#China Quietly Rebuilds Secretive Base for Nuclear Tests - New York Times
In the remote desert where China detonated its first atom bomb nearly 60 years ago, a drilling rig recently bored a deep vertical shaft that is estimated to plunge down at least a third of a mile.
It is the strongest evidence yet that Beijing is weighing whether to test a new generation of nuclear arms that could increase the lethality of its rapidly expanding missile force.
For years, U.S. government reports and independent experts have expressed vague concerns about the old base, Lop Nur. The reports point to possible preparations for year-round operations and a “lack of transparency.”
Now, however, waves of satellite images reveal that the military base has newly drilled boreholes — ideal for bottling up firestorms of deadly radiation from large nuclear blasts — as well as hundreds of other upgrades and expansions.
“All the evidence points to China making preparations that would let it resume nuclear tests,” said Tong Zhao, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Siegfried S. Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico, described Lop Nur’s rebuilding as unusual. “The Russians and Americans have continued activity at their test sites,” he said, “but nothing like this.”
Analysts say the activity at Lop Nur signals a wide modernization of China’s nuclear establishment, warning that it could speed arms buildups and spark a new age of atomic rivalry.
They add that China’s moves, along with those of other nuclear powers, could undermine the global test ban that began in 1996. The world’s atomic powers signed it after the Cold War as a way to curb a costly nuclear arms race that was spinning out of control.
The new evidence at Lop Nur was uncovered by Renny Babiarz, a former analyst at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, an arm of the Pentagon.
An expert on satellite reconnaissance as well as Beijing’s nuclear program, Dr. Babiarz says that detonations in the deep shafts could accelerate an effort to perfect new types of nuclear arms for the country’s fast-growing arsenal. Independent experts who have examined the satellite imagery and Dr. Babiarz’s analyses share his concerns.
The activity at Lop Nor comes at one of the most sensitive moments in U.S.-China relations. President Biden has said he’s trying to “stabilize” an increasingly contentious relationship and, at a summit meeting last month with Xi Jinping, China’s leader, sought a measure of accord.
American intelligence officials say they’ve followed Lop Nur’s revival for years. While the construction is obvious, they say, its purpose is not. China could be preparing for a nuclear test, they concede.
But they add that Mr. Xi may not intend to move ahead unless the United States or Russia go first. The officials say Mr. Xi could be hedging his bets, drilling the deep vertical shafts so that, if necessary, China can act quickly.
On Monday, the Foreign Ministry in Beijing responded to questions about upgrades at Lop Nur, dismissing them in a statement as “clutching at shadows, groundlessly whipping up a ‘China nuclear threat.’” It called such claims “utterly irresponsible.”
The ministry also emphasized Beijing’s commitment to observing the nuclear test ban — a position, it added, that “has won high praise from the international community.” China, it said, will spare “no effort to realize the noble aspiration of comprehensively banning and totally eradicating nuclear weapons.”
A Sleuth and His Discoveries
Dr. Babiarz, the former intelligence analyst, wrote his doctoral thesis on the roots of China’s nuclear program. He now runs the operational arm of a company that analyzes civilian satellite imagery, teaches a course on geospatial analysis at Johns Hopkins University and recently co-wrote a textbook on the interpretation of satellite images.
Since leaving government service, Dr. Babiarz has spent much time analyzing images of Lop Nur. In assessing the base, he has looked at not only the most up-to-date imagery but earlier views that provide a visual history of the site’s development.
In a report this year, he documented a new test area covering roughly 10 square miles. The barren site possesses deep boreholes, Dr. Babiarz said, as well as new roads, power lines, an electrical substation and a support area with multiple buildings.
“The overall indications are that they’re preparing to test,” he said in an interview.
Lop Nur is a sprawling military base, roughly the land mass of Virginia, in the arid Xinjiang region of China’s far west. Chinese accounts say the area was chosen for nuclear tests because it was so barren and isolated, without any permanent residents.
But the broader Xinjiang region is home to the Uyghurs, a largely Muslim ethnic group that has recently endured mass detentions and pervasive security controls.
The Uyghurs have long protested health threats from nuclear tests at the site, which began in 1964 after Mao decided to build the bomb. The early tests were capped by mushroom clouds and radioactive fallout. China conducted its firstunderground nuclear test in 1969.
At first, Beijing used shallow horizontal tunnels. It was a relative latecomer to drilling vertical shafts that were deep enough to reliably contain the deadly radiation, especially for large blasts. Its first such shaft test occurred in 1978.
Mao famously disparaged the bomb as a “paper tiger.” China thus built a nuclear arsenal smaller than the combined atomic forces of France and the United Kingdom. After the Cold War, the Lop Nur test site ended its large blasts and became a relative backwater.
That began to change after 2012, when Mr. Xi came to power. The Chinese leader saw the Rocket Force, which he created in late 2015, as one of his glories.
The elite organization, the custodian of China’s nuclear weapons, embodied Mr. Xi’s ambitions to elevate his country as a respected, and feared, great power ready to stand up to the United States.
