#1st_Division also sent some reinforcements to #Qamishlo airport yesterday. Not originally planning for today's events but they're there now.
It's important to recognize that #Assad does not have the resources to govern the territory of #Rojava on his own. The #SAA is stretched thin enough dealing with an insurgency in #Daraa & keeping pressure on #Idlib & there are near daily #ISIS attacks in central #Syria...
"Effective" governing & anti-ISIS ops in NE Syria will rely on cooperation b/w #Assad & the #SDF (or components of it)
Does anyone have much faith in Assad allowing an opposition faction to retain that much power? Not to mention the personal animosity many SAA commanders hold.
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Yesterday Mil Operations leaders met with Alawite notables in #Latakia. Hassan Soufan (ex-Ahrar) is now Mil Commander of the Coast.
An Alawite professor from Latakia University gave an overview:
"Sheikh Abu Hassan & Sheikh Hassan spoke with complete transparency ..."
1) "priority is to impose security & safety... strictly forbidden to attack any person under the pretext of sectarianism ... attack private & public property ... enter or search homes except in special cases & by the uniformed General Security after showing their identities"
2) "strictly forbidden to shoot, anyone who violates the law will be arrested - the failure to hold anyone accountable now is due to lack of a sufficient number of military operations personnel, and these matters will be addressed as soon as possible, perhaps within a few hours."
Capture of Ourm al-Sughra is an important step towards capturing 46th Reg Base, which will be crucial for solidifying gains and freeing up resources for the eastern axes.
Lots of hype for an imminent Turkish offensive in NES that seems largely divorced from reality. Reminds me of the cycles of "new Idlib operation" that are based on flimsy evidence.
Struggle to see why this would happen after yesterday's at least not-negative Biden/Erdogan summit
From the Turkish perspective, their big complaint has been the PKK commanders embedded in NES and they seem quite content with their recent policy of droning these commanders. Meanwhile their military is stretched thin with overseas deployments right now
Erdogan is also dealing with an economic crisis amid a surging opposition that is increasingly vocal in their opposition to Syria ops. It isn't like past years where he can use an offensive to "distract" voters. An op now with dead TSK would likely only weaken him in the polls
This horrible article is a great example of "analysts" manipulating "data" to fit a policy proposal and narrative they decided upon before researching. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
The moment you rely on ACLED for Syria your evidence is worthless. There were *at least* 248 anti-regime attacks this year, the vast majority targeting regime and allies. Even when ACLED under-counts attacks it absurdly inflates casualty numbers (no numbers in pic 2 are right)
These pieces by people who don't actually follow the central Syria insurgency continue to ignore the major changes that have occurred since it became "mainstream" late last year. Spring & Summer saw significant reductions to ISIS capabilities that are only just now being reversed
New thread on interesting SAA & Republican Guard facts/anecdotes I’m finding for an upcoming report. Mostly stuff from earlier in the war.
Video shows #Chechen foreign fighters in Ballermoun, Aleppo on March 17, 2014
On 3/21 rebels here killed Maj General Samea Abbas, head of the 102nd Regiment RG. On 3/25 they killed Brig General Qasi Mohammad, commander of the 415th Battalion of the 102nd.
Seems the 415th Battalion was destroyed in this battle as I can’t find any credible references to it after Qasi’s death. 102nd remained in #Aleppo until late 2017 (when deployment reports end).