Thread by @JamesSpediacci

13 Reasons why EOS is a disaster:

1A/ The ECAF Arbitration process is a disaster:
-ECAF ordered to freeze hacked accounts
-Following arbitration one BP processed blacklisted transactions.
-Dan threw out the constitution because it is socially unscalable

1B/ The constitution was resubmitted based on the problems with ECAF. There was a proposal to eliminate ECAF and no longer enforce off-chain rulings.

2/ RAM over-speculation:
It costs up to $17 for users to create an account. Whales cornered the RAM market. RAM is bought up and held by speculators. BP's implemented a constant drip of new RAM. The steadily increasing supply is meant to decrease the demand pressure.

3A/ Fake tx volume:
Due to the EOS "no transaction fee" model, usage statistics are easily and cheaply manipulated by use of Sybil which fakes Dapp activity and creates the illusion of an active ecosystem.

3B/ BeTDice (largest EOS game) for example has 91 twitter followers and 800 Telegram members which raises questions about their “7,969 users.”

4A/ It’s Centralized:
Only 21 BP's that can vote each other in. It takes just 17/21 BP’s to achieve consensus. Blockone, who claimed to have no involvement in the launch of the EOS mainnet are now using the 10% of the token supply they own to influence the list of BP’s.

4B/ The rich buy votes via token accumulation and vote themselves in. It's a plutocracy. Also exchanges are voting with customer funds.

5/ BP’s can agree to reverse transactions, meaning EOS does not have absolute finality and is therefore not Byzantine Fault Tolerant.

6/ An EOS BP is just a corporate-owned server. It can be shut down with a subpoena or by governments. EOS is not permissionless, immutable, or censorship-resistant.

7A/ Cartels:
BP’s are already forming cartels. Cartel formation means the 21 BP’s can form alliances to stay in power by mutually voting for each other in exchange for sharing proceeds.

7B/ Cartel formation enables them to print money, censor, or reverse transactions. BP’s are accumulating EOS and it gives them a stronger vote over time. It is also possible for exchanges to use their customer’s tokens to vote for delegates.

8/ tx fee tradeoff for inflation :
tx fees were replaced by 5% inflation.
BP's collect 1% of inflation, and 4% goes into the community savings fund. There are 21 active producers which share 50% of the inflation pool. 100 standby producers share the other 50%.

9/ If you dont vote within 3 years, you lose everything because your tokens get confiscated and redistributed.

10/ EOS had an uncapped ICO that raised $4B. The $4B raised went straight to a Cayman-based for-profit company called Blockone as profit, which may do whatever they want with it. 25% of the $4B EOS raised is going to be used for VC investing.

11/ The EOS ICO raised about $20m/day for a year thanks to an abitrage trading scheme. Traders profited by doing the ICO and selling on exchanges the very next day. They had bots calculating how much ETH they should put into the ICO in the last 1-2 minutes every day for a year.

12A/ EOS pushes costs onto developers.
It costs $10 in staked EOS to onboard a new end user on to any EOS Dapp. If your Dapp gets 1M users, that costs you $10M. This costs $0 on ETH. This is a massive issue that EOS has not publicly addressed it at all.

12B/ Any Dapp that doesn't want to go bankrupt will need to undertake extensive game theoretical ecosystem analysis, and incorporate it into their central planning of the Dapp’s economics.

13A/ Unlike most proof of stake blockchains, EOS does not pay out a reward to every person staking on the network; it only pays a reward to the top BP’s, allowing the rich to get richer. When you stake EOS you don't get paid, you only vote for someone else to get paid.

13B/ This also doesn’t protect you against inflation.