#Russia_Energy: Most of Russia's seaborne crude goes to India, with China buying the largest volumes of Russian oil through pipelines. The redirection of oil supply to India does not mean that it will not reach the West in one way/form or another. India has increased imports⤵️
of Russian crude to 1.7 million barrels per day in Jan 2023 from 1.2 million in Dec 2022. This is possible in part because the US is buying 200,000 barrels of Russian oil refined in India. Apparently, Russia is offering India a $10 discount which would be⤵️
€10 million per tanker. Since the West is interested in buying Russian oil if it has been sufficiently processed to lose its Russian origin, India & China will keep buying the Russian oil to later sell its derivatives. Today, India is importing 30% of its oil needs from Russia.
#CentralAsia: Kyrgyzstan is about to introduce stricter rules on the use of the Kyrgyz language in parliamentary activity (switch to Kyrgyz). The new legislation was adopted in the first reading. Although the constitution stipulates that Kyrgyz is the state language and ⤵️
Russia is official, the dominant language in parliament appears to be Russian. The de-Russification of the activity of the Kyrgyz legislator is not only a linguistic measure but a shift of the political elites towards linguistic sovereignty.⤵️
Some could see in it the echo of decolonization, triggered by the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which was motivated, and others by the protection of Russian-speakers.
#Russia_Sanctions: There are two fundamental truths about the effectiveness of Western sanctions against Russia: 1) From the very beginning, the sanctions were aimed at changing Russia's behavior by raising the costs so that Russia could no longer continue the war. In this⤵️
sense, sanctions did not hit the the goal. The reasons are many, but the main ones are the interdependence of the global market in the supply of Russian energy and other basic products. Both Russia and the old world market order are in the process of restructuring;⤵️
2) Sanctions are no longer seen as something that can stop war due to the inherent limitations (mentioned in point 1). The role of sanctions from now on is to reduce Russia's ability to conduct war and give Ukraine more leverage to counter Russian aggression. In other words,⤵️
#Armenia_EU: The new 2-year EU observation mission will have around 200 specialists. It will be operational in the first quarter of 2023. Right now, the EU is assembling the staff. Armenia will have to guarantee immunity to European officials and facilitate contacts with Russia⤵️
in Armenia. It is the first time in the common neighborhood that the EU and Russia will operate in parallel in one country with the approval of the host nation.
#Russia: A new divestment episode involving a German company. Wintershall Dea, which has worked in Russia since 2008, has announced the decision to leave, accusing Russia of “economic expropriation”. The reason is not reputational costs, but Putin's decision to regulate the⤵️
price of goods produced by companies with foreign capital, namely Wintershall Dea and OMV. These two companies are working with Gazprom on gas production at the Yuzhni-Russia site. Russian authorities seek to control and reduce the revenues collected by companies⤵️
from “unfriendly countries”. The Russian authorities wants to regulate the price retroactively at least until Oct 2023. Let's also recall that hundreds of Western companies continue to operate in Russia, despite almost a year of Russian aggression against Ukraine.👇
#CentralAsia: Kazakhstan is limiting the 90-day visa-free regime for foreigners to 180 days. It excludes the possibility of renewing the stay simply by leaving and returning to Kazakhstan after the expiration of 90 days. This measure will affect the Russians the most.⤵️
More than 100,000 have flocked to Kazakhstan, especially after the partial mobilization in the fall of 2022. This revision of the visa-free regime will make it possible to prevent the prolonged stay of Russians without a residence permit in Kazakhstan. Although with the⤵️
arrival of the Russians, remittances grew up to 13 times (~70 million euros), if they are not integrated into the legal and labor sphere, they could become a future social problem. Kazakhstan is further calibrating its domestic policies to prevent⤵️
#Ukraine: Both France and Germany think about the costs of Russian aggression, but in different ways. However, France understands that the longer the war lasts, the higher the costs will be for the West and implicitly for the EU. This thinking is guiding Macron's decision⤵️
to send military vehicles to Ukraine, following the US commitment to spend ~$45 billions on support to Ukraine in 2023. France is betting on the military capacity and high morale of Ukraine to relaunch the counteroffensive this spring. Germany also thinks about costs.⤵️
But Berlin’s calculation is based on vacillations about Ukraine's ability to defeat the Russians by the end of 2023. The bias of Germany's political leadership (except the Greens) is that they are unwilling to increase the costs of war until 2024. ⤵️