After observing the information space re: #Zaporizhia and #polohy it can be determined that no current proof of a wide-scale Russian withdrawal exists.
Timeline covers events from 02/12 - 05/12. Sources included & timestamped.
This can be surmised from expansion of defensive structures across the entire Southern AO, from Mariupol west to E. Kherson Oblast.
2/
The RAF are responding to a need to construct new defensive lines, and reinforce existing ones, in preparation for winter ops. & following the withdrawal of troops and combat capability from the west (right) bank of the Dnieper approx. 1 month ago.
Polohy and Tokmak are critical nodes protecting the northern flank of Melitopol & southern MSRs (main supply routes) running east/west.
4/
Any withdrawal here would open a clear path for the AFU to punch south, splitting the front in two & isolating Crimea. Russia will likely not take this chance.
I would expect the RAF to heavily-reinforce this area over the coming weeks/months for this very reason.
5/
How did this claim evolve?
As first a statement from the daily AFU digest on Dec 02, which was then reported widely by major media outlets.
It did not, however, gain the same fervor as previous claims, perhaps out of caution, or based on the above circumstances.
6/6
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The Governor of Kursk, Roman Starovoit, does report that the fire is the result of an #UAV attack, on airbase oil/fuel infrastructure specifically, and that the fire is localized.
Geographically this area is not suitable for expansive operational maneuver. The AFU claimed a "bridgehead" on what is essentially an island, bordered by extensive floodplain, and separated by two more rivers. They also chose a location closest to Kherson center.
On Thursday 01/12 the #GSUA stated in its daily report that individual Russian units & officials were repositioning, or evacuating, from the #Zaporizhzhia AO.
The statement conveys that Russian units & occupation admin. officials are leaving positions in public & private structures & spaces. It is specific to the point of naming the buildings that units are using.
There is no *official Russian response to claim (1) on Dec 1.
3/
"Disruptions associated with partial #mobilization and Russian setbacks on the battlefield likely contributed to increasing war weariness among #Russian public, as reflected in the polling."
The most recent poll referenced was conducted by the Federal Protective Service (FSO), a #Kremlin apparatus. Its results show a relatively-unchanged number of respondents are "in favor of peace talks" as compared to a similar poll conduced in October.
Ukraine has deftly controlled their information space (in a way that will be studied for years), and through the backing of Western partners/supporters.
This includes not only promulgation of narratives, but also intelligence operations.
Russia does have tight control of the narrative internally, but the open-source nature of the war, and the sheer volume of Ukraine supporters processing available data, makes it a near-impossible task to contain info spread, or embed disinformation.
Observation: in the past three weeks the reported use of #shahed136 has declined significantly.
Early estimates (September) suggested Russia had planned to obtain 1,800 - 2,400 aerial munitions from Iran, either directly, or through relicensed assembly; many are Shahed-136.
Interceptions have slowed, implying use of the drone has declined. Increasing failure rate of interception is highly unlikely.
A few possibilities:
1. Attrition 2. E/W countermeasures 3. Stock replenishment cycle 4. Fewer media reports 5. Supply interruption 6. Training cycles
An expansive look at the Shahed-136 can be found in an earlier thread.