Thread by @alxgraef

A ceasefire in #Ukraine is not a good option, if it freezes the status quo. It would also create a list of new problems that in the long-run could come back to bite. The post-Soviet space is rich of examples. And yet, soon enough, it might become the best among bad options. 1/10

2/10 The main strategic concern of Ukraine and its partners is that Russia would use any ceasefire to replenish its forces, entrench itself and attack again later with greater means and resolve. This concern is not only reasonable but the most likely scenario under Vladimir Putin

3/10 As a result, any ceasefire would require ironclad Western security commitments and long-term, permanent support on a scale similar or even larger than today. Only then, deterrence has a chance to work, while a political process would allow using diplomatic instruments.

4/10 It is obvious that for Ukraine, the territorial question is the most difficult and dangerous. It is also clear that no ceasefire agreement could ever settle this issue. Legal recognition is out of the question. Any possible border zone would always be viewed as temporal.

5/10 Under these conditions, the strategy of Ukraine and partners would be to change the status quo with time, working to create future options. This is a risky strategy, because it requires constant political capital to prevent a frozen conflict or defeat if escalation happens.

6/10 The historical evidence is mixed. Korea comes to mind, but also the GDR, and recently, Nagorno-Karabakh. In any case, unlike Minsk, this would be a process for another generation with highly uncertain outcomes, which is why it is so unattractive as a policy option today.

7/10 In comparison, however, the overall conditions are perhaps better than in most other post-Soviet conflicts: Western interests are much higher, Russian relative power is lower, political experience with these processes and its perils is greater. But it could still fail.

8/10 The real question then is about existing alternatives. Ukraine could only push back decisively on the battlefield, if Western partners were ready to significantly ramp up their current support and take much more risks themselves. Despite all rhetoric, however, they are not.

9/10 The ugly truth is that this war, except by Ukraine obviously, is not viewed as existential. If this does not change soon, time will increasingly become the enemy of Ukraine. This moment has not arrived yet, but sooner or later military and political exhaustion is possible.

10/10 Western states will need to make sure that this does not happen but if decisive territorial gains are impossible, they still need to make Russia to accept that it cannot reasonably hope to gain more than what it controls now. This is the real challenge.