Mr. Xi’s political rise, it turns out, coincided with Lop Nur’s rebirth. The secretive activity was publicly disclosed by means of a new kind of open surveillance.
The most powerful civilian imaging satellites that orbit the Earth can distinguish objects on the ground as small as a foot in diameter. From hundreds of miles up, the spacecraft and their telescopes can discern people, types of vehicles and even aircraft tail numbers, analysts say.
Dr. Babiarz’s analyses of civilian imagery over several years tell the story of Lop Nur’s upgrades. By 2017, an old site with a handful of buildings had turned into a slick, ultramodern complex ringed by security fences. Its new structures included a bunker protected by earthen berms and lightning arresters, making it ideal for handling high explosives.
The site was suspicious but ambiguous. Nuclear arms use conventional explosives to start their chain reactions. But so do subcritical tests — lesser experiments that a global test ban treaty allows. Conservatively, Dr. Babiarz called the complex a possible site for the preparation of atomic devices.
By 2018, the next big project at Lop Nur was the rapid expansion of a giant air base whose main runway was three miles long. Satellite images showed a dozen large buildings under construction.
In parallel, the Trump administration declared in 2018 that “the United States must remain ready to resume nuclear testing.” In 2019, the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the U.S. as undermining not only the test ban but “global strategic security and stability.”
Even so, senior Trump officials in May 2020 discussed the merits of an atomic restart. News of the meeting leaked. Soon after, Republicans on the Senate Armed Services Committee approved spending $10 million to reduce the time it would take to conduct an atomic test.
Amid the heightened tensions, Dr. Babiarz discovered that China had begun to revamp and expand Lop Nur’s test zones — initially, its horizontal tunnels. Fairly close to the surface, they had shaken with modest test explosions during the Cold War.
A 2020 satellite image showed a main tunnel undergoing extensive new digging and construction, its entrance surrounded by trucks, bulldozers and piles of excavated dirt.
Like the high-security site, however, the tunnels were ambiguous. Their rocky depths could be used to bottle up blasts from small atom bombs or large subcritical tests.
Then, unexpectedly, the clues turned more troubling. Early in 2021, Dr. Babiarz was examining new Lop Nur imagery when he noticed large pieces of road-making equipment: a grader and a front-end loader.
“They were out in the middle of nowhere,” he recalled.
Dr. Babiarz followed the new road. Over a dozen miles, it led from a flat zone used decades ago for vertical shaft detonations to a hilly region undergoing fast development.
In a labyrinth of canyons he found, to his surprise, a large drilling rig being set up. It was almost 90 feet tall. That was July 2021.
Next month, he obtained a new image showing not only the derrick but a stack of drill pipes and an adjacent pit of lubricating fluid for keeping the drill bit moving ever deeper. From the clues, Dr. Babiarz estimated that the borehole was meant to go down at least a third of a mile.
In comparison, the maximum depth of a vertical shaft at the U.S. government’s Nevada test site is 2,500 feet, or about a half mile. So the estimated depth of China’s borehole appears to fall within the American range.
Unlike Lop Nur’s flat areas, the new zone’s rugged terrain provided good concealment for large gear. Despite this, Dr. Babiarz found a second drill site last year. It “was tucked deeper into the hilly terrain,” he said, and the rig’s support gear had been meticulously covered.
To atomic experts, the deep holes seemed to have been designed to contain large nuclear tests. “We never did subcritical tests in vertical shafts,” said Patrick Rowe, a former director of drilling operations at the Nevada test site. “It didn’t make sense because drilling the holes was so expensive.”
The surprise discovery of the drill rigs prompted Dr. Babiarz to look wider. Recently, he zeroed in on a sprawling support base. By examining its historical imagery, he found that more than 30 of its buildings were major renovations or new construction.
Unexpectedly, he also found what appeared to be a training site for the shaft drillers. The biggest rig seemed similar to the tall one he had observed a hundred miles away in the new test zone.
“The bottom line is that it’s quite active,” Dr. Babiarz said of the military base.
Bluster and Brinksmanship
Nuclear experts say they see no signs of an imminent Chinese test and argue that Beijing may do nothing. The rebuilding of the military base could simply be a warning to the West, they say. Chinese experts have suggested as much.
Whether China conducts a nuclear test might also depend on what its rivals do. Signals sent recently by Russia and earlier by American administrations may worry Beijing.
Richard L. Garwin, a prominent nuclear physicist who has often visited China and met with its top scientists, said Lop Nur’s rebuilding represents a technological hedge. “They don’t want to be caught flat-footed in case somebody else goes first,” he said.
Dr. Zhao of the Carnegie Endowment agreed: “China feels it needs to prepare for the worst-case scenario.”
Stephen M. Younger, a former director of Sandia National Laboratories, said it was not inconceivable that China would unilaterally conduct a test to make a statement.
