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Janis Kluge

@jakluge

Jan 13

In the first half of 2022, more people were leaving Russia than arriving, which is very unusual and clearly related to the war. Since July, Russia is registering net migration inflow again. 1/3

In total, Russia registered a net migration outflow for 1-10/2022. Russia's population was shrinking, but mostly due to a massive increase of deaths from Covid-19 and a negative impact of demography. Fallen soldiers would be a visible, but minor component in the deaths bar.2/3

Immigration to Russia was relatively normal in January-October 2022 (around 550,000). But emigration from Russia increased by 350,000 compared to the same period in 2021. This is probably not guest workers, but Russians leaving because of the war.
3/3

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Janis Kluge

@jakluge

Jan 12

How are Russians transferring payments and goods to and from #Russia under #sanctions? Countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia & Georgia play a key role, but also remaining Western banks, especially (most likely) Raiffeisen Bank. A few examples from a recent BFM article. 1/

Russians can get Armenian Visa and Mastercards to e.g. pay for Western internet services. They transfer rubles from Russian MIR cards to an Armenian MIR-connected card, and from there send it to their Armenian Visa/Mastercard (converted to dollars) and use it from Russia. 2/

One businessman reports: "There is one European bank that still does all transfers normally. Our European business partners told us to use it." (this is most likely Raiffeisen). 3/

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Janis Kluge

@jakluge

Dec 16, 2022

The big #sanctions strategy shift: In the first months of the Russian invasion, sanctions were mainly targeted at making it hard for Russia to import. This was achieved by
- Western export controls
- side-effects of financial sanctions
- international companies leaving Russia. 1/

In early 2022, it was very difficult to cut off Russian export revenues immediately due to Western dependency on oil and global post-covid energy scarcity. Russia received obscene amounts of dollars and euros. It could afford anything that was available for importing. 2/

So the strategy was to make fewer things available, banning technology goods, machinery etc. This worked and continues to work, but it was clear from the start that the initial blow would not last. Russian imports recovered and are at pre-sanctions levels. 3/

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Janis Kluge

@jakluge

Dec 13, 2022

#Russia's budget in November 2022: Revenues rose, largely thanks to #Gazprom, which contributed ~1 trillion rubles in dividends and one-time tax on excess earnings in November. This led to a surplus, meaning that the budget is still not officially in a deficit. 1/7

#Gazprom "earned" the windfall revenue by exploiting its market power in the EU, a massive abuse that should lead to dozens of billions of euros in fines (prohibiting any market return). Without Gazprom's contribution, the negative trend in the budget becomes clear. 2/7

Russia's Finance Ministry doesn't count dividends from oil&gas companies as oil&gas revenue (one reason the actual reliance of the budget on oil&gas is greater than the offical numbers suggest). Gazprom dividends led to an increase in non-oil&gas revenue in November 2022. 3/7

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Janis Kluge

@jakluge

Dec 5, 2022

Russian oil&gas #budget revenues fell to a new 2-year low in November, actually below 450 billion RUB, but the result is obsucred by an one-time tax on Gazprom (paid in three tranches Oct/Nov/Dec). October was already pretty bad, but a quarterly tax payment made it look better.

To clarify - here are the key production tax revenues:

And the source (VPN needed): minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/…

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Janis Kluge

@jakluge

Dec 2, 2022

How much did #sanctions affect #Russia's economy? A lot: By the end of 2022, it will be ~10% smaller than it would have been without sanctions. For this scenario, I used the latest -2.8% #GDP forecast for 2022 & a pre-sanctions +3% forecast (both from 🇷🇺Economy Ministry). 1/3

The GDP index (Jun 21-Dec 22) is normalized to Feb 22 = 100. It is based on the inVEB GDP index (blue). The green line is based on constant mohtly growth that equates to 3% annual growth in 2022. The gray line is Nov/Dec 2022 if the Ministry's -2.8% scenario comes true. 2/3

It is very important to not confuse #Russia's annual GDP growth/decline with the #sanctions' effect. Both are related, but very different figures. 3/3

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