‼️ It‘s time for a wake up call. Europeans are sleepwalking into the biggest double threat they are facing from China so far. Together with @heidirediker, we argue in @ForeignAffairs that China has become a threat to Europe‘s security and prosperity - and outline what Europeans have to do… (1/9) @CFR_org @CFR_RealEcon @CFR_China @RushDoshi @EvanFeigenbaum @MPGoodman88 @Brad_Setserforeignaffairs.com/guest-pass/red… (2/9) The war in Ukraine cannot end on Kyiv’s terms if Russia remains an open floodgate for Chinese supplies, and Europe cannot remain prosperous if China has almost free rein to hollow out Europe’s industrial economy. It is essential for Brussels and EU member states to demonstrate that they are ready to impose costs of their own on China.

I could not be more delighted that @SurvivalEditors has published my critical take on NATO’s „bridge“ for Ukraine in their newest issue. There is a peril in indecision, and that’s where we are. Here are a few of my arguments 👇🧵 @CFR_org free version: @FHeisbourg @IvoHDaalder @ConStelz @JimGoldgeier @stephenwertheim @camille_grand @jgotkowska @ulrichspecktandfonline.com/eprint/QY3RHVE… NATO has a „timeline phobia“ when it comes to Ukraine. It believes in the fatalistic argument that it can not offer Ukraine membership for after the war ends or Putin will never end it. This is a circular argument. Putin believes already that Ukraine will become a NATO member anyway.

Has #Germany finally turned the corner on #China? In a new @ForeignAffairs piece w/ @ZongyuanZoeLiu, we argue that despite a toughened China strategy, Berlin treats geopolitics as a tactical risk to avoid rather than an arena to engage. THREAD 🧵👇(1/14)foreignaffairs.com/europe/berlins… Converging concerns about China’s ability to apply economic coercion have brought the United States and Europe closer together under the de-risking agenda. But significant differences persist, and Germany’s new China strategy underscores these differences. (2/14)

A thread on our new @ForeignAffairs article with @mkimmage and the question is Prigozhin’s rebellion the beginning of the end of the Putin regime? (1/12) 🧵👇 @CFR_org
foreignaffairs.com/russian-federa… Putin’s hubris and indecisiveness have been the story of the war. They are now the story of domestic Russian politics. Whatever Prigozhin’s motives and intentions may be, his rebellion has exposed an acute vulnerability of Putin’s regime: its contempt for the common man. (2/12)

Für @zeitonline habe ich zum Jahrestag aufgeschrieben, warum der Westen eine Theorie des Sieges braucht, die Ukraine "gewinnen" kann, und die nächsten Monate entscheidend sein werden. Danke auch für die schoene Aufmachung! Ein Thread (1/7) 👇🧵 zeit.de/politik/auslan… 2023 wird nicht nur ein entscheidendes Jahr in diesem Krieg sein, sondern muss auch vom Westen dazu gemacht werden. Er muss die Ukraine befähigen, eine erfolgreiche Gegenoffensive durchzuführen, eine, die verhindert, dass Russland den Krieg noch auf Jahre in die Länge zieht (2/7)

Incredible reporting by @SZ - vice chancellor Habeck received the evening before the invasion a confidential envelope from US reps that the war is about to start not knowing if others in government received it too. A story how Berlin stumbled into this war sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artik…

Putin miscalculated many things in this war. After one year, one particular misjudgment has become clear: Despite his personal ties, Putin got Germany wrong. Our piece for @CFR_org with @c_kapp99 - have a read! 👉 cfr.org/in-brief/one-y… (1/5) Putin considered Germany too dependent on Russian energy, too weak militarily, too business-minded to mount any significant resistance to his war. He thought—beyond political rhetoric and economic sanctions—GER would eventually defer to Russian dominance in Eastern Europe (2/5)

For the start of 2023, here is my optimistic take for @cfr_org why the doomsayers predicting that Europe would not get through the winter without folding on Ukraine were wrong. European democracies are much more resilient than expected: cfr.org/article/why-eu… 👇 @shannonkoneil By its nature, the EU is a compromise machine. The process by which the EU reaches a joint position is tedious and imperfect, but—as many EU leaders like to underline—it is the outcome that matters.

