariy who has made unsubstantiated claims/figures before–the event is considerable because of who has died: the recently-mobilized.

#Makiivka

1|4
The Russian MoD, and Kremlin at-large, has struggled to justify casualties among the mobilized, due in part to its reluctance to "officialize" many reasons for mobilization.

This has been a source of frustration among milbloggers, and the Russian public more generally.

2|
That extended PR failing has manifest widespread fear.

Local sources opened a hotline for families to check service rosters since the high-casualty claims have cemented in the discourse, and since no official source can effectively refute them.

s: t.me/sovanews63/285…

3| Translation  s: https://t.me/sovanews63/28593  Sourced: Jan.
Read 4 tweets
Jan 2, 2023
Reference on the #Makiivka strike:

The building is not especially old, nor is it small. This was a large three-story building primarily of standing poured columns with likely prestressed hollowcore slabs.

i/s: t.me/grey_zone/16439

1|2 "Destroyed Vocational ...
Meaning: a possible reason for such a high death toll (est. 100-150; (500 is exaggerated)) is the result of the GMLRS munitions creating multiple rapid failures in the entire structure, leading to floors pancaking thus crushing most inside.

2|2
+1

Final note: insofar as local sources claim, the building was struck at 00:01 UTC+2, most likely when the maximum number of soldiers were present in the building.

s: t.me/NeoficialniyBe… Translation.  s: https://t....
Read 5 tweets
Jan 2, 2023
I do not yet fully understand what line B. Rozhin is towing; he oscillates between (measured) analysis and open reflections on economic/social factors.

If anything, he often comes across disappointed rather than incensed like the others.

1|3
In a strange way he seems detached at times, bordering on indifferent if only to allow (objective) reporting while others lean overly-performative.

МИГ and Rozhin are similar in this way–far more "matter of fact" language used by the two.

s: t.me/mig41/22995

2| Tranlation: MIR  Sourced: J...
One interesting quirk with МИГ channel is that he only allows two emoji responses: 😢or❤️

Before even reading a message or opening discussion, you can immediately pick up on the significance of the message, and even his tone, based on those indicators alone.

3|3
Read 4 tweets
Dec 15, 2022
Wagner is engaged on multiple fronts, but its battlefield worth is in question—most recently in a seemingly unending & futile attempt at capturing #Bakhmut. But why would a famed outfit struggle so much?

A new look at #WagnerPMC

#UkraineRussianWar
#Mercenaries

🔞

1 of 48 PART ONE: In the Shadows  W...
Studies on #Wagner, a unofficial quasi-state military apparatus, illustrate #Kremlin shadow efforts aimed at enabling foreign policy objectives.

Simply, Wagner brings to bear the levers of organized violence where (official) #Russian forces cannot.

2|
This violence is an enabling force, but also a restrictive one. It is, in effect, Wagner's primary capability.

All other internal efforts (media, power-projection, political maneuvering) are oriented towards enabling and maintaining this capability.

russianpmcs.csis.org

3|
Read 49 tweets
Dec 14, 2022
It appears Wagner elements are aiming straight-west using low-density residential as an attack vector, but that likely halts when they reach the Bakhmutova River.

Unclear if toehold is a fixing action as forces N/S attempt encirclement, or a disjointed effort.

#Bakhmut

1/N
This is not an ideal vector (poor cover, flexible) but is a more efficient route to city center & river crossings.

Breaking secondary AFU defensive lines is a clear goal.

As suspected, Wagner is moving off main approaches to avoid interception.

2/

In terms of rhetoric the Wagner/milblogger narrative is kicking into gear by framing these smaller actions as more indicative of general AFU setbacks.

s: t.me/pmc_wagnera_to…
s: t.me/c/1827743879/1…

3/ Translation: Wagner PMC  Sourced: Dec 14. 2022. Telegram.Translation: Wagner PMC  Sourced: Dec 14. 2022. Telegram.
Read 6 tweets

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