Here are seven additional key takeaways from tonight's Russian campaign assessment w/ @criticalthreats:
1. #Putin’s use of the term “war” when referring to the invasion of #Ukraine has prompted some confusion within the Russian information space. isw.pub/UkrWar122222
2. The Russian Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery #Gerasimov, attempted to revive a debunked Russian narrative that the #Kremlin did not plan to invade #Ukraine in an effort to justify #Russia’s war in Ukraine.
3. The Kremlin found it necessary to claim that Russian Defense Minister Sergey #Shoigu visited the frontlines in #Ukraine for the second time in a week, likely to deflect criticism that Shoigu is not an involved wartime leader.
4. #Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy #Prigozhin continues to seek to elevate the importance of the Wagner Group in Russian military operations in Ukraine in order to establish himself as the central figure of Russia’s ultra-nationalist pro-war community.
5. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general Rafael Grossi held talks with Russian officials on the creation of a security zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
6. A senior Russian official denied claims of a second wave of mobilization amidst ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
7. Ukrainian partisans continued to target Russian occupation authorities. isw.pub/UkrWar122222
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
NEW: Russian forces’ rate of advance in the #Bakhmut area has likely slowed in recent days, although it is too early to assess whether the Russian offensive to capture Bakhmut has culminated.
2/ Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces in the #Bakhmut area have managed to slightly slow down the pace of the Russian advance around Bakhmut, with one claiming that Ukrainian forces pushed back elements of the #Wagner Group to positions they held days ago.
3/ Ukrainian social media sources previously claimed that Ukrainian forces completely pushed Russian forces out of the eastern outskirts of #Bakhmut around December 21.
Russian forces conducted at least two reconnaissance-in-force operations in northern and northeastern Ukraine on December 22-23.
Ukrainian forces likely made tactical gains east and south of #Bakhmut City over the past 72 hours. isw.pub/UkrWar12232022
2/ Russian reconnaissance of #Ukraine’s northern border advances both a Russian information operation designed to convince Ukraine and the West that Russian forces will attack northern Ukraine, as well as preparations for an actual operation.
3/ Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian attacks along the #Kreminna-Svatove line and may have captured, Kolomyichykha, another village in the direction of #Svatove.
#Russia continues to trip limited indicators for the MCDOA, reinforcing an information operation designed to establish its plausibility or actual preparations for executing it. Russia has been much more clearly setting conditions for an offensive in northwest #Luhansk, however.🧵
2/ The Russian Ministry of Defense ostentatiously announced on November 24 that it has a field hospital in Belarus. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 23 that Russian forces are planning to deploy at least one more field hospital in Belarus.
3/ Field hospitals are not necessary for training exercises and could indicate preparation for combat operations. The appearance of field hospitals in Belarus in early 2022 was among the final indicators observed before Russia commenced its full-scale invasion.
#Moscow has been setting conditions for a new most dangerous course of action (MDCOA), a renewed invasion of northern #Ukraine possibly aimed at #Kyiv, since at least October. This MDCOA could be a Russian info op or could reflect Putin’s real intentions.
2/ Current available indicators for this MDCOA are ambivalent.
3/ Some verified evidence of a Russian buildup in #Belarus makes more sense as part of preparations for a renewed offensive than as part of ongoing exercises and training practices, but there remains no evidence that Moscow is actively preparing a strike force in Belarus.
2/ Putin made several statements that Russia seeks to end the war as soon as possible while simultaneously noting that Russia will not increase the pace of the "special military operation” because that would lead to "unjustified losses."
3/ Both statements are a part of the Kremlin’s consolidated effort to justify Putin’s costly war effort to Russian domestic audiences who are increasingly making greater sacrifices to fulfill the Kremlin’s unrealistic goals.