It’s not only about the tanks, although they matter a great deal. It’s the signal that Ukraine must and will go on the offensive this spring, and it will be equipped to do so. There is no war fatigue in the West, no „let’s just hold the line and focus on air defense“. (1/3) The West is not falling for fake ceasefire talks, and for a frozen line of contact. Russia‘s new theory of victory - to wait and win - and to wear out Ukraine and the West is not working. It failed on exactly this day - visibly for everyone, also in Beijing. (2/3)

For the Jan/Feb @ForeignAffairs, @mkimmage and I explore three scenarios of Russian defeat - and implications for domestic politics, UKR & the West. Unfortunately, it is not an uplifting read. This is about the promise and peril of Russian defeat👇🧵foreignaffairs.com/russian-federa… (1/17) War is inherently unpredictable. A reversal of fortunes is impossible to discount. It nevertheless appears that Russia is headed for defeat. Less certain is what form this defeat will take. Three basic scenarios exist, and each one would have different ramifications. (2/17)

One year after being sworn in as Chancellor of Germany, @Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz explains in this long-read for @ForeignAffairs Germany's "Zeitenwende" and how to prevent a new Cold War. Here are the most important take-aways as thread👇🧵foreignaffairs.com/germany/olaf-s… @CFR_org (1/24) In his view, "Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has put an end to an era" - and is the beginning of a new multipolar world, where "different countries and models of government are competing for power and influence" - not only a German Zeitenwende, but a global one (2/24)

This long Merkel portrait is worth your time and says a lot about the legacy she will be remembered for. Here are some interesting, concerning, and surprising points 🧵👇(1/14) spiegel.de/panorama/ein-j… She repeats again that in her view, Minsk II was dead in 2021, but the only Plan B (instead of increased, perhaps also military support for Ukraine) she had in mind was a European dialogue with Putin, akin to the Biden-Putin dialogue - a non-starter with Europeans (2/14)

These are striking survey results from Germany. I’ve argued before that Germany has a leadership problem in the Ukraine war - the new opinion poll from @KoerberIP confirms this, but there are also positive results on #China and other issues. A thread 🧵 👉 cfr.org/in-brief/ukrai… The German public is more hesitant than in the years before to become more strongly involved in international crises. 52% prefer restraint, only 41% more engagement 👇

Here’s my first piece for @CFR_org 👇 - On the Ukraine War, Germany Has a Leadership Problem. Here's Why. on.cfr.org/3CYGspt via @CFR_org A quick thread🧵 (1/7) Germany is providing critical weapon systems to Ukraine in the grinding war with Russia - such as the arrival of IRIS-T air defense - but it remains reluctant to lead on European security. (2/7)

And here is the sixth installment of @mkimmage and my series for @ForeignAffairs, this time: What if the war spins out of control? 👉 foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai… @KoerberIP @WIIS_de At the outset of the war, both sides hashed out a set of invisible rules—unspoken but nonetheless real. They include Russia’s acceptance of allied heavy-weapons deliveries and intelligence support for Ukraine, but not the use of Western troops.

Has Germany done enough to prevent the return of spheres of influence in Europe? And what happened to Germany's historical responsibility with the war in Ukraine? Here are some thoughts for the new issue of @TWQgw - Thread 🧵👇And first 50 copies are free! tandfonline.com/eprint/MMQDBN2… 1) Russia’s actions stand opposed to everything Germany had learned from its history both pre- and post-1945. Pre-1945, Germany subjugated large parts of Europe into a German sphere of occupation. Post-1945, the Eastern part of GER was absorbed into a Soviet
sphere of influence

Two weeks after our initial article What If Russia Wins?, @mkimmage and I think through the opposite scenario: What If Russia Loses? for @ForeignAffairs - "They created a desert and called it peace" (Tacitus) but then the question becomes: what now?foreignaffairs.com/guest-pass/red… (1/9) Putin has made a strategic blunder by invading Ukraine and he will be unable to win this war on his preferred terms. Perhaps he can cobble together a puppet government with Kyiv as its capital, a Vichy Ukraine. Perhaps he can muster the support required from a secret police (2/9)

THREAD🧵- What If Russia Wins in Ukraine? @mkimmage and I tried to think through this scenario and the consequences for Europe and the US for @ForeignAffairs - here are some points👇@gmfus foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai… (1/11) If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the EU or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. (2/11)

Four years after our Brookings paper, @stevenckeil and myself continue our reflection on the state of #German foreign policy. Is the Biden presidency Germany’s last chance to step up? Have a look at our @gmfus paper @ConStelz @ulrichspeck @Judy_Dempsey @jan_techau @jana_puglierin

https://twitter.com/gmfus/status/1373286460485480449

(2/5) Four issues will be critical in determining Germany’s ability to partner with the #US in leadership: security policy, the #Russia & #China test cases (Nord Stream & more), public opinion on foreign policy & the makeup of the governing coalition after this fall’s elections.

1) THREAD: What to expect if the #US 🇺🇸withdraws from #NATO? At the Körber #PolicyGame, we discussed this scenario w/ high-level officials and experts in coop w/ @IISS_org - here are the summarized results for the Twitterati community: (have mercy, it’s my first thread!) 2) We wanted to know: How would Europeans react in such a situation?What are interests and red lines? Thus, we invited a 🇫🇷, 🇩🇪, 🇵🇱,🇬🇧, and 🇺🇸 team to play our scenario. Crisis in the #South, Crisis in the #East - were #Europeans able to get their act together w/out the 🇺🇸? 💪 🇪🇺