Wagner is engaged on multiple fronts, but its battlefield worth is in question—most recently in a seemingly unending & futile attempt at capturing #Bakhmut. But why would a famed outfit struggle so much?
Crucially, despite Wagner's (now) high-profile nature it "does not officially exist" lending to its ability to prioritize means typically out-of-reach or out-of-bounds by official actors.
An over-reliance on violence suggests an organization that is inherently fragmented, is present-focused, and beholden to the "glue" of power-by-personality. It also suggests a reliance on national myths to both remain relevant, and tie it to external state strategies.
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To understand Wagner as an organization, we need to wind back the clock & step away from the din created by its role in #Ukraine.
(Present) Wagner is, in essence, a brain child of Yevgeny #Prigozhin, a figure emblematic of an upper-authoritarian bulwark of the Russian State.
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His involvement—early on denied but now acknowledged—is crucial to Wagner's organizational structure. Not because of who he is specifically, but because of what structure he is part of and upholds, and that which informs Wagner's means of operating.
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The history of Wagner is (understandably) murky, albeit the focus of investigative efforts. @bellingcat outlines in great detail the inception of Wagner, evolution of Prigozhin's involvement, and their rise to relevancy as a foreign policy apparatus.
Prigozhin is by all accounts an oligarch, power-broker, and cult-of-personality. He is innately tied to the Kremlin and member to the #Siloviki.
His role within power structures of Russian leadership place Wagner directly in view of decision-makers.
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What matters here is Prigozhin's, and by extension Wagner's, predominance within an increasingly tension-filled leadership cabal, combined with presumably more desperate conditions faced by the Russian military itself.
However, this does not necessarily mean he 'commands' the actions of Wagner.
Why?
Partly, this is because of the organizational framework in which he is part of.
IOW: He 'reflects' Wagner as an organization at the highest level, but he does not control it.
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So who controls Wagner? In theory, no one.
There is no absolute hierarchy within Wagner by which power flows based on structural governance. It is propelled by power accumulated within 'roles' whereby each role acts independent, and power exercised maintains the group.
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This sounds contradictory, and that is true if assigning a different paradigm—for example: rule by an authoritarian government with an expansive central bureaucracy (Soviet Union). In the case of Wagner PMC, we need to introduce a new one.
Here are two premises to hold:
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First, all organizations are composed of beings that build on, and derive from one another, their aims, means, and motivations.
Second, all organizations are a living reflection of present worldviews.
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Wagner PMC is a unique expression of these two premises.
Specifically, it can be understood as a disaggregated body of individuals and defined by characteristics of what is known as a 'RED Organization'.
(Integral Theory, K. Wilber; Organizational Paradigms, F. Laloux).
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(RED) are among the oldest of organizational frameworks, dating to humanity's "early conquering armies" and exist to this day "in the form of street gangs and mafias."
"Present versions adopt features of modernity like information warfare."
F. Laloux (2014)
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(RED) have no absolute hierarchies.
Rather, they are upheld by reinforced separation among roles, whereby each role (and by extension each member) advances individual & group influence via simple mechanisms of power: incentives, manipulation, violence, and 'othering'.
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These simple mechanisms are key to Wagner's perceived success and power projection (but are equally limiting).
Further, they are endorsed (not sanctioned, owing to its unofficial status) by roles with most power, yet highest degree of separation (Prigozhin, #Putin, etc.).
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Incentives
Wanger recruits are offered higher-than-average wages for participation. These incentives are made explicit and offer a 'better path' than their professionally-trained peers in the armed forces, with the added promise of veteran status for recruits.
Recruitment from prisons is key element of manipulation, pulling from the 'bottom' of society—those who are already 'othered' through the legal process—to draw in members who will never attain any real power, and are expendable based on their societal status.
There is ample evidence of Wagner executing deserters and non-conformists, recently brought back into public view by the death-by-sledgehammer of Yevgeny Nuzhin. The violence extends to include likely war crimes committed by its members.
Sexual violence is another brutal but effective simple power mechanism, made apparent by Prigozhin's 'cock divisions' where those 'othered' by Russian society can be effectively and totally manipulated into the least-desirable (thus least powerful) roles.
All these mechanisms are based on a necessity to maintain casual relationships, but which never evolve to interpersonal ones.
For example, #Wagner does not employ notions of 'morality' not because it does not have them (rampant use of violence implies it doesn't) ...
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Instead, it does not *require* morals to function. Introducing morality would actually destabilize the organization, undoing the basic premise that its 'glue' is the "continuous exercising of power in [all] relationships."
F. Laloux (2014)
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Wagner communications are an instrument designed to weave these mechanisms into more complex expressions of otherwise simple concepts.
It relies on simple tropes, displays of glory and honor, and recurring themes of Russian national myth and anxieties.
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Communications have evolved to cover and legitimatize Wagner's exploits, elevating them into key roles as saviors or shapers of Russian national destiny.
It targets audiences who are easily manipulated or reactive (predominately male, young, and disaffected) with media tailored to generating intrigue and outrage, and tapping into generational themes and subcultures.
Those subcultures vary greatly in reach and origin.
Figures are stylized, as are combat operations. Identities of 'heroes' are exaggerated, as are those who are subjugated. The expanse and effectiveness of these efforts are broadly known.
