#Putin's speech also followed his February 21 decree revoking his May 2012 edict on Russia's position on #Moldova's territorial integrity. isw.pub/UkrWar022223
2/ #Putin revoked his 2012 orders to the Russian Foreign Ministry to firmly uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter - which require the development of friendly relations between states on the basis of equality, respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity -
3/ ...and also revoked #Russia's commitment to actively seek ways to resolve the #Transnistria issue on the basis of respect for Moldovan territorial integrity.
4/ The revocation of the 2012 decree does not indicate that #Putin intends to attack #Moldova—an undertaking for which he lacks military capability—although it does point toward an escalation in his ongoing efforts to undermine the Moldovan state.
5/ The new decree also canceled #Russia's provision of "consistent implementation" of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) with the United States.
6/ #Putin stated that he signed the decree "in order to ensure the national interest of the Russian Federation in connection with the profound changes taking place in international relations." isw.pub/UkrWar022223
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A prominent Russian milblogger attempted to preempt Western discussions of releasing classified information regarding #China’s considerations to provide lethal aid to #Russia. 🧵 (1/6) isw.pub/UkrWar022323
2/ The milblogger responded to Chinese Foreign Minister Yi Wang’s denial that #China intends to supply weapons to #Russia & stated that China provides Russia the opportunity to purchase various ammo, industrial drones, field medicine, & protective gear on a commercial basis.
3/ The Russian milblogger claimed that Chinese-made equipment is abundantly available in #Russia and is present throughout the front in #Ukraine.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around #Bakhmut and made tactical gains in the area on 23 FEB. Russian forces also continued ground attacks in the #Avdiivka-Donetsk City area in western Donetsk Oblast. 🧵(1/8) isw.pub/UkrWar022323
Geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces have made incremental advances in the eastern, southern, and southwestern sectors of Bakhmut.
3/ Footage posted by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin on February 23 and later geolocated shows him visiting #Wagner troops in eastern #Bakhmut within 500m of the current frontline, although Prigozhin claimed he was within 400m of the frontline.
2/ Geolocated footage published on February 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions north of Novovodiane (15km south of #Svatove), indicating a limited Russian advance along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
3/ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations near #Kreminna itself, #Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and in the Serebrianske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).
#Putin indeed seems more concerned with appealing to ultranationalist pro-war ideologues and tired rhetorical gestures than with presenting any new approach to achieving the #Kremlin’s objectives in #Ukraine. 🧵(1/6) isw.pub/UkrWar022323
2/ #Putin’s only specific remark in his public address concerned the operation of the Borei-A nuclear-powered submarine and how it would allow the Russian Navy’s strategic nuclear forces to operate at 100 percent capacity.
3/ #Putin’s remarks concerning the Russian Navy‘s strategic nuclear forces were likely meant to support ongoing Russian information operations aimed at discouraging Western support to #Ukraine by fueling hyperbolic concerns about nuclear escalation...
#Putin meanwhile continues to deliver boilerplate rhetoric in public addresses that offered him opportunities he did not take to shape the Russian information space ahead of the one-year anniversary of #Russia’s invasion of #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar022323
2/ #Putin’s speech did not offer specific goals or objectives for the war on #Ukraine but instead continued generic rhetorical lines of effort aiming to prepare the Russian public for a protracted war in Ukraine.
3/ Putin’s refusal to use the public address to issue specific goals or policies ahead of the one-year mark suggests that he remains uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space through a dramatic speech that represents a significant inflection in his rhetoric.
2/ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 23 that Ukrainian forces are planning to conduct an armed provocation against #Transnistria in the near future.
3/ The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces would dress as Russian military personnel and stage an alleged Russian offensive from positions in #Transnistria. The Moldovan government denied the Russian MoD’s allegations.