It also seemed that the U.S. credit markets were in the grips of a (fallacious) complacency, shown on the proportionally milder reaction of the "junk" bonds on the current tightening cycle.
But, can the #Fed support the markets in the current situation? We're not so sure. 2/
The good news was that the "zombie-corporation" problem seemed to be less severe than previously thought.
However, we also know that the ultra-easy monetary policies has created weak highly indebted firms. 3/
Retail sales of the U.S. economy have held up, somewhat, albeit they fell heavily after the Russo-Ukrainian war started, showing how international shocks can affect also the U.S. economy.
However, this had been due to excess savings accumulated during the Covid -era. 4/
Excess savings are currently depleting rapidly with all but collapsed personal saving rate. Most importantly, lending standards of banks are tightening rapidly and they now correspond levels seen during H1 2008.
This implies that the U.S. economy can face a 'sudden stop'. 5/
Considering the above, it's no surprise that consumer sentiment is in deeply recessionary levels. 6/
And, while the QT of the #FederalReserve keeps manipulating the yield curves, it should be noted that both 10y/3mo and 10y/2y spreads are currently heavily inverted.
The #recession signal of the yield curve is thus strong. 7/
Alas, we conclude in our recent Special Issue that, while the U.S. #recession has been postponed, it's still very much on the cards.
The global business cycle is forecastable around 4-5mo ahead and the provision of liquidity into the financial markets is forecastable around 2-3mo ahead, currently.
The onset of economic crises is much more cumbersome and uncertain to forecasts.
A short 🧵on what's coming. 1/6
The flow of aggregate financing in China sputtered in October and fell of a 'cliff' in Nov/Dec. This implied that
1) This month will see first signs of a renewed decline in econ. indicators. 2) Decline will deepen in March and April.
Past week I promised a (long) thread on global #liquidity and so, here goes!
I have been analyzing the current state global liquidity since early November. Then I warned on possibility of an outright collapse of market liquidity.
🧵1/25 mtmalinen.substack.com/p/global-liqui…
Basically, I re-iterated our original warning from October 2018, when we had discovered that:
1. Global outside-US dollar denominated debt has risen to a record. 2. The role of non-bank institutions on providing funding has increased.
2/
3. The composition of international credit has shifted from bank loans to debt securities.
These straight-forwardly implied that:
"The increased role of non-bank institutions in providing credit means that an increasing proportion of international finance comes..."
3/
Everything you need to know is summarized in this graph. It shows that Chinese business (debt) cycle leads European cycle by around 3-4mo and the global business cycle by around 4-5mo.
In tight turning points (crises), with synchronous response, the lag is shorter. 2/
This relationship was revealed in 2015/2016.
In 2015 Chinese leaders tried to stabilize the economy by tightening the availability of credit especially to the manufacturing sector, which led to a slump in the Chinese housing market, which had already weakened in 2014. 3/
Seven charts to explain, why the U.S. is heading into a #recession (which is unlikely to be "mild"). 🧵
Let's start with the most problematic one: the yield curves. Many read these like the Bible, and they rarely have gotten it wrong. However, this time there's a problem.
1/14
Our first-ever U.S. #recession call, in March 2019, predicting the beginning of an U.S. recession in early 2020, was based on the inversion of the yields of the Treasuries with 10-year and 3-month maturities.
This is depicted in the strange divergence of the 10y/3mo and 10y/2y spreads in early 2022 shown in the figure above. I explained this in detail in my @EpochOpinion piece in May.