🧵 1) #China's “Joint Sword-2024A” drills - CSIS Special Report

How Is China Responding to the Inauguration of Taiwan’s President William Lai?

On May 23, 2024, China commenced large-scale military exercises surrounding Taiwan, called “Joint Sword-2024A.”

The drills came just three days after Taiwan’s new president William Lai gave his inauguration speech. Chinese officials stated that the drills are intended to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”

This activity by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was accompanied by what China called “comprehensive law enforcement operations” involving China’s coast guard around two of Taiwan’s offshore islands.

This is the third round of major escalatory military exercises China has held around Taiwan, following unprecedented exercises in August 2022 and another round in April 2023.

How is this exercise different from the prior ones? What does this exercise reveal about China’s approach towards Taiwan? What was China’s rationale for engaging in these exercises, and what other non-military activities has China taken?

Joint Sword-2024A and Comprehensive Law Enforcement Operations

In the days leading up to the start of Joint Sword-2024A, China’s military was relatively inactive in the Taiwan Strait.

The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported no PLA aircraft in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or “around Taiwan” on the day of William Lai’s inauguration (May 20) or the following day, and there was only one reported on May 22.

This all changed on the morning of May 23. At 7:45 am that day, the PLA Eastern Theater Command announced it was commencing joint military exercises around Taiwan and its outlying islands from May 23-24.

The exercise sought to engage in “joint sea-air combat-readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets.”

China’s MND published a map showing that operations would occur in five different zones around the island as well as four smaller zones surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands (Kinmen, Wuqiu, Matsu, and Dongyin).

The publication of this map is different than before. When China conducted large-scale exercises in August 2022, Chinese authorities issued specific coordinates for seven exercise zones and warned ships and aircraft not to enter those zones.

During the April 2023 exercises, China did not announce any specific zones. This time, China again announced zones for the exercises, but it did not issue coordinates and warn ships and aircraft not to enter.

The placement of the five zones around Taiwan is significant, and there are notable differences between these five zones and the seven zones that were announced during the August 2022 exercises.

The northern zone is positioned closest to Taiwan’s capital Taipei. Some Chinese military commentators indicated this is intended to signal that China can position forces close to Taiwan’s leadership. This zone is significantly larger than any of the northern zones announced in 2022, but the 2022 exercises had three separate northern zones as opposed to one.

Additionally, the Joint Sword-2024A northern zone does not appear to intrude as close to Taiwan as the 2022 zones did. In 2022, two of the northern zones intruded well into Taiwan’s contiguous zone and into the territorial waters.

The eastern zone is positioned near the port city of Hualien, which is one of Taiwan’s main international shipping ports (though a relatively small one).

Chinese commentators suggest the zone is indicated to test and display China’s ability to block three key lines: the flow of energy into Taiwan, the likely “escape” route that Taiwan citizens might take to flee conflict, and the route through which the United States and others might flow forces to defend Taiwan.

It is also important to note that Taiwan’s new Vice President Bhi-kim Hsiao spent a decade of her political career representing the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Hualien.

The exercise zone here is significantly closer than the eastern zones in the 2022 exercises. According to the map published by Chinese authorities, the zone appears to intrude well into Taiwan’s contiguous zone.

The southeastern zone extends into the Bashi Channel, the waterway that connects the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea to the broader Pacific Ocean. This is a crucial route for international shipping traffic. In the August 2022 exercises, China positioned a smaller exercise zone more squarely in the middle of the channel.

The southwestern zone is positioned off the coast of Kaohsiung, which is Taiwan’s busiest container shipping port, as well as a critical hub for imports of oil and natural gas. It is also home to a major Taiwan naval port.

Chinese commentators note that operations in the area would aim to “strangle” the port and “confine” Taiwan’s navy. Notably, the zone does extend into the contiguous zone (according to China’s maps), but it does not intrude into Taiwan’s claimed territorial waters, while the August 2022 zone there did extend into territorial waters.