Some analysts argue that China may not be planning large blasts but instead ramping up its program of subcritical experiments, which stop short of producing self-sustaining chain reactions. Both Russia and the United States use them to assess their existing arms.
Other analysts disagree, arguing that China’s fleets of new bombers, submarines and missile silos herald a push for new armaments.
China could field 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 at its current pace of force expansion, the Pentagon has projected. That figure would be a fivefold increase from the “minimum deterrent” that China possessed for more than half a century.
American experts say Chinese scientists are now planning the particular arms they see as best suited for that buildup and may learn much from test explosions — unlike Moscow and Washington, which detonated far more blasts during the Cold War.
“I know they believe they’re behind,” said Terry C. Wallace, a former Los Alamos director who has long studied China’s program of nuclear experimentation. “They may feel that they’re so far behind in testing knowledge that they want to do something exotic.”
A Question of Risk and Reward
Nuclear testing allows scientists to uncover flaws and fine-tune new weapon designs. During the Cold War, China conducted 45 test explosions. In comparison, France set off 210, Russia 715 and the United States 1,030.
The test ban treaty, though signed by 187 nations, never entered into force because China, the United States and six other nations failed to ratify it. Even so, analysts have long argued that it favors Washington because it bars pact-abiding rivals from making their nuclear arms more advanced.
What China wants most, experts say, is miniaturization. With new, more accurate missiles that pinpoint targets, its scientists can reduce the power, size and cost of warheads.
“They have perfectly serviceable nuclear weapons,” said Dr. Garwin, who is credited with designing the world’s first hydrogen bomb. “But they might want to make them smaller.”
Experts say miniaturization could make China’s submarine missiles far more deadly. They’re judged to be carrying up to three warheads each. In contrast, the main American submarine missile, the Trident II, carries up to eight.
Miniaturization could also aid China’s development of hypersonic warheads that would zig and zag to evade U.S. defenses. According to the Pentagon, Beijing wants to give the weapons a nuclear edge.
This fall, global civil society leaders warned of “growing threats” to the test ban and suggested ways to reinforce the taboo against experimental blasts.
While Chinese officials are quick to deny any testing plans, they’re even faster to criticize Washington.
“If you truly care” about the test ban, the Foreign Ministry said in its statement, “you should pay serious attention to the position of the United States.”
For instance, Chinese experts accuse Washington of a double standard in backing the global ban while seeking technologies that can sidestep its prohibitions.
Last year, American scientists announced a fusion breakthrough that was hailed as a step toward abundant clean energy. The next day, Global Times, China’s nationalistic Communist Party tabloid, highlighted a little-known fact about the giant laser: Its main job is to advance nuclear arms development.
Of late, China has pointed to the W93 — the first new American nuclear warheadsince the Cold War, now in development — as an example of U.S. nuclear strides. The military says the innovative weapon will require no test detonations.
Even so, Chinese experts cast the threat of test resumption as coming from the United States. In September, the military affairs channel of China’s state television network ran a program in which Teng Jianqun, a former military officer, said Washington was “trying to break through the restrictions.”
American experts, in contrast, cast Lop Nur’s modernization as a sign of just how far the Chinese may be willing to go.
“We have to realize that they had a conservative posture,” said Dr. Wallace, the former Los Alamos director. “That’s changing.”
🧵 1) #China's “Joint Sword-2024A” drills - CSIS Special Report
How Is China Responding to the Inauguration of Taiwan’s President William Lai?
On May 23, 2024, China commenced large-scale military exercises surrounding Taiwan, called “Joint Sword-2024A.”
The drills came just three days after Taiwan’s new president William Lai gave his inauguration speech. Chinese officials stated that the drills are intended to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”
This activity by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was accompanied by what China called “comprehensive law enforcement operations” involving China’s coast guard around two of Taiwan’s offshore islands.
This is the third round of major escalatory military exercises China has held around Taiwan, following unprecedented exercises in August 2022 and another round in April 2023.
How is this exercise different from the prior ones? What does this exercise reveal about China’s approach towards Taiwan? What was China’s rationale for engaging in these exercises, and what other non-military activities has China taken?
Joint Sword-2024A and Comprehensive Law Enforcement Operations
In the days leading up to the start of Joint Sword-2024A, China’s military was relatively inactive in the Taiwan Strait.
The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported no PLA aircraft in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or “around Taiwan” on the day of William Lai’s inauguration (May 20) or the following day, and there was only one reported on May 22.
This all changed on the morning of May 23. At 7:45 am that day, the PLA Eastern Theater Command announced it was commencing joint military exercises around Taiwan and its outlying islands from May 23-24.
The exercise sought to engage in “joint sea-air combat-readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets.”
China’s MND published a map showing that operations would occur in five different zones around the island as well as four smaller zones surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands (Kinmen, Wuqiu, Matsu, and Dongyin).
The publication of this map is different than before. When China conducted large-scale exercises in August 2022, Chinese authorities issued specific coordinates for seven exercise zones and warned ships and aircraft not to enter those zones.
