#Ukrainian forces may be withdrawing from their positions on the eastern bank of the #Bakhmutka River given recent geolocated footage of the destruction of the railway bridge over the river in northeastern #Bakhmut. isw.pub/UkrWar03052023
2/ #Russian war correspondents and milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured eastern, northern, and southern parts of #Bakhmut on March 5 and claimed to be reporting from positions in eastern Bakhmut, but @TheStudyofWar cannot independently verify these claims at this time
3/ Geolocated footage showed that #WagnerGroup forces continued to make advances in northeastern #Bakhmut and advanced near the Stupky railway station on March 5.
4/ A #Ukrainian serviceman told a Ukrainian outlet that #Russian forces have yet to cross the Bakhmutka River into central #Bakhmut as of March 4, and Russian milbloggers claimed that the #Wagner Group pushed Ukrainian positions back to central Bakhmut.
5/ It is unclear if #Ukrainian forces are planning to hold positions on the western bank of the Bakhmutka.
6/ Ukrainian forces are unlikely to withdraw from #Bakhmut all at once and may pursue a gradual fighting withdrawal to exhaust #Russian forces through continued urban warfare. isw.pub/UkrWar03052023
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#Russian forces additionally likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to advance beyond #Bakhmut, and the tactical “assault detachments” used in assaults against Bakhmut are likely unable to conduct maneuver warfare. (1/7) isw.pub/UkrWar030723
2/ Recent #Russian advances within urban areas of #Bakhmut demonstrate that Russian forces can secure limited tactical gains with infantry-led frontal assaults. They likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to exploit roads (which are likely highly fortified) west of Bakhmut.
3/ As @TheStudyofWar has recently reported, Russian forces are increasingly relying on “assault detachments,” a battalion-size element optimized for frontal assaults on fortified areas, rather than for maneuver warfare.
#Russian forces would have to choose between two diverging lines of advance after capturing #Bakhmut that are not mutually supporting, and degraded Russian forces would likely have to prioritize the pursuit of just one to have any chance of success. (1/4) isw.pub/UkrWar030723
2/ #Russian forces could attempt to push west along the T0504 highway towards Kostiatynivka (about 20km from #Bakhmut) or northwest along the E40 highway towards the #Slovyansk-#Kramatorsk area in NW #Donetsk Oblast (about 40km northwest of Bakhmut. isw.pub/UkrWar030723
3/ Degraded #Russian forces would likely have to prioritize the pursuit of just one to have any chance of success - though Russian commanders have repeatedly stretched their forces too thin across multiple axes of advance throughout the invasion of #Ukraine.
#Prigozhin has ramped up efforts to disseminate #Wagner’s militarism and ideology in #Russia via its role in Bakhmut. He is among the most extreme of the pro-war nationalists & the severe degradation of elite Wagner forces would have positive ramifications beyond the battlefield.
2/ The #WagnerGroup has recently opened several recruitment centers at sports clubs throughout #Russia, opened a youth branch, and is visiting schoolchildren to lecture them about #Wagner’s structure and show them unfiltered combat footage from Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar030623
3/ #Wagner’s success in #Bakhmut thus far has given #Prigozhin a major advantage in the information space, bolstering his reputation and increasing his popularity in a way that will likely have long-term impacts in the #Russian domestic sphere.
Some Western reports have recently suggested that Ukraine is expending its own elite manpower & scarce equipment in #Bakhmut on mainly Wagner prison recruits who are mere cannon fodder, noting that such an exchange is to Ukr's disadvantage even at high ratios of Ru to Ukr losses.
2/ That observation is valid in general, although the pool of #Russian convict recruits suitable for combat is not limitless and the permanent elimination of tens of thousands of them in #Bakhmut means that they will not be available for more important fights.
3/ #Ukrainian intelligence has supported @TheStudyofWar's assessment that #Russian forces near #Bakhmut have recently changed tactics and committed higher-quality special forces operators and elements of conventional forces to the fight. isw.pub/UkrWar030623
Russian forces continued ground attacks in & around Bakhmut on March 6 and secured gains but still have not succeeded in encircling the city. 🧵(1/7) isw.pub/UkrWar030623
2/ Geolocated footage posted on March 6 shows #WagnerGroup infantry hanging a #Wagner flag and posing in front of the T-34 tank monument in eastern #Bakhmut, confirming the Wagner has advanced westward along Maksyma Horkoho street towards Bakhmut’s city center.
3/ Ukraine reported on March 6 that Russian forces are storming Bakhmut despite continued losses and that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; near Zalizianske (7km NW), Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km NW), and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km NW); and Ivanivske (5km west).
NEW: #Ukraine will continue to defend #Bakhmut for now. While Bakhmut itself isn't intrinsically important operationally or strategically, Ukraine’s fight for it has become strategically significant due to the current composition of Russian forces there.🧵 isw.pub/UkrWar030623
2/ Taking #Bakhmut is necessary but not sufficient for further Russian advances in #Donetsk Oblast, and #Russian forces have already taken such heavy losses fighting for the city that their attack will very likely culminate after they have secured it—if not before.
3/ The loss of #Bakhmut is not, therefore, of major operational or strategic concern to #Ukraine, as US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and others have observed.