The western zone is located in the Taiwan Strait, just west of Taiwan’s Penghu Islands. This zone is notable in that the August 2022 exercises did not feature a zone in this area.

The zone may be intended to display China’s ability to dominate and seal off portions of the Taiwan Strait. According to maps released during a Taiwan MND press briefing, three China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels were operating in the waters south of this exercise zone on May 23.

The lack of Chinese detailed coordinates for these zones leaves some of these finer details up for question. As one indication of this, maps released by Taiwan’s MND appear to show exercise zones of slightly smaller sizes and in slightly different positions.

One critical difference is that the Taiwan MND map does not show any of the exercise zones extending significantly into Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. The Taiwan MND version of the map is recreated below.

In addition to the map of the exercise locations, China’s MND released additional information to either signal Chinese intentions or depict PLA movements.

One was a graphic of how Chinese maritime forces could close in on the main island of Taiwan from five key directions. Another animation showcased Chinese forces targeting four labeled Taiwan locations (Taipei, Taichung, Kaohsiung, and Hualien County) and one unnamed location (near Taitung ).

In terms of overall force deployment, the first day of Joint Sword-2024A featured a smaller number of air forces than in past exercises. Taiwan’s MND reported 49 aircraft around Taiwan on May 23, of which 35 crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or into Taiwan’s ADIZ.

This is less than the peak of 68 aircraft during the 2022 exercises and considerably lower than the high of 91 aircraft seen in April 2023.

China’s naval activity has been relatively more impressive. Taiwan MND announced that 19 PLA Navy vessels were deployed around Taiwan on May 23. That is higher than the peak in August 2022 (14 vessels) and in April 2023 (12 vessels).

However, it is lower than the record high of 20 vessels in September 2023 during a round of lower-profile, un-named exercises.

In addition to the PLA, Chinese maritime law enforcement forces conducted their own operations around Taiwan’s outlying islands. On the same day that the PLA exercises started, the Fujian Province Coast Guard launched a “comprehensive law enforcement exercise” in waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin islands “to test its joint patrol, rapid reaction and emergency response capabilities.”

A map of these CCG exercises shows that patrol vessels came as close as 2.8 nautical miles from Taiwan’s Wuqiu islands and as close as 3.1 nautical miles from Dongyin island.

This is the first time the mainland’s coast guard vessels have entered waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. In total nine CCG vessels were reported around Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The coast guard’s activities were not constrained to patrolling around Taiwan’s outlying islands. Information published by Taiwan’s MND indicated that four CCG vessels sailed east of Taiwan near the eastern PLA exercise zone off the coast of Hualien.

The CCG also sailed three vessels southwest of Taiwan near the southern entrance of the Taiwan Strait. In all, the MND reported a total of 16 CCG vessels around Taiwan and its outlying islands on the first day of the exercises.

The Significance of These Exercises

The Joint Sword-2024A exercise and linked law enforcement operation suggest several different aspects of China’s approach to Taiwan.

First, China is likely to continue to employ large-scale military activities around Taiwan to signal its displeasure and punish Taiwan and the United States. Since China’s April 2023 military exercises, some experts from China, Taiwan, and the United States have argued that Chinese military exercises face diminishing utility in terms of advancing Chinese interests vis-à-vis Taiwan.

A CSIS China Power survey of leading U.S. and Taiwan experts in late 2023 found that more leading Taiwan experts believed that the most escalatory Chinese response to a Lai victory was highly coercive non-military actions, not a large-scale exercise encircling Taiwan.

However, Joint Sword-2024A shows that when China needs to demonstrate significant displeasure, the PLA and CCG are readily available actors and are best suited to attract international attention. During the week of Lai’s inauguration, China first imposed sanctions and engaged in diplomatic pushback and condemnation before launching military exercises.

