Thread by @CarmiOmer

While a worst case scenario approach is an important tool in strategic planning, one should remember that #Iran will probably be cautious than before in retaliating to the #US #IRGC_FTO decision
1/6

First, #Tehran is focused on the floods and is under harsh criticism from its public. As senior #IRGC officials were threatened by an angry mob this week, #Soleimani himself had to announce a 1-month tour in the flooded provinces. This is no time for a conflict with the #US 2/6

Second, while designating the #IRGC as an #FTO is significant and important, it is mainly a symbolic and political move. The restrictions on the IRGC are already in effect due to various #US sanctions acts and executives orders on #Iran 3/6

Third, while #Iran talks big, it usually doesn’t live to its threats. This was the case when Iran threatened to put #US bases and forces within a "radius of 1,000 km from Iran" at risk if the 2017 CAATSA #sanctions pass (the bill was approved, the threat did not materialize) 4/6

This was also the case when #Tehran repeatedly threatened to close the straits of #Hormuz in 2011-2012 (oil sanctions) and again in 2018 (JCPOA withdrawal) 5/6

Bottom line - #Iran has repeatedly shown that it is unlikely to take precipitous, direct action in response to #US #sanctions. Tehran is likely to be even more risk-averse in light of current domestic situation in the country 6/6