Fascinating details in this report with #Baghdadi's brother-in-law about the hunt to the ISIS leader. Interesting insights on how ISIS used sheep herders to move around, and how these shepherds ended up stealing about $70m from an ISIS hideout:

Thread:
July 2019, Iraqi National Intelligence Service intercepts a person by the name of Mohammed Ali Sajet al-Zoubai, Baghdadi’s brother-in-law & close aide. He crossed into Iraq and was traveling under “Othman Ahmed Farhan.
He‘d been tracked for a month after he entered the Iraqi borders. Within a month, he was captured as he entered Baghdad wearing his suicide belt, carrying a message to cells in the capital.
In the process of tracking him, several leaders were killed:

His uncle & Baghdadi’s aide Abu Abdullah al-Zoubai.

Ayub al-Zawi Abu Sabah, a courier for both Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi & his predecessor Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.

Abu Ziyad al-Janabi, ISIS leader in Salah ad-Din.
He led authorities to Baghdadi’s secret hideouts. One where the gun Baghdadi had to his side during his last appearance on camera.

In the process, authorities killed several ISIS leaders, incl. one in charge of Mosul, Abu Noah.

Hundreds of docs were found in Oct with US help
The report reveals that one of those present during #Baghdadi’s last appearance was the spokesman Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir, killed hours later in #Syria’s Jarablus. A profile picture was revealed in video.

The April video was filmed in a 6mx8m tunnel hideout in Anbar desert.
Baghdadi’s brother-in-law said he lived a normal life with Baghdadi, in a 6mx8m hideout in the Anbar desert. Baghdadi spent time praying, reading the Quran, stretching, kept reminding him to be religious.
Baghdadi’s security situation was worsening. He and ISIS leaders relied for their security on sheer herders, so when the security measures became more intensive there, shepherds had to leave the area, and that caused problems.
Baghdadi was with his brother-in-law, along with Abu Sabah (Baghdadi’s aide), Hajj Tayseer (in charge of Iraq), Abu Noah (courier), Abu Baraa. All wore suicide belts. There were worried and squeezed.
The brother-in-law stayed with Baghdadi 13 days in Anbar. When they wanted to venture outside the hideout, Baghdadi would ask them to go before him, for about 20-30 minutes early, to listen in for any drones or planes before he came out.
He said Baghdadi trusted him. He asked him about the news of the Hajji (Abdullah Qardash) & Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir. He said they had it better in a nice hideout in Idlib.
Other hideouts in Syria were in Mayadeen, Albu Kamal, Hajin, Desheesha. Everywhere Baghdadi moved, there was a hideout for him.

He met Baghdadi in those places. Previously, he used to hang out with his brother Abu Hazem, his father-in-law Abdullah al-Zoubai, and al-Muhajir.
Those in charge of Baghdadi’s security file were killed one by one, first his brother, then father-in-law, then Abu Sabah, then his brother-in-law. Baghdadi was killed soon after the killing of Abu Sabah and under the watch of his brother-in-law.
The report speaks of fitna before Baghdadi’s last appearance:

Baghdadi’s disappearance led to serious clashes between ISIS foreigners & locals in Hajin. This was seen as a heavy blow to Baghdadi.

