Omer Carmi Profile picture
Apr 6, 2019 6 tweets 5 min read Read on X
While a worst case scenario approach is an important tool in strategic planning, one should remember that #Iran will probably be cautious than before in retaliating to the #US #IRGC_FTO decision
1/6
First, #Tehran is focused on the floods and is under harsh criticism from its public. As senior #IRGC officials were threatened by an angry mob this week, #Soleimani himself had to announce a 1-month tour in the flooded provinces. This is no time for a conflict with the #US 2/6
Second, while designating the #IRGC as an #FTO is significant and important, it is mainly a symbolic and political move. The restrictions on the IRGC are already in effect due to various #US sanctions acts and executives orders on #Iran 3/6
Third, while #Iran talks big, it usually doesn’t live to its threats. This was the case when Iran threatened to put #US bases and forces within a "radius of 1,000 km from Iran" at risk if the 2017 CAATSA #sanctions pass (the bill was approved, the threat did not materialize) 4/6
This was also the case when #Tehran repeatedly threatened to close the straits of #Hormuz in 2011-2012 (oil sanctions) and again in 2018 (JCPOA withdrawal) 5/6
Bottom line - #Iran has repeatedly shown that it is unlikely to take precipitous, direct action in response to #US #sanctions. Tehran is likely to be even more risk-averse in light of current domestic situation in the country 6/6

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More from @CarmiOmer

Jan 14, 2021
Khamenei’s office issues a series of interviews with members of the “JCPOA Monitoring Council” discussing Khamenei’s guidelines.

The council is composed of conservatives and “moderates”, with members like Rouhani, Larijani, Zarif, Salehi, Jalili, Kharazi, Velayati & Ghalibaf Image
The interviews were held in the context of Khamenei’s last speech, and are clearly meant to show that the regime is in full consensus with Khamenei’s line of thought — the kind of “rallying around the flag” rhetoric Tehran has taken many times in 2003-05 (per Rouhani’s memoirs) Image
What do these interviews try to show?

1 - The notion that Iran is in “no hurry” for the US to return to the JCPOA. Jalili & Velayati noted that if sanctions aren’t lifted, Iran won’t rush into a deal & Kharazi explained that Iran must first see how the Biden admin will act
Read 12 tweets
Sep 3, 2020
Quick #Iran Elections thought: 9 months before the ballots, newspapers are filled with an increasing number of IRGC-related hardliners who may run (e.g. Ghalibaf, Dehghan, Ghasemi, Fattah etc.). Yet so far no strong candidate on the other side of the political map has emerged
1/4
Indeed #Iran’s pendulum politics seem to shift to the hardline side. Traditional conservatives & reformists will have hard choices to take if they want to counter this trend. They would prob have to reach a compromise/ZOPA candidate if they want to win elections
2/4
According to many, former Majles Speaker Ali #Larijani is an option. While his family’s power diminished over the last years (his brothers were removed from their positions), I wouldn’t disregard him. Remember that #Rouhani won elections after a decade in political wilderness
3/4
Read 4 tweets
Aug 21, 2020
Thread 👇
Whatever shape the Snapback clash may take, Iran’s reaction is becoming clearer. Instead of playing hardball, it embraced a cautious approach of disregarding the US threat & exploiting the crisis for political gains

My latest @WashInstitute washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
1/10
Over the past few months, Tehran has warned that reimposing UN sanctions might push it to take harsh steps in response. Yet more recent statements indicate that the regime is poised to follow its frequent pattern of taking a more calculated nuclear approach in the end.
2/10
The Majles National Security & FP Committee warned that if snapback is triggered, AEOI should immediately “return all nuclear activity to the level before JCPOA”. The statement then echoed the same steps Iran threatened to take in the past (increasing # & % of enrichment)
3/10
Read 10 tweets
Jun 19, 2020
A few thoughts re @iaeaorg decision and the potential for "dynamics of escalation".
Iran had always had blind-spots in assessing how others would react to its actions. The 2005 nuclear crisis and the storming of the UK embassy in 2012 are great example of strategic fallacies 1/5
Decision makers in Iran likely see today's events as part of a broader US attempt to extend the arms embargo. The regime has a dilemma - it doesn't want to risk an escalation at its current situation (Covid, Economy, Protests), yet wants to deter US from pursuing this path 2/5
Now comes the tricky part - does the strategic planners in Tehran believe that there is an equilibrium in which Iran reacts in a "proportionate" way, holding true to its implicit threats to hinder the cooperation with the IAEA, but still doesn't risk broader escalation? 3/5
Read 5 tweets
Apr 17, 2020
Since 2012, Tehran has suggested it may need to produce nuclear-fueled ships and submarines because sanctions have forced its navy to look for alternative fuel sources. 4/6 navies in the world that possess nuclear propulsion reactors use high enriched Uranium 1/4
In 2018, Tehran reemphasized the project in the wake of US pressures, taking a step forward by alerting the IAEA of its decision “to construct naval nuclear propulsion in the future.” Iran told the agency that no facility will be involved in the project for the next 5 years 2/4
Yet Tehran uses this project from time to time to threaten the West, hoping to deter it from increasing pressures. Only last week did the AEOI spox announced an advancement in the project, without shading more light on this subject. Yesterday the navy chief joined the choir 3/4
Read 4 tweets
Apr 14, 2020
Thread👇:
How does the #Coronavirus outbreak in Iran affects the regime's attention to its nuclear program? What can we learn from Iran's dull nuclear holiday, and how should the Intl. community deter Iran from any cheater?

Read my latest @WashInstitute washin.st/34yh2MH
Iran's Nuclear holiday is an opp for the regime to unveil (exaggerated) advancements in its nuke program. In light of #Coronavirus the festival was postponed this year, a decision that was probably influenced by the high infection rate among top officials
washin.st/34yh2MH
The AEOI announced “122 nuke achievements” (to be unveiled later this year), but the leadership doesn't seem to be focused on the nuke program. Rouhani didn't issue a statement re the holiday, and Khamenei didn't reference the program in his Nowruz speech
washin.st/34yh2MH
Read 13 tweets

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