🚨 IMPORTANT: The #Manipur gov has withdrawn its Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Kuki National Army (KNA) & Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) following violent clashes between some Kuki groups & police over encroachment of tribal land. (1/8) nenow.in/north-east-new…
Protests have taken place in mostly Kangpokpi district, but also in Churachandpur & Tengnoupal districts. Demonstrators allege that the #BirenSingh gov has been taking over tribal land in the name of expanding reserve forests & wildlife sanctuaries. (2/8) thehindu.com/news/national/…
#Manipur CM, Biren Singh, told @NELiveTV's Wasbir Hussain that protests are happening in only 2 districts inhabited by "Chin-Kuki brothers". He said "illegal immigrants from #Myanmar" are creating chaos cuz they want to expand poppy cultivation. (3/8)
Singh identified the #ZRA as a Myanmar-based group led by a "Myanmarese ex-MP."
Last month, I wrote about how the ZRA's "Eastern Command" is operating as proxy of the Burmese junta & facilitating poppy cultivation in areas bordering #Manipur. (4/8) barbedwires.substack.com/p/is-the-myanm…
What is worrying, however, is the #Manipur government's framing of the issue as an "indigenous vs illegal immigrants" rift.
There is no doubt that #Myanmar-based groups like #ZRA are using the instability next door to fill their coffers. But, that shouldn't be conflated with these protests, some of which are driven by genuine tribal concerns over land alienation. (6/8) eastmojo.com/manipur/2023/0…
It is possible to act against armed groups trying to create instability in #Manipur to protect their own illicit interests without going after all Chin-Kuki asylum seekers from #Myanmar. Security policies shouldn't be mutually exclusive from humanitarianism. (7/8)
If anything, New Delhi should pull up the #Myanmar junta, which has hired groups like the #ZRA to fight its own dirty wars next to #India's borders in exchange for shelter, arms, drug money. 🇮🇳 should ask junta thugs to stop backing elements that create chaos in Manipur. (8/8)
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Today, #India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) released its Annual Report of 2022.
What does it say about #Myanmar? Any change in tone and content from last year's report?
A thread 🧵 (1/n)
Introductory section:
2022 report projects the usual Indian diplomatic, "neutral" narrative on post-coup #Myanmar – except the following sentence that appeared in the 2021 report:
"Restoration of democracy in Myanmar remains a priority."
L: 2022 report; R: 2021 report (2/n)
Later, however, in the "India's Neighbours" section, it notes how #India has, among other things, called for "#Myanmar's return to democracy at the earliest." (3/n)
🧵"China wants peace" is too simplistic a narrative.
Weeks before the #China-brokered deal b/w #Iran & #SaudiArabia was announced, Beijing sent its top envoy, Deng Xijun, to northern #Myanmar to meet top ethnic rebel groups & convince them to sign ceasefire deals with the junta.
And last week, Xijun travelled to Nay Pyi Taw to meet the coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing. Beijing wants to tell the US (which has sanctioned "non-lethal" aid to the democratic resistance) that it has more access in Burmese power corridors. irrawaddy.com/opinion/analys…
For Xi's China, "peace" in #Myanmar only means ceasefire between a rogue junta & powerful ethnic rebel groups that have sway over the Myanmar-China border regions. Beijing wants them to stop fighting so that it can resume work on its own projects.
- New Delhi continues to wager on the junta to keep its Northeastern borders secure & stable;
- India wants to resume its development projects, including the Border Area Development Projects (BADP), in #Myanmar at the earliest. Most of these are funded by grants; (2/n)
Emphasis on "early restoration of peace & security" as opposed to "democracy" (as was the case before). In fact, New Delhi has quietly dropped all references to "restoration of democracy" in its statements on post-coup #Myanmar since last year. (3/n)
👋🏾 all, I’ve been running @eleventhcolumn since 2017 along with my talented friend @ahmausaf. We’ve managed to create a rich repository of 600+ pieces (both fiction & non-fiction) on politics, geopolitics, environment, society, worker rights & other themes. (1/n)
We don’t have any budget beyond basic server & domain upkeep costs. We stopped publishing in late 2021 due to technical challenges. But we’re slowly beginning to publish again.
🧵 Quick glance at the #India sections of this detailed & timely report by @SpecialCouncil on the global supply network of the #Myanmar junta's defence production industry. (1/n)
The @SpecialCouncil found that the #Myanmar junta was relying on defence production supplies from #India (among other countries) because of deteriorating quality of Chinese products. This new dynamic creates a major incentive for the supply side. (2/n)
#India-domiciled companies are supplying two types of defence production materials to the #Myanmar military:
1) Spare parts & components for weapons/platforms (fuses, optical accessories, detonators, etc.) 2) Raw materials (iron, copper, high-grade steel, etc.). (3/n)
For #India, #Myanmar has been a key development partner in the neighbourhood. Since the last 1 decade & half, Delhi has spent more than $2 billion in various development projects in Myanmar (connectivity, border area dev, training, etc.).
How did the Feb 21 coup affect this? 1/n
One would think the coup choked #India's development aid programme in #Myanmar. But that's not true.
MEA dashboard shows high budgetary allocations & spendings after the coup. In fact, the amount 🇮🇳 disbursed in 2021-22 (Rs 598.25 cr/$72.5 mil) is the highest ever recorded. 2/n
The budgetary aid allocation for 2022-23 (1 yr after the coup) i.e. Rs 600 crore/$73 mil is also the highest ever for #Myanmar since MEA started publishing data.
Here's a snapshot of the same from the 2022-23 budget profile (4th column shows allocated amount for current FY). 3/n