The more sophisticated productions combine all the above.
Symbols of action, notably the sledgehammer, are integrated as symbols of power and retribution. Mundane tools become overt displays of group prowess and influence (including to other organizations) even if power is short-lived.
s: multiple
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A metaphor used to describe RED organizations is a "Wolfpack" wherein alpha leaders prevail so long as unquestioned, and chaos is embraced. Subgroups of Wagner PMC literally use this term in often describing themselves.
So what does this organizaiton look like? Where are the boundaries drawn, the mechanisms enforced, and the power accumulated? And what can it actually accomplish?
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An aggregation of the elements introduced in this thread so far result in this conceptual version of Wagner's organizational (RED) structure.
Note: it is shaped to minimally resemble a hierarchy, but critical defining elements, like stratified roles, are absent.
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It's also important to understand a (RED) organization's relationship to time. They cannot effectively extend power beyond the limits of mechanisms that propel it.
They are present-focused, highly-reactive, and poor at planning, thus mostly incapable of strategic outlook.
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Returning to the original observation: why is Wagner failing in and around Bakhmut?
The answer may be painfully simple: it is simply not 'organized' well enough to accomplish the complex effort it has set out to do.
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In comparison, Ukrainian forces are mounting a considerable defense—albeit also taking heavy losses—not just because of tactical and geographic advantages.
It is because they are a more coherent organization than Wagner (existing at a higher level in the paradigm).
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Very simply: the AFU in #Bakhmut may be considered as (AMBER), an organization driven by strong(er) moral principles, high(er) levels of self-awareness, distributed decision-making through stratified roles, and able to project actions further in time (strategic).
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Wagner organizational principles leave it with few options for success: either psychological degradation of #Ukrainian forces by amplifying chaos, or simply overwhelming the AFU in numbers via the use of 'expendable groups'.
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It is doing precisely the latter, made further infamous by accepting the notion that many convicts, soldiers, and 'others' are sent there simply to feed the grinder (though claims of mass human wave attacks are dubious).
Wagner's worldview is built upon Russian national myth: a nation beholden to an unending "geographic destiny" exhibited by its need to expand & conquer neighboring regions to address deep-seated insecurities, and upheld by the ruggedness of its people.
R. D. Kaplan (2012)
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In spite of how Wagner's power is demonstrated—for example the opening of Wagner centers in cities across Russia—each new member introduced will be thrust into the organization's fragile paradigm, and the history of chaos that comes with it.
Wagner evolution is depends on its ability to adapt. Internal competition may arise as other Russian PMC increase in power and influence, perhaps by taking advantage of loss-of-power by a depleted Wagner in Ukraine. A changing foreign policy will also inform its relevance.
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For all these reasons Wagner is, and will remain, a potent yet fragile force within Ukraine and beyond. For now, the ideological basis for its operating holds, even if that too is under threat from a weakened Russia.
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But if under continuing pressure the social glue begins to dry and crack, and if the chaos in Ukraine subsides, it will have to look elsewhere to remain legitimate, or else it will quickly collapse under the weight of the very things that support its existence.
They also did not die in battle...not even during rear area operations. They were just vaporized in a building while partying.
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From what I've gathered the mobilized are called to revive (concretely) a failing operation. Embedded is hope (of/for Russians) that they serve some patriotic capacity (abstractly-speaking), but there is likely an implicit "limit" to that...it's just not clear where.
Regardless of the actual figure: 63 as "official" toll from Russian MoD, "600" from A. Shariy who has made unsubstantiated claims/figures before–the event is considerable because of who has died: the recently-mobilized.
The Russian MoD, and Kremlin at-large, has struggled to justify casualties among the mobilized, due in part to its reluctance to "officialize" many reasons for mobilization.
This has been a source of frustration among milbloggers, and the Russian public more generally.
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That extended PR failing has manifest widespread fear.
Local sources opened a hotline for families to check service rosters since the high-casualty claims have cemented in the discourse, and since no official source can effectively refute them.
The building is not especially old, nor is it small. This was a large three-story building primarily of standing poured columns with likely prestressed hollowcore slabs.
Meaning: a possible reason for such a high death toll (est. 100-150; (500 is exaggerated)) is the result of the GMLRS munitions creating multiple rapid failures in the entire structure, leading to floors pancaking thus crushing most inside.
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+1
Final note: insofar as local sources claim, the building was struck at 00:01 UTC+2, most likely when the maximum number of soldiers were present in the building.
I do not yet fully understand what line B. Rozhin is towing; he oscillates between (measured) analysis and open reflections on economic/social factors.
If anything, he often comes across disappointed rather than incensed like the others.
One interesting quirk with МИГ channel is that he only allows two emoji responses: 😢or❤️
Before even reading a message or opening discussion, you can immediately pick up on the significance of the message, and even his tone, based on those indicators alone.
It appears Wagner elements are aiming straight-west using low-density residential as an attack vector, but that likely halts when they reach the Bakhmutova River.
Unclear if toehold is a fixing action as forces N/S attempt encirclement, or a disjointed effort.
The Governor of Kursk, Roman Starovoit, does report that the fire is the result of an #UAV attack, on airbase oil/fuel infrastructure specifically, and that the fire is localized.