On Thursday 01/12 the #GSUA stated in its daily report that individual Russian units & officials were repositioning, or evacuating, from the #Zaporizhzhia AO.
The statement conveys that Russian units & occupation admin. officials are leaving positions in public & private structures & spaces. It is specific to the point of naming the buildings that units are using.
There is no *official Russian response to claim (1) on Dec 1.
3/
1️⃣🇷🇺 23:30 UTC+2
Russian TG sources assume that units are not evacuating fully. Instead, it is part of planned rotation in these areas which are near front-line activity.
In that statement is a response to another claim regarding the #ZNPP [2️⃣] .
On 28/11 Ukrainian sources circulated a claim that an evacuation of Russian forces from #ZNPP was imminent, possibly driven by claims of a proposed IAEA 'safe zone' deal. However, it was interpreted from a statement and immediately disputed.
This claim may have also originated due to change in upper occupation leadership at ZNPP. The press representative for Rosenergoatom (utility managing the occupied plant) and Dmitry Peskov state the claim is false.
Despite the closeness of these two claims in type, we can presume they are likely separate.
Additional occupation administration officials may leave areas IVO ZNPP along with others near front-line areas, but no source confirms this as of Dec 1.
7/
1️⃣🇺🇦
Operationally, it is highly unlikely that Russian forces will retreat as far as Tokmak, or further south, as this fully exposes the GLOCs leading to Melitopol, exposes all East/West MSRs along the southern front, and risks splitting forces there in half.
8/
1️⃣🇺🇦
There is evidence to support the rationale for Russia to rotate forces, or consolidation positions, in the Zaporizhzhia AO.
#Polohy and other frontline areas have been subject to intense AFU shelling & counter-battery fires for months.
There have been no new updates to the claim that #Russian forces are withdrawing in the Zaporizhzhia AO in the last 24 hours, as monitored.
The first claim will be tracked for approx. two more days until an assessment is made.
10/
2⃣ 🇷🇺
An update to the claim RAF are leaving the #ZNPP is added context that discussions between IAEA and Rosatom included "withdrawal of heavy weapons in exchange for no shelling by AFU"
This is considered separate from events IVO Polohy.
They also did not die in battle...not even during rear area operations. They were just vaporized in a building while partying.
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From what I've gathered the mobilized are called to revive (concretely) a failing operation. Embedded is hope (of/for Russians) that they serve some patriotic capacity (abstractly-speaking), but there is likely an implicit "limit" to that...it's just not clear where.
Regardless of the actual figure: 63 as "official" toll from Russian MoD, "600" from A. Shariy who has made unsubstantiated claims/figures before–the event is considerable because of who has died: the recently-mobilized.
The Russian MoD, and Kremlin at-large, has struggled to justify casualties among the mobilized, due in part to its reluctance to "officialize" many reasons for mobilization.
This has been a source of frustration among milbloggers, and the Russian public more generally.
2|
That extended PR failing has manifest widespread fear.
Local sources opened a hotline for families to check service rosters since the high-casualty claims have cemented in the discourse, and since no official source can effectively refute them.
The building is not especially old, nor is it small. This was a large three-story building primarily of standing poured columns with likely prestressed hollowcore slabs.
Meaning: a possible reason for such a high death toll (est. 100-150; (500 is exaggerated)) is the result of the GMLRS munitions creating multiple rapid failures in the entire structure, leading to floors pancaking thus crushing most inside.
2|2
+1
Final note: insofar as local sources claim, the building was struck at 00:01 UTC+2, most likely when the maximum number of soldiers were present in the building.
I do not yet fully understand what line B. Rozhin is towing; he oscillates between (measured) analysis and open reflections on economic/social factors.
If anything, he often comes across disappointed rather than incensed like the others.
One interesting quirk with МИГ channel is that he only allows two emoji responses: 😢or❤️
Before even reading a message or opening discussion, you can immediately pick up on the significance of the message, and even his tone, based on those indicators alone.
Wagner is engaged on multiple fronts, but its battlefield worth is in question—most recently in a seemingly unending & futile attempt at capturing #Bakhmut. But why would a famed outfit struggle so much?
It appears Wagner elements are aiming straight-west using low-density residential as an attack vector, but that likely halts when they reach the Bakhmutova River.
Unclear if toehold is a fixing action as forces N/S attempt encirclement, or a disjointed effort.