A few thoughts on the UK decision to pull diplomats out of most EU meetings on 1/9/19 ("bonkers" @CER_Grant). One place where this could be immediately notable is at the #UnitedNations, where @UKUN_NewYork has attended about 1000+ EU coordination meetings a year. [1/4]
@CER_Grant@UKUN_NewYork@ecfr The funny thing is that in the immediate post-referendum years, @UKUN_NewYork made a point of contributing *more* not less to EU coordination meetings at the UN [3/4].
@CER_Grant@UKUN_NewYork@ecfr Now, on the verge of the #UNGA circus -- where the UK has big-ticket items on development and climate change to push -- @UKUN_NewYork may be directed to limit coordination with EU. My guess is that the Brits will sill quietly keep working with the EU through various channels...
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OK, it's that time of year again: The #UNGA high-level week is one week away.
I'll be linking to @CrisisGroup & my comments and quotes on #UNGA78 in this thread.
Follow along... 1/x
In a new piece at @just_security, I look at the big issues and possible divisions we'll see at #UNGA78.
My basic predictions: The #SDGs will be the top policy issue @UN but #Ukraine's President #Zelenskyy may steal the show. 2/x justsecurity.org/88126/the-them…
@just_security @UN I also talked to @pshah518 about what to expect at #UNGA78 in this @just_security podcast. 3/x
There's lots of justified concern about the #BlackSeaGrainInitiative after Russia suspended its participation.
I'd just note that (i) this sort of crisis with the deal was always quite likely; and (ii) the deal is not necessarily dead. [1/5] economist.com/europe/2022/10…
There is a long history of stop-start diplomacy with Russia @UN over humanitarian initiatives - especially in #Syria - during which Moscow often threatens to halt cooperation entirely and then relents.
Last week was a significant (and worrying) one for those who watch U.S./Western interactions with #China and the #UnitedNations, for three reasons.
[1/5]
First, and most widely discussed, the High Commissioner for Human Rights's visit to #China turned into a (100% predictable) public relations mess. [2/5] ft.com/content/6ca09f…
Second, #China joined #Russia in vetoing a U.S. sanctions resolution on #DPRK, signalling a break with previous (uneasy) accommodations among the P5 on North Korean issues. [3/5] dw.com/en/china-russi…
First, the SG should be very careful to avoid any "grip and grin" moments with Putin and Lavrov.
Lavrov tricked the @ICRC's experienced chief into an apparently jolly handshake in March, and will doubtless want to do the same with Guterres. [2/6] euractiv.com/section/global…
More substantively, the SG will need to have some clear "asks" and ideas for Russia. Options might include:
* Improving humanitarian access;
* Relief for civilians in #Mariupol;
* Suggesting possible frameworks for peace talks (but without making predictions on substance). [3/6]
India is first non-NATO country to speak on #Ukraine in #UNSC tonight. Lots of talk about the need for diplomacy, de-escalation, etc. But no reference to Ukraine's sovereignty or condemnation of Russia.
Brazil expresses "extreme concern" about Ukraine in #UNSC, and calls for diplomacy for peace. Does raise sovereign equality of states and territorial integrity.
Avoids using the word "Russia".
Mexico (3rd non-NATO speaker on Ukraine in UNSC) does call out Russia -- a little more gingerly than NATO members but by name -- and talks about Ukrainian sovereignty. Notably firmer than India and Brazil, although also pivoting to diplomacy and dialogue.