During the April 2023 exercises, China did not announce any specific zones. This time, China again announced zones for the exercises, but it did not issue coordinates and warn ships and aircraft not to enter.
The placement of the five zones around Taiwan is significant, and there are notable differences between these five zones and the seven zones that were announced during the August 2022 exercises.
The northern zone is positioned closest to Taiwan’s capital Taipei. Some Chinese military commentators indicated this is intended to signal that China can position forces close to Taiwan’s leadership. This zone is significantly larger than any of the northern zones announced in 2022, but the 2022 exercises had three separate northern zones as opposed to one.
Additionally, the Joint Sword-2024A northern zone does not appear to intrude as close to Taiwan as the 2022 zones did. In 2022, two of the northern zones intruded well into Taiwan’s contiguous zone and into the territorial waters.
The eastern zone is positioned near the port city of Hualien, which is one of Taiwan’s main international shipping ports (though a relatively small one).
Chinese commentators suggest the zone is indicated to test and display China’s ability to block three key lines: the flow of energy into Taiwan, the likely “escape” route that Taiwan citizens might take to flee conflict, and the route through which the United States and others might flow forces to defend Taiwan.
It is also important to note that Taiwan’s new Vice President Bhi-kim Hsiao spent a decade of her political career representing the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Hualien.
The exercise zone here is significantly closer than the eastern zones in the 2022 exercises. According to the map published by Chinese authorities, the zone appears to intrude well into Taiwan’s contiguous zone.
The southeastern zone extends into the Bashi Channel, the waterway that connects the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea to the broader Pacific Ocean. This is a crucial route for international shipping traffic. In the August 2022 exercises, China positioned a smaller exercise zone more squarely in the middle of the channel.
The southwestern zone is positioned off the coast of Kaohsiung, which is Taiwan’s busiest container shipping port, as well as a critical hub for imports of oil and natural gas. It is also home to a major Taiwan naval port.
Chinese commentators note that operations in the area would aim to “strangle” the port and “confine” Taiwan’s navy. Notably, the zone does extend into the contiguous zone (according to China’s maps), but it does not intrude into Taiwan’s claimed territorial waters, while the August 2022 zone there did extend into territorial waters.
The western zone is located in the Taiwan Strait, just west of Taiwan’s Penghu Islands. This zone is notable in that the August 2022 exercises did not feature a zone in this area.
The zone may be intended to display China’s ability to dominate and seal off portions of the Taiwan Strait. According to maps released during a Taiwan MND press briefing, three China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels were operating in the waters south of this exercise zone on May 23.
The lack of Chinese detailed coordinates for these zones leaves some of these finer details up for question. As one indication of this, maps released by Taiwan’s MND appear to show exercise zones of slightly smaller sizes and in slightly different positions.
One critical difference is that the Taiwan MND map does not show any of the exercise zones extending significantly into Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. The Taiwan MND version of the map is recreated below.
In addition to the map of the exercise locations, China’s MND released additional information to either signal Chinese intentions or depict PLA movements.
One was a graphic of how Chinese maritime forces could close in on the main island of Taiwan from five key directions. Another animation showcased Chinese forces targeting four labeled Taiwan locations (Taipei, Taichung, Kaohsiung, and Hualien County) and one unnamed location (near Taitung ).
In terms of overall force deployment, the first day of Joint Sword-2024A featured a smaller number of air forces than in past exercises. Taiwan’s MND reported 49 aircraft around Taiwan on May 23, of which 35 crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or into Taiwan’s ADIZ.
This is less than the peak of 68 aircraft during the 2022 exercises and considerably lower than the high of 91 aircraft seen in April 2023.
China’s naval activity has been relatively more impressive. Taiwan MND announced that 19 PLA Navy vessels were deployed around Taiwan on May 23. That is higher than the peak in August 2022 (14 vessels) and in April 2023 (12 vessels).
However, it is lower than the record high of 20 vessels in September 2023 during a round of lower-profile, un-named exercises.
In addition to the PLA, Chinese maritime law enforcement forces conducted their own operations around Taiwan’s outlying islands. On the same day that the PLA exercises started, the Fujian Province Coast Guard launched a “comprehensive law enforcement exercise” in waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin islands “to test its joint patrol, rapid reaction and emergency response capabilities.”
A map of these CCG exercises shows that patrol vessels came as close as 2.8 nautical miles from Taiwan’s Wuqiu islands and as close as 3.1 nautical miles from Dongyin island.
This is the first time the mainland’s coast guard vessels have entered waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. In total nine CCG vessels were reported around Taiwan’s outlying islands.
The coast guard’s activities were not constrained to patrolling around Taiwan’s outlying islands. Information published by Taiwan’s MND indicated that four CCG vessels sailed east of Taiwan near the eastern PLA exercise zone off the coast of Hualien.
The CCG also sailed three vessels southwest of Taiwan near the southern entrance of the Taiwan Strait. In all, the MND reported a total of 16 CCG vessels around Taiwan and its outlying islands on the first day of the exercises.