Indeed, in the last three years, China has engaged in highly publicized and large-scale military exercises around Taiwan for a variety of reasons: to oppose a high-level U.S. visit to Taiwan (August 2022), a Taiwan presidential transit of the United States and meetings with senior U.S. leaders (April 2023), and statements by Taiwan’s new president during his inauguration speech that Beijing deemed unacceptable (May 2024).

The analysis on this page draws from ChinaPower research tracking China’s major military and diplomatic activities in response to Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. Explore a detailed timeline of Chinese activities here.

This trend is likely to continue. There is a risk moving forward that China could lower the bar to justify exercises against lesser perceived transgressions, particularly if China is pessimistic about the future direction of Taiwan. These large-scale exercises also provide valuable opportunities for the PLA and CCG to train around Taiwan.

Second, China appears to be routinizing future large-scale PLA exercises intended to punish Taiwan. China did not name its August 2022 exercise, but its April 2023 exercises were given the name “Joint Sword.” This most recent exercise was titled Joint Sword-2024A, using the same name as the prior exercise, but affixing a year and a letter.

This indicates that Beijing has established a new series of exercises with the goal of punishing Taiwan and the United States and suggests China could engage in more than one large-scale exercise per year.

When China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was asked whether there would be additional military exercises in the future, the spokesperson suggested it was possible by stating “each time ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists make waves, it garners stronger effort from China and the rest of the world to defend the one-China principle.”

Routinizing large-scale PLA exercises against Taiwan does not mean there will be prior warning. The PLA lowered military activities around Taiwan during Lai’s inauguration and in the two days afterwards and then provided no public advance notice for Joint Sword-2024A.

If these exercises are routinized, it will be important to see if they differ significantly each time to provide different training value or if China begins to standardize components of the exercise to signal more or less displeasure.

Third, China’s coast guard and other law enforcement actors are likely to play a growing role in military and quasi-military operations against Taiwan.

According to Taiwan MND descriptions of Chinese activities on May 23, China’s maritime force included 19 PLA vessels and 16 CCG vessels. CCG vessels were operating immediately off China’s Fujian coast and to the southwest of Taiwan as well as the east of Taiwan.

This builds on growing CCG and PLA exercises and suggests greater military-law enforcement cooperation not only in the Taiwan Strait but also surrounding Taiwan.

Improved PLA and CCG operations could enhance China’s ability to quarantine or blockade the main island of Taiwan or any of Taiwan’s outlying islands—steps which China could take in the future to significantly intensify pressure on Taiwan.

Fourth, Future Chinese punishment of Taiwan could involve more geographically expansive operations and is likely to target the main island of Taiwan and its outlying islands.

The August 2022 and April 2023 exercises almost exclusively focused on targeting the main island of Taiwan. Joint Sword-2024A includes activities against four outlying islands (with the CCG in the lead and the PLA in supporting role) and against the main island of Taiwan (with the PLA in the lead and the CCG in a supporting role).

The larger geographic scope of the 2024 exercise allows China to train for a range of operations including gray zone activities, quarantine or blockade scenarios, and invasion.

This time, China positioned most of its maritime assets in the Taiwan Strait. In a future crisis or conflict scenario, this positioning could enable China to engage in operations to inspect or disrupt commercial traffic in the Taiwan Strait or cut off Taiwan’s outlying islands from Taipei.

The Chinese MND’s description of Joint Sword-2024A also mentioned “integrated operations inside and outside the island chain.” Chinese operations east of Taiwan are likely part of this and it remains to be seen what additional activities China could take beyond the first island chain.

Why China Escalated against Taiwan

China has long held deep suspicions of Taiwan’s new president William Lai. Even before Lai won Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2024, Chinese officials characterized him as a “‘pro-independence’ advocate” and his running mate Bi-khim Hsiao as one of the “die-hard ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists.”

They point to his political trajectory and past activities within the DPP as evidence, including Lai’s own description of himself as “a pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence.”

