--he might be missing the Pentagon's perspective. So, let me fill y'all in.
Tanks, missiles, etc. are #classic: they deploy everywhere to strike anything. Need to put a hole in something? Tank. Obliterate? Missile. Crater? Bomb…
Worse, our own global community has never proved it -- and we've got every good reason to prove it if true.
But hey, our industry turned the tables on Kaspersky the day his dictator launched a genocide campaign.
Because we're just like that. We've always been like that.
That's why our industry's #ThoughtLeaders can dance on a pinhead: because IT'S EASY!
The logic in the back of their minds is simple: "Kaspersky is a Russian billionaire who craves genocide in Ukraine and does anything Putin asks. I must destroy Kaspersky with all my willpower."
Steve Morgan's guesstimates stretch from 2015 to the end of 2025. This chart shows how, in less than two years, everyone on Earth will be on the hook for $8,441 of his "global cost of cybercrime."
And that's just by 2025! It gets WAY worse as you project a few years forward...
"$10.5 trillion" exceeds $1,000 annually for only 8+ billion people on Earth. It's simple math.
When we project the 20th year of Steve Morgan's absurd guesstimates, we see the "global cost of cybercrime" per capita in 2034 will reach $19,507 for every man, woman, and child:
There was an immediate feeling that everyone must cancel all Kaspersky subscriptions, as if customers -- especially corporate clients -- had a competitor's product waiting in the wings to replace it in some trivial fashion:
Likewise, there was an immediate plea to [translated] "remove Kaspersky from your PC. Now. Immediately." Again, as if customers -- especially corporate clients -- could do it trivially and without serious consequences:
…legitimate criticism led many (perhaps most) victims in #cybersecurity to cry out that humor negates legitimacy: "the stakes are too high for <THIS|ME>to be taken so lightly!"
Yet these same victims adore e.g. Jon Oliver for his brutal use of #comedy in legitimate criticism.
And here we arrive at the crux of the matter:
The victims, not the #elements of legitimate #criticism, decide what is "fair" in cybersecurity.
This way, anything that is not ✌️criticism✌️ may be labeled as such so victims can associate legit critics to their SCUM counterparts.
2/🧵
This chart plots Steve Morgan's asinine #guesstimates against WorldBank.org's figures for the 2015-2021 Global Gross Domestic Product with projections up to 2024. For 2025 onward, these charts show a 2.5% increase from an acceptable 2-3% for a healthy global GDP.
What we call "the cybersecurity industry" [d]evolved from the #antivirus industry that formed in 1988 when John proposed "NCSA" as a media con game. It later split in two (think "Good/Evil Kirk"), and the good stuff became what we know today as ICSA Labs.
John's antics appealed to reporters infatuated with the newfangled idea of a computer virus. Some vendors (e.g. Solomon's) shunned it but others (e.g. Panda) couldn't help but play along.
Still, the allure of media exposure tainted nearly everything it touched. There was no…
…ethical foundation in these early days. SANS formed to fill this hole but it struggled at first to make inroads. The late @howardas formed an ethics team inside the White House that ultimately vetted SANS, and he pushed it with every fiber of his being.