The Significance of These Exercises
The Joint Sword-2024A exercise and linked law enforcement operation suggest several different aspects of China’s approach to Taiwan.
First, China is likely to continue to employ large-scale military activities around Taiwan to signal its displeasure and punish Taiwan and the United States. Since China’s April 2023 military exercises, some experts from China, Taiwan, and the United States have argued that Chinese military exercises face diminishing utility in terms of advancing Chinese interests vis-à-vis Taiwan.
A CSIS China Power survey of leading U.S. and Taiwan experts in late 2023 found that more leading Taiwan experts believed that the most escalatory Chinese response to a Lai victory was highly coercive non-military actions, not a large-scale exercise encircling Taiwan.
However, Joint Sword-2024A shows that when China needs to demonstrate significant displeasure, the PLA and CCG are readily available actors and are best suited to attract international attention. During the week of Lai’s inauguration, China first imposed sanctions and engaged in diplomatic pushback and condemnation before launching military exercises.
Indeed, in the last three years, China has engaged in highly publicized and large-scale military exercises around Taiwan for a variety of reasons: to oppose a high-level U.S. visit to Taiwan (August 2022), a Taiwan presidential transit of the United States and meetings with senior U.S. leaders (April 2023), and statements by Taiwan’s new president during his inauguration speech that Beijing deemed unacceptable (May 2024).
The analysis on this page draws from ChinaPower research tracking China’s major military and diplomatic activities in response to Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. Explore a detailed timeline of Chinese activities here.
This trend is likely to continue. There is a risk moving forward that China could lower the bar to justify exercises against lesser perceived transgressions, particularly if China is pessimistic about the future direction of Taiwan. These large-scale exercises also provide valuable opportunities for the PLA and CCG to train around Taiwan.
Second, China appears to be routinizing future large-scale PLA exercises intended to punish Taiwan. China did not name its August 2022 exercise, but its April 2023 exercises were given the name “Joint Sword.” This most recent exercise was titled Joint Sword-2024A, using the same name as the prior exercise, but affixing a year and a letter.
This indicates that Beijing has established a new series of exercises with the goal of punishing Taiwan and the United States and suggests China could engage in more than one large-scale exercise per year.
When China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was asked whether there would be additional military exercises in the future, the spokesperson suggested it was possible by stating “each time ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists make waves, it garners stronger effort from China and the rest of the world to defend the one-China principle.”
Routinizing large-scale PLA exercises against Taiwan does not mean there will be prior warning. The PLA lowered military activities around Taiwan during Lai’s inauguration and in the two days afterwards and then provided no public advance notice for Joint Sword-2024A.
If these exercises are routinized, it will be important to see if they differ significantly each time to provide different training value or if China begins to standardize components of the exercise to signal more or less displeasure.
Third, China’s coast guard and other law enforcement actors are likely to play a growing role in military and quasi-military operations against Taiwan.
According to Taiwan MND descriptions of Chinese activities on May 23, China’s maritime force included 19 PLA vessels and 16 CCG vessels. CCG vessels were operating immediately off China’s Fujian coast and to the southwest of Taiwan as well as the east of Taiwan.
This builds on growing CCG and PLA exercises and suggests greater military-law enforcement cooperation not only in the Taiwan Strait but also surrounding Taiwan.
Improved PLA and CCG operations could enhance China’s ability to quarantine or blockade the main island of Taiwan or any of Taiwan’s outlying islands—steps which China could take in the future to significantly intensify pressure on Taiwan.
Fourth, Future Chinese punishment of Taiwan could involve more geographically expansive operations and is likely to target the main island of Taiwan and its outlying islands.
The August 2022 and April 2023 exercises almost exclusively focused on targeting the main island of Taiwan. Joint Sword-2024A includes activities against four outlying islands (with the CCG in the lead and the PLA in supporting role) and against the main island of Taiwan (with the PLA in the lead and the CCG in a supporting role).
The larger geographic scope of the 2024 exercise allows China to train for a range of operations including gray zone activities, quarantine or blockade scenarios, and invasion.
This time, China positioned most of its maritime assets in the Taiwan Strait. In a future crisis or conflict scenario, this positioning could enable China to engage in operations to inspect or disrupt commercial traffic in the Taiwan Strait or cut off Taiwan’s outlying islands from Taipei.
The Chinese MND’s description of Joint Sword-2024A also mentioned “integrated operations inside and outside the island chain.” Chinese operations east of Taiwan are likely part of this and it remains to be seen what additional activities China could take beyond the first island chain.
Why China Escalated against Taiwan
China has long held deep suspicions of Taiwan’s new president William Lai. Even before Lai won Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2024, Chinese officials characterized him as a “‘pro-independence’ advocate” and his running mate Bi-khim Hsiao as one of the “die-hard ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists.”
They point to his political trajectory and past activities within the DPP as evidence, including Lai’s own description of himself as “a pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence.”