Immediately prior to President Lai’s inauguration, China shared its expectations for what Beijing wants Lai to say and how Beijing wants Lai to operate after he assumes office.

During a May 15 press conference, the spokesperson for China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Chen Binhua commented on the public sentiment within Taiwan that supported “peace not war, development not decline, communication rather than separation, and cooperation instead of confrontation.” He suggested that those should be elements within Lai’s speech.

Chen also emphasized China’s resolve to punish Taiwan, the United States, and other actors. Chen revealed that China “will introduce legal measures to punish diehards whose actions and rhetoric aggressively promote ‘Taiwan independence.’”

He announced sanctions on five Taiwan commentators that Beijing viewed as stirring up “erroneous statements” to mislead people and “fuel[ing] hostility and opposition.” He further noted China’s opposition to U.S. support for “Taiwan independence elements” and encouraged the United States to stop arms sales to Taiwan.

From China’s perspective, Lai’s inauguration speech failed to meet Beijing’s expectations by casting cross-Strait dynamics and Taiwan’s status in ways that contradicted and undermined China’s one-China principle. Chinese officials and state media have made six different criticisms of Lai’s speech:

It distorts Taiwan’s relations with China, does not recognize that Taiwan is part of China, promotes a two-state theory, and labels China as a foreign country;

It seeks external involvement and intervention to support Taiwan independence and to make Taiwan a pawn for the west;

It tries to use democracy as a guise to pursue independence and undermine peace and stability;

It exaggerates and stokes the military threat from China;

It weaponizes Taiwan public opinion against China; and It does not accurately reflect mainstream public opinion in Taiwan.

China’s Non-Military Activities to Punish Taiwan and the United States

This highly negative interpretation of Lai’s inauguration speech and Beijing’s deep distrust of Lai drove China to begin to “punish” Taiwan and the United States even before the announcement of Joint Sword-2024A:

On May 20, China’s Ministry of Commerce sanctioned Boeing Defense Space & Security and General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems by placing them on China’s unreliable entities list for providing arms sales to Taiwan.

On May 21, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly called out Lai by name and noted “those like Lai Ching-te have betrayed their nation and ancestors. What they have done is simply disgraceful… All ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists will see their names written on the wall of shame.” 

This statement represents a marked escalation in rhetoric, a clear political labeling of Lai, and set the tone for China’s subsequent actions to “punish” Taiwan.

Chinese official media followed suit and argued that Lai is worse than all Taiwan’s perceived pro-independence leaders, including Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen.

On May 21, China’s MFA also announced the decision to sanction former U.S representative Mike Gallaher for his attempts “to interfere in Chinese domestic politics, undermine Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and activities to undermine Chinese interests.”

On May 22, the MFA announced sanctions on 12 U.S. defense companies and 10 defense company executives in retaliation against U.S. sanctions on Chinese companies involved in efforts to support Russia’s Ukraine war and as punishment for these companies also providing arms to Taiwan.

Appendix: Timeline of Chinese Statements and Activities (May 20–23)

Since May 20, the Chinese government has released increasingly harsh statements to criticize Lai’s speech, suggesting a toughening of China’s condemnation of Lai and greater resolve to punish or coerce Taiwan. The Chinese government, however, did not appear to fully decide on how to respond to Lai’s inauguration until May 21.

State Council Taiwan Affairs Office

China’s State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) shared four press releases and statements from May 20 to May 23. The first two released on May 20 were shorter and reflected China’s standard talking points on Taiwan.

It was not until the evening of May 21 that TAO released a longer and more detailed statement that went beyond standard talking points to reference specific components of Lai’s inauguration speech.

This May 21 statement characterized Lai (not by name) as providing “a thorough ‘Taiwan independence confession,’” which “fully proves that he is a betrayer of the mainstream public opinion on the island and a destroyer of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region.”

