#Taliban and #Iran have a complicated relationship. At times, it was mutual enmity (almost escalated into an invasion in 1998, after Taliban forces killed members of the #Iranian consulate staff in Mazar-e Sharif) and Iran supported the Taliban’s rival, the Northern Alliance 👇
Yet #Iran has since provided arms to the #Taliban, including grenades, rockets, and explosives, and the #Quds Force has trained the Taliban on various tactics and weapons 👇
In 2012, #Iran even allowed the #Taliban to open an office in Iran, and in May 2016 #Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was killed after visiting his family in Iran by a #US drone strike on the #Iran-#Pakistan border 👇
Further, reporting in 2017 indicated that cooperation between the #Taliban and #Iran has evolved and that the parties are now working together on a tactical level, jointly planning Taliban operations.
More on this in “Deconstructing and Countering the #Iran Threat Network” @WashInstitute
Khamenei’s office issues a series of interviews with members of the “JCPOA Monitoring Council” discussing Khamenei’s guidelines.
The council is composed of conservatives and “moderates”, with members like Rouhani, Larijani, Zarif, Salehi, Jalili, Kharazi, Velayati & Ghalibaf
The interviews were held in the context of Khamenei’s last speech, and are clearly meant to show that the regime is in full consensus with Khamenei’s line of thought — the kind of “rallying around the flag” rhetoric Tehran has taken many times in 2003-05 (per Rouhani’s memoirs)
1 - The notion that Iran is in “no hurry” for the US to return to the JCPOA. Jalili & Velayati noted that if sanctions aren’t lifted, Iran won’t rush into a deal & Kharazi explained that Iran must first see how the Biden admin will act
Quick #Iran Elections thought: 9 months before the ballots, newspapers are filled with an increasing number of IRGC-related hardliners who may run (e.g. Ghalibaf, Dehghan, Ghasemi, Fattah etc.). Yet so far no strong candidate on the other side of the political map has emerged
1/4
Indeed #Iran’s pendulum politics seem to shift to the hardline side. Traditional conservatives & reformists will have hard choices to take if they want to counter this trend. They would prob have to reach a compromise/ZOPA candidate if they want to win elections
2/4
According to many, former Majles Speaker Ali #Larijani is an option. While his family’s power diminished over the last years (his brothers were removed from their positions), I wouldn’t disregard him. Remember that #Rouhani won elections after a decade in political wilderness
3/4
Thread 👇
Whatever shape the Snapback clash may take, Iran’s reaction is becoming clearer. Instead of playing hardball, it embraced a cautious approach of disregarding the US threat & exploiting the crisis for political gains
Over the past few months, Tehran has warned that reimposing UN sanctions might push it to take harsh steps in response. Yet more recent statements indicate that the regime is poised to follow its frequent pattern of taking a more calculated nuclear approach in the end.
2/10
The Majles National Security & FP Committee warned that if snapback is triggered, AEOI should immediately “return all nuclear activity to the level before JCPOA”. The statement then echoed the same steps Iran threatened to take in the past (increasing # & % of enrichment)
3/10
A few thoughts re @iaeaorg decision and the potential for "dynamics of escalation".
Iran had always had blind-spots in assessing how others would react to its actions. The 2005 nuclear crisis and the storming of the UK embassy in 2012 are great example of strategic fallacies 1/5
Decision makers in Iran likely see today's events as part of a broader US attempt to extend the arms embargo. The regime has a dilemma - it doesn't want to risk an escalation at its current situation (Covid, Economy, Protests), yet wants to deter US from pursuing this path 2/5
Now comes the tricky part - does the strategic planners in Tehran believe that there is an equilibrium in which Iran reacts in a "proportionate" way, holding true to its implicit threats to hinder the cooperation with the IAEA, but still doesn't risk broader escalation? 3/5
Since 2012, Tehran has suggested it may need to produce nuclear-fueled ships and submarines because sanctions have forced its navy to look for alternative fuel sources. 4/6 navies in the world that possess nuclear propulsion reactors use high enriched Uranium 1/4
In 2018, Tehran reemphasized the project in the wake of US pressures, taking a step forward by alerting the IAEA of its decision “to construct naval nuclear propulsion in the future.” Iran told the agency that no facility will be involved in the project for the next 5 years 2/4
Yet Tehran uses this project from time to time to threaten the West, hoping to deter it from increasing pressures. Only last week did the AEOI spox announced an advancement in the project, without shading more light on this subject. Yesterday the navy chief joined the choir 3/4
Thread👇:
How does the #Coronavirus outbreak in Iran affects the regime's attention to its nuclear program? What can we learn from Iran's dull nuclear holiday, and how should the Intl. community deter Iran from any cheater?
Iran's Nuclear holiday is an opp for the regime to unveil (exaggerated) advancements in its nuke program. In light of #Coronavirus the festival was postponed this year, a decision that was probably influenced by the high infection rate among top officials washin.st/34yh2MH
The AEOI announced “122 nuke achievements” (to be unveiled later this year), but the leadership doesn't seem to be focused on the nuke program. Rouhani didn't issue a statement re the holiday, and Khamenei didn't reference the program in his Nowruz speech washin.st/34yh2MH