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<THREAD>Why did the Hanoi Summit end without an agreement? What lessons should be learned for getting diplomacy back on track? (1/n)
We don't know what the precise stumbling blocks in Hanoi were. In fact, we haven't even heard the North Korean take yet. But it seems there was a mismatch between North Korean asks on sanctions and U.S. asks on denuclearization. (2/n)
Trump implied that North Korea was only willing to address facilities at Yongbyon, not elsewhere. (3/n) 
But it should come as no surprise that North Korea wasn't willing to address facilities outside Yongbyon. Kim said as much in the Pyongyang declaration with Moon. (4/n)
U.S. officials seem to have genuinely believed, however, that Kim would go further. Here are Beigun's remarks from Stanford. Obviously, I don't know what Pompeo was told privately, but the Pyongyang declaration is more limited in scope than Beigun suggests. (5/n)
For its part, I suspect North Korea calculated that Trump was desperate for a deal and was going to fold on sanctions relief. It wasn't a bad bet, I think, but it didn't end up paying off. Trump is actually quite unpredictable about when he folds and when he raises. (6/n)
Because North Korea (wrongly) calculated that Trump would fold in Hanoi, they had very little incentive to engage in serious preliminary talks with the United States. As a result, there was no opportunity to narrow the gap or conclude that it couldn't be narrowed. (7/n)
So, here's the good news. Diplomacy is not dead. I hope. *So far* the aftermath of Hanoi has not been acrimonious and Trump expressed a willingness to keep talking. Though, as I said, we await the North Korean reaction. (8/n)
Moreover, we should really hope that diplomacy works. I *really* don't want to go back to the tensions of summer 2016. Or worse. So, here are some lessons going forward. (9/n)
Lesson 1: The United States should take Kim's public statements seriously and literally. Private statements--that may or may not be understood correctly --should be given less weight, (10/n)
Lesson 2: North Korea should understand that Trump won't acquiesce to just anything. However they assess him personally, he does face structural and political barriers to accepting a bad deal. (11/n)
Lesson 3: Most controversially, I believe even more strongly that we need to move from a denuclearization to a risk-reduction paradigm. Let's not make the good the enemy of the best. (12/n)
Putting aside the question of whether North Korea would ever actually denuclearize, both sides lack the capacity, IMO, to negotiate a detailed and complex agreement. And, yes, that includes the United States as my colleague noted this morning. (13/n)
The most practical way forward is to negotiate modest risk-reduction measures in return for modest sanctions relief. At the risk of sounding like a stuck record, I call this "less for less." (14/14) carnegieendowment.org/2018/06/13/wha…
