Russia likely staged this attack in an attempt to bring the war home to a Russian domestic audience & set conditions for a wider societal mobilization.🧵1/7
3/ RU authorities have recently taken steps to increase RU domestic air defense capabilities, including within #Moscow itself. Geolocated imagery from Jan. shows that RU authorities have been placing air defense systems near Moscow to create air defense circles around the city.
4/ It is therefore extremely unlikely that two drones could have penetrated multiple layers of air defense and detonated or been shot down just over the heart of the #Kremlin in a way that provided spectacular imagery caught nicely on camera.
5/ The #Kremlin’s immediate, coherent, and coordinated response to the incident further suggests that the attack was internally prepared in such a way that its intended political effects outweigh its embarrassment.
6/ The rapid and coherent presentation of an official Russian narrative around the strike suggests that Russia staged this incident in close proximity to the May 9th Victory Day holiday in order to frame the war as existential to its domestic audience.
7/ Some Russian nationalist milbloggers seized on the #Kremlin drone strike to call for Russian escalation in the war despite the fact that Russia currently lacks the military capability to do so. isw.pub/UkrWar050323
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Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks in the #Avdiivka area on May 2. ISW has not observed recent visual evidence of successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Avdiivka area, however. isw.pub/UkrWar050223
2/ A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in #Marinka (27km SW of #Avdiivka) and conducted a partially successful counterattack towards #Vodayne (8km SW of Avdiivka).
3/ Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Troitske (17km northeast of #Avdiivka) and advanced 1.5km in the area.
Russian forces made marginal gains near #Bakhmut but didn't advance within the city itself on May 2.
Geolocated footage posted on May 1 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains NE of the O0506 highway near #Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut). isw.pub/UkrWar050223
2/ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Ivanivske and Predtechyne.
Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were 17 combat clashes in the #Bakhmut area.
3/ Cherevaty also reported that Ukrainian forces periodically attack Russian positions in #Bakhmut when they see opportunities to conduct assaults that would not endanger their troops and noted that Ukrainian counterattacks are part of the Ukrainian mobile defense in Bakhmut.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 2 with no confirmed changes to control of terrain. isw.pub/UkrWar050223
2/ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (11km south of Kreminna).
3/ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and Torske (16km west of Kreminna).
#Putin’s affinity for rotating personnel and not outright dismissing commanders is emblematic of his style of domestic rule, a style of leadership not well suited for leading a military engaged in a costly war. 1/4
#Putin has long rotated personnel in government positions as a way to ensure that no one figure amasses too much political influence and to maintain support among competing factions. 2/4
#Putin also routinely avoids outright dismissing officials and instead temporarily demotes them in order to encourage them to seek to regain his favor and to retain options for future appointments. 3/4
2/ #Russia’s ability to reconstitute its military capability is constrained. The #Kremlin is trying to replenish its resources but is still pursuing half-measures. Enabling further successful Ukrainian counteroffensives will deny the Kremlin a breather to replenish its resources.
3/ Space and time could enable #Russia to reconstitute its capabilities. Space=Ukrainian territory Russia gets to use as a staging ground. Time=a breather on the battlefield from a premature cessation of hostilities or a slowed counteroffensive due to insufficient Western aid.
2/ NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on April 27 that NATO has trained and equipped more than nine new Ukrainian brigades, emphasizing that Ukrainian forces are in a “strong” position to retake captured territory in their upcoming counteroffensive.
3/ Stoltenberg also stated that NATO and its partners have delivered over 98 percent of promised combat vehicles to Ukraine, totaling over 1,550 armored vehicles, 230 tanks, and other unspecified equipment.