TAO released another statement on May 23 that clearly stated China’s Joint Sword 2024-A exercise was meant to “punish Taiwan secessionists, counter foreign support for Taiwan independence and interference in Chinese domestic affairs, and protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” None of the TAO statements referenced Lai by name, referring to him only as the leader of the Taiwan region.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

China’s MFA also addressed Lai’s inauguration and dynamics related to Taiwan on a daily basis as part of their daily press conference. Similar to the TAO, the MFA spokesperson did not have much to share on May 20 beyond standard talking points.

By May 21, MFA began addressing a range of Taiwan related questions. It reported on all the countries that voiced support for one China; criticized countries that supported or sent delegations to Lai’s inauguration; condemned Secretary Antony Blinken’s congratulatory message to Lai; and alleged Taiwan’s use of money to buy diplomatic allies.

The Chinese spokesperson’s response to Secretary Blinken’s message to Lai was particularly strong and he claimed that the United States “seriously violates the one-China principle and the three China-US joint communiqués, and breaches its political commitment to maintaining only cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the Taiwan region. This sends a seriously wrong signal to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”

The spokesperson also warned that such problematic activities “will be met with China’s resolute response.” None of these early MFA press releases mentioned Lai by name.

The most important Chinese statement came from Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on May 21 as part of his speech at the high-level Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting.

He called out Lai by name and noted “Those like Lai Ching-te have betrayed their nation and ancestors. What they have done is simply disgraceful… All ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists will see their names written on the wall of shame.” 

This statement represents a marked escalation, a clear political labeling of Lai, and a departure from past practice of not calling out Taiwan’s leader by name. Wang’s points on Taiwan were repeated verbatim by the MFA during its May 22 press release.

On May 21, the same day of Wang Yi’s statement, the MFA announced the decision to sanction former U.S representative Mike Gallaher for his attempts “to interfere in Chinese domestic politics, undermine Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and activities to undermine Chinese interests.”

On May 22, MFA announced sanctions on 12 U.S. defense companies and 10 defense company executives in retaliation against U.S. sanctions on Chinese companies involved in efforts to support Russia’s Ukraine war and as punishment for these companies also providing arms to Taiwan.

China’s MFA spokesperson’s remarks on May 23 were heavily focused on answering a range of questions related to Taiwan and the PLA announced military exercise around Taiwan.

In response to questions of whether China was planning for more punishment drills beyond Joint Sword-2024A, China suggested it was possible: spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated, “Each time “Taiwan independence” separatists make waves, it garners stronger effort from China and the rest of the world to defend the one-China principle.”
Ministry of National Defense

China’s MND was largely silent on Lai’s inauguration until May 23, when it announced the commencement of the Joint Sword-2024A military drills by the PLA Eastern Theater Command.

The drills started immediately at 7:45am on May 23 and were scheduled to continue until May 24. Joint Sword-2024A was intended to “serve as a strong punishment for the separatist acts of “Taiwan independence” forces and a stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”

The drills also aimed to practice China’s “joint sea-air combat-readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets.” China MND released not only a map of the exercise zones, but also a graphic showing how China’s surface fleet would move towards Taiwan.

China Coast Guard

Approximately 1.5 hours after the MND announcement at 9am on May 23, China Coast Guard (CCG) announced that it will engage in a comprehensive law enforcement exercise to practice joint patrol, rapid response, and emergency response capabilities.

The CCG exercise was led by the Fujian Coast Guard. CCG showcased the exercise patrol path as operating within 2.8 nautical miles of Taiwan’s Wuqiu island and around 3.1 nautical miles near Taiwan’s Dongyin island.

Chinese media claimed that such operations “effectively shattered the Taiwan authorities’ claim of the so-called restricted waters.”

Article link in tweet 4.
2) The Significance of These Exercises

The Joint Sword-2024A exercise and linked law enforcement operation suggest several different aspects of China’s approach to Taiwan.

First, China is likely to continue to employ large-scale military activities around Taiwan to signal its displeasure and punish Taiwan and the United States.