$70m & a ton of gold gone missing in Jazira. A shepherd took $15m.
Toward the end, they had to rush out of the desert because they heard of a security raids. The wife of Baghdadi’s courier, Hanan, told Iraqi authorities just two days before Baghdadi was killed that he was in Idlib. She was told so by Abu Sabah.
A lot more other details about Baghdadi’s life etc, and there is an interview with one of Baghdadi’s cousins. He was so close to him: a maternal & paternal cousin, and a member of ISIS, who was asked by Baghdadi to accompany their female & children relatives out of the area.
This close cousin and associate confirms the normal life that Baghdadi led before his radicalism after 2004. During his youth, there was never a sign of unusual behavior by Baghdadi. He was jailed by the US for about a year, appeared briefly and then disappeared.
I have to listen to the video once more, but the video seems to confirm that Baghdadi's last appearance was indeed in Iraq, and that he left the area soon after the video for Idlib. He left behind that gun that appeared next to his right side in the video in Anbar.
Another interesting detail is that ex-spokesman Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir, the Saudi national killed hours after Baghdadi, was closer to Baghdadi than we thought. He was hanging out with him most of the time. He & "the Hajji" were mentioned as in Idlib before Baghdadi got there.
Some of the books that #Baghdadi had in a recent desert hideout on the Syria-Iraq borders.
Most are regular prayers / jurisprudence books, except Wahhabism’s Book of Tawhid, and the old Islamic State of Iraq’s Informing Mankind about the State of Islam.
A closeup for some of these books from Google, for those asking. The middle two on the top, who can identify them? Can’t read them.
The more you listen to the evidence provided by the Iraqis here, the more interesting the story gets.

One takeaway:
One takeaway from the massive evidence released here by the Iraqis is that the Iraqi role ends when Baghdadi leaves the Anbar desert.

Iraqis created a leap that made them sound they were behind the location of Baghdadi in #Idlib. Nothing indicates they knew, the US did the rest?
In the report, for example, the Iraqi intel agency behind this whole thing told the reporter that Hanan mentioned Idlib as where Baghdadi was hiding. She didn’t know the location. She said so only two days before Baghdadi was killed.
Another interesting detail is that there was an “Abu Baraa” with Baghdadi early on, not during his last days in Anbar.

Someone identified as Abu Baraa was killed with Baghdadi in Idlib. That Abu Baraa was widely reported as a member of Hurras ad-Din.
Even though who thought Abu Baraa was from Hurras ad-Din still suspected he was an ISIS mole, and that he was using different names to do online propaganda for ISIS.
Another takeaway, the reporting from the Iraqis makes it clear that Baghdadi simply had nowhere else to run (as @martinchulov reported).

theguardian.com/world/2019/oct…
Baghdadi was squeezed in Anbar, multiple associates of his got killed or captured & ISIS leaders had been in Idlib. Baghdadi told his brother-in-law other leaders were living comfortably in Idlib. Now, for the first time, I see why Baghdadi would relocate to such a hostile area.
Baghdadi’s brother-in-law says Baghdadi trusted him, told him about where the two top leaders below him were living. The two were nominees to lead the group after Baghdadi. If Baghdadi was going to, say, speak to al-Qaeda or HaD, the Iraqis would have learned that detail.
Staying with Hurras ad-Din is a stupid notion, but some suggested Baghdadi might have wanted to meet secretly with al-Qaeda to reach an agreement. That theory was plausible, if far-fetched, but impossible to trust them with his safety. That theory is now even more far-fetched.
Another super intriguing detail is the role of shepherds for ISIS movements (not necessarily knowingly, though). Scroll up.

Now, to connect the dots, remember that a shepherd was near the compound where Baghdadi was killed!

Coincidence?
That’d be a crazy coincidence.

The shepherd said he met the Americans who asked him to take children they found at the compound. He returned to speak to locals, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, after Baghdadi’s death.

What was his role, if any?
Speculating here, but the US worked with a local indirectly before the killing of bin Laden. Was the shepherd working with the US? The US did say they extracted 2 individuals who assisted them. I believe the Iraqis’ role ended early on; brother-in-law denied he led to Baghdadi.
Important tidbit— Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s brother-in-law tells the story of a doctor of sorts who started recruiting individuals to conduct attacks on behalf of ISIS (not members, just quid pro quo?). The instruction by Baghdadi was to target mukhtars, town elders, in Sunni areas.

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More from @hxhassan

Oct 7, 2021
One major flaw in jihadism/counterterrorism analysis is to compensate for knowledge of the human terrain by relying on (flawed) stats/numbers or statements on social media. We’ve seen that in Iraq and Syria, and we’re seeing it now in Afghanistan.

