The NPCSC interpretation goes well beyond just the relatively narrow (but already worrying) issue of whether foreign lawyers can represent parties in #HongKong NatSec cases. A THREAD. (1/8)
A1. In any #HongKong NatSec litigation, the court must now get a certificate from the Chief Executive on whether any act or piece of evidence involves NatSec and what to do in relation to the same. And if the court does not ask CE, then NatSec Commission can intervene. (2/8)
A2. What this means is that both the #HongKong CE and the NatSec Commission can now intervene and override the HK court at any time, and their decisions and acts would not be subject to any judicial review or any other form of legal challenge or oversight. (3/8)
B1. But it gets worse. Given that #HongKong NatSec Commission has plenary, unchecked powers to decide what is or isn’t NatSec, and make decisions in relation to the same, such powers can go beyond NatSec litigation or any litigation. It can touch on any policy area. (4/8)
B2. If #HongKong NatSec Commission decides that any policy or laws involving regulation of lawyers, pandemic prevention, education, financial regulation, or anything else involves NatSec, it can take action as it pleases with no judicial, legislative or executive oversight. (5/8)
C. As such, this NPCSC interpretation does not merely destroy the authority of #HongKong courts, but it destroys the entire integrity of the HK legal system, effectively allowing the Chief Executive (in litigation) and NatSec Commission (generally) to rule by decree. (6/8)
D. I already harboured doubts about whether #HongKong could achieve the #Singapore bifurcation of weak rule of law on political cases but strong rule of law on commercial cases even before this NPCSC interpretation. Now I can’t see how HK could ever get to such a point. (7/8)
E. Now I await the gutless responses from the #HongKong Law Society and the HK Bar Association. (8/8)
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Many thanks to @GregTorode of @Reuters for interviewing me on this. Leaving #HongKong was a difficult decision. I was making good money as an international law firm partner, and I wasn’t yet in any immediate danger. However,… (1/10) reuters.com/investigates/s…
… as more and more #HongKong friends were locked up, going into exile, or otherwise migrating, plus the knowledge that overseas experience suggest that authoritarians will eventually go after even minor, inactive dissidents like me, meant that … (2/10) reuters.com/investigates/s…
… I had to consider my options. More and more #HongKong friends urged me to leave. And being separated from my Australia-based family thanks to COVID restrictions didn’t help. But I was careful to tell most friends and colleagues that … (3/10) reuters.com/investigates/s…
Thanks @MikeSmithAFR for interviewing me. I often get asked about rule of law/judicial independence in #HongKong nowadays when it comes to commercial disputes. The point I made in this article is one of the facets - more context on just this one point in this thread: (1/12)
To start with, of course we are not yet in the territory of #HongKong judges being told how to rule in commercial cases. And we probably won’t yet see Mainland Chinese businesses being given undue favour in commercial disputes. All good right? NO. The battering that… (2/12)
… #HongKong legal system’s international reputation is taking due to human rights/political cases is having a real impact on the recruitment of judges, including judges suitable for commercial cases. High-earning HK commercial silks are now even less willing… (3/12)
Personally I’m not sure about “capitulation” language either, but specifically addressing Adam’s question about what it should take from China for anyone (not just so-called “hawks”) living in the free world to stop seeing China as an adversary, I have a 14-point list: (1/8)
The answer to this “crucial question” is obviously not “wrong”, but query whether it really is a “crucial question” or even a right question. A thread by reference to #HongKong experience: (1/12)
It may be a asked, is #HongKong’s freedoms eroded even more quickly after the unyielding protests of 2019 which prompted Beijing to act (just as Pelosi’s visit prompted Beijing to act in relation to #Taiwan)? That answer is almost certainly yes. (2/12)
Every #HongKong person who supported the 2019 protests that I spoke with in recent years knew full well that by protesting as they did, Beijing’s full crackdown on HK was imposed sooner than otherwise. (3/12)
THREAD: Not a commentary on @mhar4’s piece but on the reactions to Keating’s speech within #auspol and one specific phenomenon that it reflects which I haven’t seen being discussed to date in relation to the Keating speech: (1/8)
A. Let’s start with “progressives”. Out of idolatry towards their (and, for a long time, my) erstwhile hero and “owning the right”, they backed Keating despite a lot of what he espoused running counter to progressive universal values and being straight out misinformation. (2/8)
B. Then there are the conservatives who, out of Keating hatred and “owning the left”, make reflexive militaristic noises about Taiwan just to appear macho, without any regard or reflection upon what primary stakeholders in the Taiwan situation actually want. (3/8)
I agree completely that the organiser of the aborted #BlackLivesMatter protest in #HongKong does not deserve the degree of vitriol that she received. That said, this response does demonstrate a lack of local awareness and sensitivity. (1/6)
To begin with, did it occur to the organiser that by being granted the sorts of right to protest that are now denied to local democracy protesters, they are being given precisely the sort of privilege that #BlackLivesMatter is rightly seeking to fight against? (2/6)
Second, did it occur to the organiser that by cops giving preferential treatment to this protest, cops are perpetuating the stereotype that expats are “better” and “less trouble”, as reflected by non-enforcement of #covid19 laws against drinking crowds in expat precincts? (3/6)