Since China’s April 2023 military exercises, some experts from China, Taiwan, and the United States have argued that Chinese military exercises face diminishing utility in terms of advancing Chinese interests vis-à-vis Taiwan.

A CSIS China Power survey of leading U.S. and Taiwan experts in late 2023 found that more leading Taiwan experts believed that the most escalatory Chinese response to a Lai victory was highly coercive non-military actions, not a large-scale exercise encircling Taiwan.

However, Joint Sword-2024A shows that when China needs to demonstrate significant displeasure, the PLA and CCG are readily available actors and are best suited to attract international attention.

During the week of Lai’s inauguration, China first imposed sanctions and engaged in diplomatic pushback and condemnation before launching military exercises.

Indeed, in the last three years, China has engaged in highly publicized and large-scale military exercises around Taiwan for a variety of reasons: to oppose a high-level U.S. visit to Taiwan (August 2022), a Taiwan presidential transit of the United States and meetings with senior U.S. leaders (April 2023), and statements by Taiwan’s new president during his inauguration speech that Beijing deemed unacceptable (May 2024).

This trend is likely to continue. There is a risk moving forward that China could lower the bar to justify exercises against lesser perceived transgressions, particularly if China is pessimistic about the future direction of Taiwan.

These large-scale exercises also provide valuable opportunities for the PLA and CCG to train around Taiwan.

🧵 1) Map of activities & deployments of #US allies & #PLA forces in the #SouthChinaSea during #Balikatan2024 exercises April 26 - May 10

The Chinese military is closely watching the drills.

On May 1, two B-52H bombers from the Andersen Air Force Base (Guam) flew over the South China Sea, right over the islands disputed by China and Philippines.

The PLA responded by scrambling two Xian-11 fighters from the Yongxingdao airbase on the Paracel Islands and a Y-8 EW aircraft to monitor the American bombers. 2) China deployed the Tianwangxing Electronic Surveillance ship to monitor the #Balikatan2024 exercise.

At one point the USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) aborted a live-fire drill in the South China Sea due to the entry of Chinese spy ship Tianwangxing into the exercise area on April 29, 2024

1) #Chinese Nuclear plants Releasing Water Containing Tritium at Levels 6.5 Times Higher than Planned Fukushima Discharge

Fukushima's discharge of treated water to start this summer. Beijing strongly opposes the plan.

China plans dozens of new N-plants.
japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/world/asia-pac… 2) Chinese state media regularly condemn the planned release. Chinese Communist Party organ, People’s Daily, quoted an official saying, “Japan’s plan is not the country’s private matter, but a major issue that has an effect on the global marine environment and public health.”

THREAD: 1) Xi throws #Okinawa into East Asia geopolitical cocktail

Xi speaks of Ryukyu's history, with emphasis on ties with #China

Xi's message is clear: That 600 years back, Okinawa was under the sway of the Chinese world order.
asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks… 2) Xi said that 36 Clans of the Min-People went over to the Ryukyus & settled, a reference to the movement of people during Ming Dynasty China in the 14th century. He emphasized the need to collect and sort such historic documents to inherit and develop Chinese civilization well.

THREAD 1) At least 10,000 people died in #TiananmenSquareMassacre - Secret #British cable from the time says

Secret document say death toll was much higher than later reported, while claiming wounded students were bayoneted as they begged for their lives.
independent.co.uk/news/world/asi… 2) First waves of troops went in unarmed to disperse the protesters. Then “The 27 Army APCs opened fire on the crowd before running over them. APCs ran over troops & civilians at 65kmh.” “Students were given one hour to leave square, but after five minutes APCs attacked.

#BREAKING: #Chinese media said 2,296 delegates to the 20th Party Congress have been elected under the leadership of #XiJinping

Xi is expected to receive a 5-year-term in October, paving the way for his ascendence to Paramount Leader of the Party for life.
Sorry, No #chinacoup 2) Xinhua News Agency: Election of deputies to the 20th National Congress was completed.