To give a quick example:
Not a single Afghan talks about an expanding Islamic State there, for example. This is almost exclusively coming from non-Afghan observers, old or new. But let’s entertain this claim, which really relies on not reporting or in-field woek but on “stats”. Still, let’s see the stats
Two points:

1. ISIS is claiming attacks, and those go into analysts’ databases. A trendline is established. A dude somewhere walking by another dude & shooting toward him, only injuring him, that is counted as an ISIS “operation”.

A more vital point >>>
Read 7 tweets
Apr 17, 2021
Wow! For the first time, a video showing the ISIS leader defending his PhD thesis at the university of Mosul in 2007. This is the first time he’s seen in live footage, and the discussion in the video is quite astonishing in multiple levels. (H/t @NihadJariri)

1/
As detailed here, at that point he was part of al-Qaeda in Iraq (Islamic State of Iraq) and was just appointed the general sharii (judge) of the group. He would be jailed by the Americans at Camp Bucca a short while later.
So according to @newlinesmag reporting, he became the group’s top cleric at the same time he defended his PhD at the University of Mosul.

His PhD dedication was brought up in the video here. “Dedicated to those whose nature is to work behind the scenes & in the dark.” Al-Qaeda?
Read 13 tweets
Dec 21, 2020
Today is the death anniversary of Dr Mohammed Shahrour, a Syrian intellectual known for his controversial views on Islam (radical but on the opposite spectrum of jihadism). He came up with a novel way of approaching the Quran, widely rejected by clerics but fascinating at times.
To me, the most fascinating is that he came up with a method that's almost identical to Islamic radicals but in a way that pushes a liberal view of Islam, different from traditional & extremist views. A "literalist" view with modern applications.
While progressives usually focus on avoiding what they see as odd statements in Islamic texts by going for maqasid (the higher objectives of sharia, specified in hadiths) or majaz (metaphorical explanations), he embraced literalism and found a method to explain things.
Read 7 tweets
Dec 18, 2020
Even as it tries to do the right thing, @nytimes falls short. Who has a history of misrepresentation that the NYT has avoided specifying?

The Times said its investigation had “found a history of misrepresentations by Mr. Chaudhry”

nytimes.com/2020/12/18/bus…
Really? After months of investigation, the paper found the interviewee is to blame? Apart from the rhetoric, it really merely walked back on its earlier decision to still use the podcast but edit it. Now it’s saying no, we’ll retract it, and everyone is supposed to applaud.
For an brief on what is the real trouble here, follow this thread (
[the problem is much deeper, it’s systemic & there are real-life effects to journalism led by ignorance + arrogance, despite repeated warnings of the damages it had caused.]
Read 5 tweets
Dec 2, 2020
Important: A breakthrough in the Gulf rift in the coming hours, sources tell Al Jazeera aja.me/b5k8f
Kuwait is to issue a statement about a "breakthrough" in the Gulf rift, between Saudi Arabia & Qatar. The breakthrough will be a set of confidence-building measures before a full end of the crisis that began June 2017. Moves to resolve the Saudi-Qatari dispute started last fall.
The gist of it: the imminent breakthrough is to allow Qatari flights over Saudi Arabia, which the US hopes will rattle Iran’s economy. Currently Qatar pays millions of dollars to route over Iran.

nytimes.com/2020/12/02/wor…
Read 5 tweets
Nov 6, 2020
Doom & gloom within Arab regime circles about reports of a Biden win. They were hoping Trump would win.

Even if they don’t think Biden would actively be against them, they get how their detractors will have space & multiple advantages perhaps unprecedented in recent decades!
In 2016, it was a whole different world: Arab dictators and their circles were simply intoxicated with their love of the incoming Trump presidency. They saw historic opportunities, and they were right to a certain degree but not entirely.
These regimes will always have friends in DC but things, and they may think their puppets are doing a great job at placing op-eds or forming partnerships here & there; but there are parallel things happening both inside the US & when it comes to their detractors they can’t stop.
Read 12 tweets

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