| osint_east | Profile picture
Dec 6 6 tweets 3 min read
After observing the information space re: #Zaporizhia and #polohy it can be determined that no current proof of a wide-scale Russian withdrawal exists.

Timeline covers events from 02/12 - 05/12. Sources included & timestamped.

1/6
What may be deduced: troop rotation in conjunction with redoubling of defensive operations across the LOC.

s: t.me/RSaponkov/4096

This can be surmised from expansion of defensive structures across the entire Southern AO, from Mariupol west to E. Kherson Oblast.

2/
The RAF are responding to a need to construct new defensive lines, and reinforce existing ones, in preparation for winter ops. & following the withdrawal of troops and combat capability from the west (right) bank of the Dnieper approx. 1 month ago.

3/

Polohy and Tokmak are critical nodes protecting the northern flank of Melitopol & southern MSRs (main supply routes) running east/west.

4/ Area of claims observation: Defensive Nodes IVO Polohy and T
Any withdrawal here would open a clear path for the AFU to punch south, splitting the front in two & isolating Crimea. Russia will likely not take this chance.

I would expect the RAF to heavily-reinforce this area over the coming weeks/months for this very reason.

5/ Area of claims observation: Expanded Southern AO Analysis.
How did this claim evolve?

As first a statement from the daily AFU digest on Dec 02, which was then reported widely by major media outlets.

It did not, however, gain the same fervor as previous claims, perhaps out of caution, or based on the above circumstances.

6/6

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More from @osint_east

Dec 6
At approx. 07:00 UTC+3 a fire was reported at the airfield in #Kursk [#курск ] where a suspected - and later reported - drone attack occurred.

This comes less than 24 hours after suspected drone attacks on Engels and Diaghilev airbases.

a/v s: t.me/gistapapapa/54…

1/N
The Governor of Kursk, Roman Starovoit, does report that the fire is the result of an #UAV attack, on airbase oil/fuel infrastructure specifically, and that the fire is localized.

s: t.me/gubernator_46/…

2/
The fire location is consistent with fuel tanks and pumping infrastructure in the northeastern quadrant of the airbase.

The specific source involved (infrastructure) of the fire is unclear.

IVO: 51.752013 N, 36.306151 E

s: t.me/kurskadm/40868
s: t.me/opersvodki/114…

3/ Suspected drone attack on Kursk Airfield.  TG. Sourced Dec 0Suspected drone attack on Kursk Airfield.  TG. Sourced Dec 0Suspected drone attack on Kursk Airbase.  osint_east
Read 12 tweets
Dec 4
@TheStudyofWar released its daily (12/03) assessment:

"...[a] limited Ukrainian incursion onto the east bank could open avenues for Ukrainian forces to begin to operate on the east bank."

#UkraineRussianWar
#Kherson

1/4

🔽
The challenge with this assessment is that it takes a video-based claim and extrapolates and operational outcome from it.

s: t.me/aerocarlson/689

Albeit ISW's language leaves room for interpretation, this should not be considered as a practical assessment. Emil expands:

2/
Geographically this area is not suitable for expansive operational maneuver. The AFU claimed a "bridgehead" on what is essentially an island, bordered by extensive floodplain, and separated by two more rivers. They also chose a location closest to Kherson center.

3/
Read 5 tweets
Dec 2
Claim: #Russian Forces are Evacuating in the #Zaporizhzhia AO.

A fact-based thread tracking communications regarding this evolving claim & related events.

Claims sorted by type & origin [ 1️⃣ , 2️⃣ ... ; 🇷🇺 🇺🇦 ]

#OSINT
#UkraineRussianWar

1/N

mapclips: @DefMon3 Area of claims observation: Russian forces "evacuating
1️⃣🇺🇦 18:00 UTC+2

On Thursday 01/12 the #GSUA stated in its daily report that individual Russian units & officials were repositioning, or evacuating, from the #Zaporizhzhia AO.

Specifically IVO settlements:

#Polohy (city)
#Mykhailivka
#Inzhenerne

s: facebook.com/GeneralStaff.u…

2/ GSUA Daily Report Statement. December 01, 2022.
1️⃣🇺🇦

The statement conveys that Russian units & occupation admin. officials are leaving positions in public & private structures & spaces. It is specific to the point of naming the buildings that units are using.

There is no *official Russian response to claim (1) on Dec 1.

3/
Read 12 tweets
Dec 1
@TheStudyofWar released its daily (11/30) assessment:

"Disruptions associated with partial #mobilization and Russian setbacks on the battlefield likely contributed to increasing war weariness among #Russian public, as reflected in the polling."

1/10

#UkraineRussiaWar️
The most recent poll referenced was conducted by the Federal Protective Service (FSO), a #Kremlin apparatus. Its results show a relatively-unchanged number of respondents are "in favor of peace talks" as compared to a similar poll conduced in October.

2/

meduza.io/en/feature/202…
The dynamics of the poll—including the precise geography of respondents and their affiliations, and whether incentives were involved—is unclear.

However, there is an observed increase in what may be considered "war weariness" as opposed to direct "anti-war" sentiment.

3/ Results from FSO Opinion Po...
Read 11 tweets
Nov 30
Good point. We can expand on this.

Ukraine has deftly controlled their information space (in a way that will be studied for years), and through the backing of Western partners/supporters.

This includes not only promulgation of narratives, but also intelligence operations.

1/3
Russia does have tight control of the narrative internally, but the open-source nature of the war, and the sheer volume of Ukraine supporters processing available data, makes it a near-impossible task to contain info spread, or embed disinformation.

2/
meduza.io/en/short/2019/…
Example:

I have watched picture sets of Russian casualties posted on TG, and within an hour they are:

• cross-posted here
• geolocated
• cross-referenced through Russian SM
• added to open-source casualty databases
• added to daily updates

then shared 1000s of times.

3/
Read 5 tweets
Nov 29
Observation: in the past three weeks the reported use of #shahed136 has declined significantly.

Early estimates (September) suggested Russia had planned to obtain 1,800 - 2,400 aerial munitions from Iran, either directly, or through relicensed assembly; many are Shahed-136.
Interceptions have slowed, implying use of the drone has declined. Increasing failure rate of interception is highly unlikely.

A few possibilities:

1. Attrition
2. E/W countermeasures
3. Stock replenishment cycle
4. Fewer media reports
5. Supply interruption
6. Training cycles Claimed Shahed-136 Intercep...
An expansive look at the Shahed-136 can be found in an earlier thread.

Read 5 tweets

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