Each electoral unit across China held party congresses or party representative meetings respectively & elected 2,296 deputies to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of #China

#THREAD: 1) It seems to me that #China has chosen a phased approach of limited military measures to squeeze #Taiwan here & there, on & off, pressure & release tactics, coupled with long term economic retaliation.

Southern Okinawa Japanese islands are also in China's crosshairs. 2) Here, the Global Times talks about #PLA military drill areas becoming a threat to #Taiwan's ports & shipping lanes, forming a blockade as a step to achieve reunification by force in the future.

Also a good way to test a US response.

https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1554712334685261824?s=20&t=AdzXUUpeAkISIQPT1VdtMw

THREAD: 1) With His Weak Response to #China’s Threats, Biden May Just Have thrown #Taiwan under the Bus

Biden worked behind the scenes to stop Pelosi from visiting Taiwan.

Biden also seemed to sacrifice Taiwan’s defence on a phone call with Xi Jinping.
msn.com/en-in/news/opi… 2) In a a long phone call over 2 hours, a White House statement said that Biden “underscored that the United States policy has not changed and that the US strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace & stability across the Taiwan Strait”

1/ #Ukrainian Nationalist Volunteers Committing 'ISIS-Style' War Crimes: Amnesty International

Right-wing Ukrainian ultra nationalists are committing war crimes in rebel-held territories of Eastern #Ukraine, evidence of militias beheading their victims.
newsweek.com/evidence-war-c… 2/ Armed volunteers who refer to themselves as the Aidar battalion "have been involved in widespread abuses, including abductions, unlawful detention, ill-treatment, theft, extortion, and possible executions", Amnesty said.

1/ #Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 11:

It's likely #Russian forces will renew offensive operations in the next 24-48 hours with emphasis on continuing to encircle #Kyiv, attacking west of #Kharkiv & capturing #Mariupol. Via @JominiW

#Russia #Ukraine #Donbass
#UkraineRussiaWar 2/ Kyiv AO assessment is detailed in this chart.

Key take away, both #Russian & #Ukrainian forces conducted limited probes throughout NW Kyiv.

Russian forces seem to be increasing targeting of known civilian exit routes, most likely to degrade morale. #KyivNow Via @JominiW

1/ How to interpret #Putin’s nuclear war threats

If #Russia's economy collapses & #Ukraine war fails, a limited nuclear strike to demonstrate resolve is not inconceivable.

I'd say very likely. Analysts & diplomats with good links to #Putin are worried.
asiatimes.com/2022/03/how-to… 2/ By alluding to a disproportionate nuclear escalation, Moscow wants to limit (or even reverse) western interference in Ukraine, in order to make the Russian war effort more sustainable. The West’s most powerful weapon at present is sanctions rather than military intervention.

#Russian 2S4 Tyulpan 240mm heavy mortars and 2S7M Malka 203mm heavy artilleries on the move in Belgorod.
vk.com/milinfolive?w=…
#UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaCrisis #RussianArmy 2/n
The "Z" markers denote they are heading to #Ukraine
- via @RALee85
#UkraineRussiaConflict #UkraineWar #UkraineInvasion

Assuring Assured Retaliation: Why #China is Growing its Nuclear Arsenal - An Analysis

Prof. @fravel & Prof. @Fiona_Cunning analyze the latest revelations about PRC’s nuclear modernization.

It's unclear if the goals of PRC's nuke strategy are changing..

washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/… @fravel @Fiona_Cunning 2/ The #US DoD's report assessed China's nuclear arsenal could quadruple by 2030.

PRC is building 3 missile-silo fields, which analysts expect to account for a significant increase in projected warhead stockpile.

PRC is modernizing, diversifying & expanding its nuke forces.

The World Is Fed Up With China’s Belligerence

Democracies are less worried about offending a fragile Beijing.

