China's President Xi Jinping's alma mater Tsinghua University just released a survey named "China Unfiltered: The Chinese People's View on National Security". (“无滤镜的中国”:中国人的国际安全观调查)
What did the survey find? A thread. /1🧵
Tsinghua University is widely known as one of China's 'Big 2' universities (along with PKU), and is arguably the most politically connected one -- having produced 4 out of the last 6 Presidents and Premiers, including Xi Jinping (pictured in 1975 at his send-off to Tsinghua)./2
This survey is done by Tsinghua's CISS (Center for International Strategy and Security), and has made 8 findings. /2
1. Almost 80% of Chinese people believe they have 'great' (36%) or 'good' (41.3%) understanding of international security. /3
But what's the information diet that cultivated their understanding?
Government sources dominate. 2/3 get their info primarily from govt sources (central govt media; local govt media; govt sites/apps).
2. #Optimism I: Chinese people think the world is largely safe.
49.8% - safe
19.9% - unsafe
Interestingly, Southern China, which is economically prosperous & often farther removed from national politics, tends to be most optimistic (i.e. least worried) about global security. /5
2. #Optimism I: Chinese people think the world is largely safe.
49.8% - safe
19.9% - unsafe
Interestingly, Southern China, which is economically prosperous & often farther removed from national politics, tends to be most optimistic (i.e. least worried) about global security. /5
3. #Optimism II: 71% think the world will become safer for China over the next 5 years.
Note that #age and #education level matter here. The older and more educated the respondent, the more likely they'll think the world is unsafe for China. /6
4. Still #Open door:
68% still think globalization on the whole has been good for China's development, and most respondents (60-94%) across all education levels think international education and scientific exchanges are desirable. /7
5. Chinese people's top 3 security concerns:
a. Global pandemic (72% are concerned)
b. International interference on the Taiwan issue (72%)
c. US-China competition & conflict (74%) /8
Bottom 2 concerns:
a. International econ stagnation.
b. Climate change /8
6. Clear confidence that China is still on the rise (no #PeakChina talk):
Perceived influence ranking: China > US > Russia > UN > EU.
90.4% believe China's global influence has gown over the last 5 years, and 90.8% believe its global influence will grow over the next 10 yrs./9
Australian FM @SenatorWong is not saying PM Albanese's China visit is #preconditioned on China making progress on lifting trade sanctions & detained Australians. Rather, China doing so would be very #conducive to such a visit. /1
@SenatorWong In Penny Wong's own carefully chosen words: "I would say that we would want to see continued progress and the most positive circumstances for any visit by the Prime Minister, and I think #China would understand that." /2
This is Australia learning from China's playbook but doing it with more grace.
China's typical rhetorical playbook: 1. When in a foul mood: Other countries need to repent and address China's grievances (e.g. 14 grievances) before China would restore senior bilateral talks etc./3
My quotes for @CNN, on US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s changing his Taiwan trip into a in-person meeting with #Taiwan’s President @iingwen in California.
@CNN@iingwen Tsai’s potential meeting with Kevin McCarthy in California is not necessarily a “replacement or downgrade, but an add-on”, or a bonus.
McCarthy could always visit Taiwan at a later date. 2/
Taiwan is balancing multiple needs here.
1. A visit by yet another US House Speaker (after Nancy Pelosi) could #normalize high-level visits by American officials, and consolidate earlier gains. /3
China's cabinet & CCP party issue a new directive that calls for "resolute opposition and boycott of erroneous Western concepts such as 'constitutional rule' and 'separation of powers'".
2/ This likely forebodes more constitutional reform to come at next week's annual two sessions (China's parliament session).
Specifically it hints at further enshrining of Xi and Xi Jinping thought into the constitution.
3/ Namely either 'two establishes' and/or 'two safeguards' (兩個確立 and 兩個維護) may make their way into China's constitution. The latter had already being incorporated into the party charter at 20th PC last October.
#China releases its comprehensive official position paper on #Ukraine today.
It seems like: 1) a very thinly veiled attempt to help Russia achieve an upper hand over Ukraine, though 2) superficially disguised as a call for peace to deflect Western criticism. A short🧵
2/ Paper's Point 2 calls for 'prevent #bloc confrontation"' (防止形成陣營對抗).
What does that mean? It means nobody should help Ukraine. Russia is on its own and has essentially no 'bloc' or other countries overtly helping it. But Ukraine does...
3/ Ukraine gets significant ongoing assistance from Western countries.
So when China says the Ukraine-Russia war should not be a contest between 'blocs', China is effectively saying Ukraine shouldn't get support from other countries in the Western camp.
As US alleges China is providing 'non-lethal support' for Russia, China's MFA fires back and blames US for giving weapons to Ukraine.
This is in line with longstanding Chinese view. PSA: Back in Sept 2022, China effectively said that Russia's war against Ukraine is a #JustWar./1
2/ The closest thing to a direct official Chinese judgment of the nature of that war so far (AFAIK) comes from China's #3 leader, National People's Congress Speaker Li Zhanshu.
3/ When Li Zhanshu visited Russia in Sept 2022, he told Russian Duma's speaker that "China understands and supports matters concerning Russia's core interests."
("在涉及俄罗斯核心利益和一些重大关键问题上,中方对俄罗斯表示充分的理解和支持。")