Immediately prior to President Lai’s inauguration, China shared its expectations for what Beijing wants Lai to say and how Beijing wants Lai to operate after he assumes office.
During a May 15 press conference, the spokesperson for China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Chen Binhua commented on the public sentiment within Taiwan that supported “peace not war, development not decline, communication rather than separation, and cooperation instead of confrontation.” He suggested that those should be elements within Lai’s speech.
Chen also emphasized China’s resolve to punish Taiwan, the United States, and other actors. Chen revealed that China “will introduce legal measures to punish diehards whose actions and rhetoric aggressively promote ‘Taiwan independence.’”
He announced sanctions on five Taiwan commentators that Beijing viewed as stirring up “erroneous statements” to mislead people and “fuel[ing] hostility and opposition.” He further noted China’s opposition to U.S. support for “Taiwan independence elements” and encouraged the United States to stop arms sales to Taiwan.
From China’s perspective, Lai’s inauguration speech failed to meet Beijing’s expectations by casting cross-Strait dynamics and Taiwan’s status in ways that contradicted and undermined China’s one-China principle. Chinese officials and state media have made six different criticisms of Lai’s speech:
It distorts Taiwan’s relations with China, does not recognize that Taiwan is part of China, promotes a two-state theory, and labels China as a foreign country;
It seeks external involvement and intervention to support Taiwan independence and to make Taiwan a pawn for the west;
It tries to use democracy as a guise to pursue independence and undermine peace and stability;
It exaggerates and stokes the military threat from China;
It weaponizes Taiwan public opinion against China; and It does not accurately reflect mainstream public opinion in Taiwan.
China’s Non-Military Activities to Punish Taiwan and the United States
This highly negative interpretation of Lai’s inauguration speech and Beijing’s deep distrust of Lai drove China to begin to “punish” Taiwan and the United States even before the announcement of Joint Sword-2024A:
On May 20, China’s Ministry of Commerce sanctioned Boeing Defense Space & Security and General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems by placing them on China’s unreliable entities list for providing arms sales to Taiwan.
On May 21, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly called out Lai by name and noted “those like Lai Ching-te have betrayed their nation and ancestors. What they have done is simply disgraceful… All ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists will see their names written on the wall of shame.”
This statement represents a marked escalation in rhetoric, a clear political labeling of Lai, and set the tone for China’s subsequent actions to “punish” Taiwan.
Chinese official media followed suit and argued that Lai is worse than all Taiwan’s perceived pro-independence leaders, including Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen.
On May 21, China’s MFA also announced the decision to sanction former U.S representative Mike Gallaher for his attempts “to interfere in Chinese domestic politics, undermine Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and activities to undermine Chinese interests.”
On May 22, the MFA announced sanctions on 12 U.S. defense companies and 10 defense company executives in retaliation against U.S. sanctions on Chinese companies involved in efforts to support Russia’s Ukraine war and as punishment for these companies also providing arms to Taiwan.
Appendix: Timeline of Chinese Statements and Activities (May 20–23)
Since May 20, the Chinese government has released increasingly harsh statements to criticize Lai’s speech, suggesting a toughening of China’s condemnation of Lai and greater resolve to punish or coerce Taiwan. The Chinese government, however, did not appear to fully decide on how to respond to Lai’s inauguration until May 21.
State Council Taiwan Affairs Office
China’s State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) shared four press releases and statements from May 20 to May 23. The first two released on May 20 were shorter and reflected China’s standard talking points on Taiwan.
It was not until the evening of May 21 that TAO released a longer and more detailed statement that went beyond standard talking points to reference specific components of Lai’s inauguration speech.
This May 21 statement characterized Lai (not by name) as providing “a thorough ‘Taiwan independence confession,’” which “fully proves that he is a betrayer of the mainstream public opinion on the island and a destroyer of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region.”
TAO released another statement on May 23 that clearly stated China’s Joint Sword 2024-A exercise was meant to “punish Taiwan secessionists, counter foreign support for Taiwan independence and interference in Chinese domestic affairs, and protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” None of the TAO statements referenced Lai by name, referring to him only as the leader of the Taiwan region.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
China’s MFA also addressed Lai’s inauguration and dynamics related to Taiwan on a daily basis as part of their daily press conference. Similar to the TAO, the MFA spokesperson did not have much to share on May 20 beyond standard talking points.
By May 21, MFA began addressing a range of Taiwan related questions. It reported on all the countries that voiced support for one China; criticized countries that supported or sent delegations to Lai’s inauguration; condemned Secretary Antony Blinken’s congratulatory message to Lai; and alleged Taiwan’s use of money to buy diplomatic allies.
The Chinese spokesperson’s response to Secretary Blinken’s message to Lai was particularly strong and he claimed that the United States “seriously violates the one-China principle and the three China-US joint communiqués, and breaches its political commitment to maintaining only cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the Taiwan region. This sends a seriously wrong signal to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”
The spokesperson also warned that such problematic activities “will be met with China’s resolute response.” None of these early MFA press releases mentioned Lai by name.