Today, Beijing represents a frowning, finger-pointing, never-erring crank, its constant vitriol diminishes the effectiveness of Chinese anger.

theatlantic.com/international/… 2/ Not long ago, Beijing was economical & targeted with its outrage, only lashing out over major issues.

“Now China just picks fights out of arrogance and bullying.”

After all, if most moves are likely to anger Beijing, why hold back from any of them?

The #ASEAN disunity over AUKUS

The #ASEAN sees #aukus pact increases geopolitical risks in the region, as #aukus is aimed at countering rising Chinese belligerence.
The rise of partnerships in the region, which are not ASEAN-centric causes them concern.

orfonline.org/expert-speak/t… 2/ How have various #ASEAN countries reacted to #aukus ?

They've not reacted in unison. Each member expressed its own views. The divergence in opinion was quite apparent.
Brunei did not speak about it.
Indonesia expressed caution with AUKUS.
Malaysia appears astonished.

China increasing depth near #India 's Siliguri corridor
“China is building an alternative axis in the Chumbi valley, which is close to the Siliguri corridor. They are increasing their depth by building roads through Bhutanese territory.”
- via @the_hindu
thehindu.com/news/national/… @the_hindu 2/ The U.S. DoD Report noted that despite dialogues to reduce border tensions, the PRC has “continued taking incremental & tactical actions to press its claims at the LAC.”
In this context, the recent MoU between Bhutan & China was significant & could have implications for India.

#THREAD: 1/ What the #US should do about #Taiwan

No one can doubt that #China is very close to attacking Taiwan.

Words from Washington are not enough as #Chinese warplanes step up their provocative incursions into Taiwan's airspace.

A great read!
asiatimes.com/2021/10/what-t… 2/ Taiwan so far has exercised restraint, putting its F-16s and other aircraft into the sky to challenge Chinese incursions into its air defense zone (ADIZ) but not firing on the intruding aircraft. But if a mistake happens, it will end up a bloody mess.

1/ #THREAD: #Submarine rescue ships in the Pacific

HQ-927 Yet Kieu sub rescue ship of the #Vietnamese Navy is the latest one

It supports #Vietnam's 6 Kilo-class submarines, it was just commissioned this year

Only Vietnam, #Singapore & #Malaysia have sub rescue ships in #ASEAN 2/ The Yet Kieu is designed to rescue submarines & surface ships, survey the seabed & search & recover undersea objects.

Built by the #Vietnamese 189 military owned shipyard.

It measures 94m long x 16m wide and has a displacement of 4,000 tons.

#Tibetan monks receive 'apocalyptically harsh' sentences in secret #Chinese trials

#China's crackdown against #Tibetans intensifies.

A new report revealed for the first time that four monks were sentenced up to 20 years in prison on unknown charges.
abc.net.au/news/2021-07-0… 2/ The 61-page report by Human Rights Watch found four monks from Tengdro monastery in Tingri county – Choegyal Wangpo, Lobsang Jinpa, Norbu Dondrup, and Ngawang Yeshe – were sentenced to 20, 19, 17, and five years respectively in September 2020.

#China magazine publishes article detailing 3 stage attack on #Taiwan

The first stage of an assault on Taiwan is ballistic missile attacks. The second stage includes cruise missile attacks. The 3rd round is artillery strikes from land-based rocket forces.
indianarrative.com/world-news/chi… 2/ The three stages would pave the way for the PLA's marine corps and amphibious landing troops who would invade Taiwan for the final assault and integration.

#IndiaChinaFaceOff : Ladakh standoff exposed #PLA's weaknesses, made #China rejig security narrative

The Galwan incident was the first taste of combat—though without firearms—that it had with an actual enemy after getting a bloody nose in #Vietnam in 1979
theweek.in/theweek/cover/… 2/ “The PLA has been facing a challenge of absence of combat experience and a lack of realistic training. It has been widely accepted even within the Chinese establishment,” said Lieutenant General (retd) D.S. Hooda, former northern Army commander.