The most important Chinese statement came from Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on May 21 as part of his speech at the high-level Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting.
He called out Lai by name and noted “Those like Lai Ching-te have betrayed their nation and ancestors. What they have done is simply disgraceful… All ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists will see their names written on the wall of shame.”
This statement represents a marked escalation, a clear political labeling of Lai, and a departure from past practice of not calling out Taiwan’s leader by name. Wang’s points on Taiwan were repeated verbatim by the MFA during its May 22 press release.
On May 21, the same day of Wang Yi’s statement, the MFA announced the decision to sanction former U.S representative Mike Gallaher for his attempts “to interfere in Chinese domestic politics, undermine Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and activities to undermine Chinese interests.”
On May 22, MFA announced sanctions on 12 U.S. defense companies and 10 defense company executives in retaliation against U.S. sanctions on Chinese companies involved in efforts to support Russia’s Ukraine war and as punishment for these companies also providing arms to Taiwan.
China’s MFA spokesperson’s remarks on May 23 were heavily focused on answering a range of questions related to Taiwan and the PLA announced military exercise around Taiwan.
In response to questions of whether China was planning for more punishment drills beyond Joint Sword-2024A, China suggested it was possible: spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated, “Each time “Taiwan independence” separatists make waves, it garners stronger effort from China and the rest of the world to defend the one-China principle.”
Ministry of National Defense
China’s MND was largely silent on Lai’s inauguration until May 23, when it announced the commencement of the Joint Sword-2024A military drills by the PLA Eastern Theater Command.
The drills started immediately at 7:45am on May 23 and were scheduled to continue until May 24. Joint Sword-2024A was intended to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of “Taiwan independence” forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”
The drills also aimed to practice China’s “joint sea-air combat-readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets.” China MND released not only a map of the exercise zones, but also a graphic showing how China’s surface fleet would move towards Taiwan.
China Coast Guard
Approximately 1.5 hours after the MND announcement at 9am on May 23, China Coast Guard (CCG) announced that it will engage in a comprehensive law enforcement exercise to practice joint patrol, rapid response, and emergency response capabilities.
The CCG exercise was led by the Fujian Coast Guard. CCG showcased the exercise patrol path as operating within 2.8 nautical miles of Taiwan’s Wuqiu island and around 3.1 nautical miles near Taiwan’s Dongyin island.
Chinese media claimed that such operations “effectively shattered the Taiwan authorities’ claim of the so-called restricted waters.”
Article link in tweet 4.
2) The Significance of These Exercises
The Joint Sword-2024A exercise and linked law enforcement operation suggest several different aspects of China’s approach to Taiwan.
First, China is likely to continue to employ large-scale military activities around Taiwan to signal its displeasure and punish Taiwan and the United States.
Since China’s April 2023 military exercises, some experts from China, Taiwan, and the United States have argued that Chinese military exercises face diminishing utility in terms of advancing Chinese interests vis-à-vis Taiwan.
A CSIS China Power survey of leading U.S. and Taiwan experts in late 2023 found that more leading Taiwan experts believed that the most escalatory Chinese response to a Lai victory was highly coercive non-military actions, not a large-scale exercise encircling Taiwan.
However, Joint Sword-2024A shows that when China needs to demonstrate significant displeasure, the PLA and CCG are readily available actors and are best suited to attract international attention.
During the week of Lai’s inauguration, China first imposed sanctions and engaged in diplomatic pushback and condemnation before launching military exercises.
Indeed, in the last three years, China has engaged in highly publicized and large-scale military exercises around Taiwan for a variety of reasons: to oppose a high-level U.S. visit to Taiwan (August 2022), a Taiwan presidential transit of the United States and meetings with senior U.S. leaders (April 2023), and statements by Taiwan’s new president during his inauguration speech that Beijing deemed unacceptable (May 2024).
This trend is likely to continue. There is a risk moving forward that China could lower the bar to justify exercises against lesser perceived transgressions, particularly if China is pessimistic about the future direction of Taiwan.
These large-scale exercises also provide valuable opportunities for the PLA and CCG to train around Taiwan.
3) Second, China appears to be routinizing future large-scale PLA exercises intended to punish Taiwan. China did not name its August 2022 exercise, but its April 2023 exercises were given the name “Joint Sword.”
This most recent exercise was titled Joint Sword-2024A, using the same name as the prior exercise, but affixing a year and a letter.
This indicates that Beijing has established a new series of exercises with the goal of punishing Taiwan and the United States and suggests China could engage in more than one large-scale exercise per year.
When China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was asked whether there would be additional military exercises in the future, the spokesperson suggested it was possible by stating “each time ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists make waves, it garners stronger effort from China and the rest of the world to defend the one-China principle.”
Routinizing large-scale PLA exercises against Taiwan does not mean there will be prior warning. The PLA lowered military activities around Taiwan during Lai’s inauguration and in the two days afterwards and then provided no public advance notice for Joint Sword-2024A.
If these exercises are routinized, it will be important to see if they differ significantly each time to provide different training value or if China begins to standardize components of the exercise to signal more or less displeasure.
Third, China’s coast guard and other law enforcement actors are likely to play a growing role in military and quasi-military operations against Taiwan.
According to Taiwan MND descriptions of Chinese activities on May 23, China’s maritime force included 19 PLA vessels and 16 CCG vessels.
CCG vessels were operating immediately off China’s Fujian coast and to the southwest of Taiwan as well as the east of Taiwan.
This builds on growing CCG and PLA exercises and suggests greater military-law enforcement cooperation not only in the Taiwan Strait but also surrounding Taiwan.
Improved PLA and CCG operations could enhance China’s ability to quarantine or blockade the main island of Taiwan or any of Taiwan’s outlying islands—steps which China could take in the future to significantly intensify pressure on Taiwan.
Fourth, Future Chinese punishment of Taiwan could involve more geographically expansive operations and is likely to target the main island of Taiwan and its outlying islands.
The August 2022 and April 2023 exercises almost exclusively focused on targeting the main island of Taiwan. Joint Sword-2024A includes activities against four outlying islands (with the CCG in the lead and the PLA in supporting role) and against the main island of Taiwan (with the PLA in the lead and the CCG in a supporting role).
The larger geographic scope of the 2024 exercise allows China to train for a range of operations including gray zone activities, quarantine or blockade scenarios, and invasion.
This time, China positioned most of its maritime assets in the Taiwan Strait. In a future crisis or conflict scenario, this positioning could enable China to engage in operations to inspect or disrupt commercial traffic in the Taiwan Strait or cut off Taiwan’s outlying islands from Taipei.
The Chinese MND’s description of Joint Sword-2024A also mentioned “integrated operations inside and outside the island chain.” Chinese operations east of Taiwan are likely part of this and it remains to be seen what additional activities China could take beyond the first island chain.
🧵 1) Map of activities & deployments of #US allies & #PLA forces in the #SouthChinaSea during #Balikatan2024 exercises April 26 - May 10
The Chinese military is closely watching the drills.
On May 1, two B-52H bombers from the Andersen Air Force Base (Guam) flew over the South China Sea, right over the islands disputed by China and Philippines.
The PLA responded by scrambling two Xian-11 fighters from the Yongxingdao airbase on the Paracel Islands and a Y-8 EW aircraft to monitor the American bombers.
2) China deployed the Tianwangxing Electronic Surveillance ship to monitor the #Balikatan2024 exercise.
At one point the USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) aborted a live-fire drill in the South China Sea due to the entry of Chinese spy ship Tianwangxing into the exercise area on April 29, 2024
3) Australia’s RAAF P-8A flying over the #PLA Navy Tianwangxing Electronic Surveillance ship in the #SouthChinaSea during the #Balikatan2024 exercises.
2) Chinese state media regularly condemn the planned release. Chinese Communist Party organ, People’s Daily, quoted an official saying, “Japan’s plan is not the country’s private matter, but a major issue that has an effect on the global marine environment and public health.”
3) However, a Japanese government official said Beijing does not have agreements with neighboring countries on the release of tritium from Chinese nuclear power plants, nor has it provided any explanations about the matter.
THREAD: 1) Xi throws #Okinawa into East Asia geopolitical cocktail
Xi speaks of Ryukyu's history, with emphasis on ties with #China
Xi's message is clear: That 600 years back, Okinawa was under the sway of the Chinese world order. asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks…
2) Xi said that 36 Clans of the Min-People went over to the Ryukyus & settled, a reference to the movement of people during Ming Dynasty China in the 14th century. He emphasized the need to collect and sort such historic documents to inherit and develop Chinese civilization well.
3) In the past, the Global Times, a newspaper affiliated with the People's Daily, said in an editorial that China should support Okinawa's independence from Japan within the framework of international law.
Secret document say death toll was much higher than later reported, while claiming wounded students were bayoneted as they begged for their lives. independent.co.uk/news/world/asi…
2) First waves of troops went in unarmed to disperse the protesters. Then “The 27 Army APCs opened fire on the crowd before running over them. APCs ran over troops & civilians at 65kmh.” “Students were given one hour to leave square, but after five minutes APCs attacked.
3) “Students linked arms but were mown down. APCs then ran over the bodies time and time again to make, quote ‘pie’ unquote, and remains collected by bulldozer. “Remains incinerated and then hosed down drains.”
#BREAKING: #Chinese media said 2,296 delegates to the 20th Party Congress have been elected under the leadership of #XiJinping
Xi is expected to receive a 5-year-term in October, paving the way for his ascendence to Paramount Leader of the Party for life.
Sorry, No #chinacoup
2) Xinhua News Agency: Election of deputies to the 20th National Congress was completed.
Each electoral unit across China held party congresses or party representative meetings respectively & elected 2,296 deputies to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of #China
3) The National Party Congress of the Communist Party of China is held every five years.
The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China will determine the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party for the next five years.