Thread by @ReassessHistory

The Sherman Tank is one of the coolest AFVs

I mean seriously with nearly 50k produced, it's a wartime icon and modern meme.

But how come it has such a marmite rep?

I've long held off on it but... here is the Sherman thread. /1

#ww2 #sww #history

A lot of Sherman's marmite reputation is owed to Belton Cooper's book 'Death Traps' which was edited by Stephen Ambrose, and there's still a wealth of questions as to how much the latter dabbled. In this regard it's like David Render's memoir, excellent but problematic edit. /2

The revisionist movement from the 1980s heavily framed Shermans as poor outgunned AFVs, as did many Western militaries from the 60s-(well present frankly) on battlefield studies/tours as they sought to find ways to defeat the Russians.

So several gens learned it was awful. /3

Archival data on the Sherman is spread across several countries, in dozens of often small archives, and it's actually tricky to reconstruct a good image of service.

So most historians just quoted each others assumptions/mistakes and hoped no one would notice.

Feedback loop. /4

To make matters worse a few accounts were cherry picked. Want to say Sherman is ace, quote A. Say it's awful, quote B.

Original work is also expensive... and many historians lazy. Thus study of the Sherman becomes a basket case of confirmation bias.

So it's ass over tit. /5

In the 2000s, various historians clearly smelt a rat and a wealth of new work by Zaloga et al comes in to kick life back into the subject.

So, history overview over, we now have two conflicting schools of thought on Sherman, but... what was the AFV really like? /5

Sherman's design history dates back to 1940.
In short US tank designers grabbed a load of proven technologies and incorporated them into same AFV, expediting development and harnessing efficient modern production systems.
Unlike UK/GER AFVs much every component is well proven. /6

Commercially available or modified engines are harnessed, chassis adapted, reliable VVSS suspension (first used on M2s in 1935), all comes together to create a remarkable near-modular AFV that offers reliability and steady potential for future upgrade.

Tank. Lego. /7

Through expansion of heavy industry and adapting practices, they really start bashing them out and Sherman gets a thorough thumbs up from troops.

In part this is because of the 75mm gun as British development of a good dual purpose gun (and munitions) had been fraught. /8

So we shift from a situation where British armour struggles to KO anti-tank guns with anything other than direct hits or scything crew with MGs, to being able to engage them at range with a good prospect of success.

It's a huge deal as this was a real headache. /9

And the argument on tank armament would linger for quite a while (which is why the Churchill V was going to be issued enmass to tank troops with a single 6 pdr armed Churchill but this is another story entirely).

In short, a good multi-role tank is desired & Sherman fits. /10

For the Brits, it's a brilliant tank which neatly fits in the Cruiser category for use in Armoured Divisions... and Monty is clearly impressed, along with a lot of senior tankies.

He wasn't a fan of Churchills at this point (another story), which we can't produce enough of.../11

This is where the key problem emerges.

It appears Monty and co wanted a universal tank, and we weren't quite there yet & not producing enough Churchills to kit the Tank Brigades, independent assets held at Corps for infantry support.

Infantry tanks are rugged beasts. /12

Designed to take a wallop and aid infantry onto the objective. They're gonna attract a lot of attention... an interesting middle ground of AFV development.

Problem: Sherman is distinctly a medium tank, and we need 8 tank bdes fully equipped with inf tanks for Overlord... /13

Given we also need Churchill to act as a specialist engineering chassis, we can only kit out 3 of the 8 Brigades with Churchills.

3 of 8.

So out of necessity, the remainder are gonna get Shermans.

Mediums thrust into a much heavier role. /14

So we designate these formations Independent Armoured Brigades, whereas those with Churchills remain Independent Tank Brigades.

Monty is insistent that doctrine will NOT be different for the two units, aiming for standardisation.

Two types: one doctrine. /15

This seems like madness until you realise Monty actually does listen to his subordinates and various specialists. Frankly... Churchill/Sherman employment in Italy was pretty successful and it appears that no major problems were envisaged.

If anything there appears to be concerns that differing doctrine for supporting brigades may cause more confusion at a divisional and corps level than anything else... and this certainly emerges in action. /17

In part as most ind armd bde's develop their own methods of operation, as expecting Shermans to shrug impacts like Churchill is unrealistic - so we see pretty organic development of these units.

Also... the Americans use Separate Armoured Battalions in the same slugging way. /18

It's a really important thing to bare in mind.

Sherman isn't really suited to duffing up actions in 1944, weapons development has moved on, just as Panzer IV isn't.

Mobile exploitation etc - sure, but infantry bloodbaths are not where you really want to be. /19

Brigadier Pyman had already looked at these problems in Italy and devised doctrine in Nov 43 for Shermans to hang back and 'shoot-in' inf onto objectives. But given Monty's believe in a 'capital' tank, he eschewed these suggestions. /20

In short, to reiterate, it appears Monty believed that unified doctrine offered greater prospect of success rather than devising two separate methodologies for div/corps comds to contend with.

Fine in principle but leaves the much lighter Shermans at far greater risk. /2

So what is the role expected of these poor bastards expected to do infantry support against meaty opposition in medium tanks... take out MGs to allow infantry to quickly claim objectives & KO any AT guns etc.

In short... tanks kill MGs & inf, inf kill ATK & tanks. /21

This all requires good communication between infantry and tanks, but that's a thread for another day.

It isn't easy and even with extensive provisions put in place for both sides, it's waaaay trickier in action. /22

In the weeks before Normandy, and I do mean weeks, a new piece of kit arrives for Armoured Regts.

FIREFLY.

Biggest news is that she mounts a beastly 17 Pdr in the turret, and can KO any cat she comes across. /23

It's a huge deal & highlights the radical difference between independent tank & armoured regiments.

The former mostly consisted of troops of 3 tanks, two 75mm armed and a single 6 Pdr. The 6 pdr was to KO enemy tanks but struggled with infantry. A balanced troop all in. /24

They could also call on support from SP anti-tank guns such as M10 as needed... which means Tank Regts were already *very* well provisioned to engage hard opposition.

Ind Armoured Regts were much less so, as until Firefly they had Shermans' 75mm. /25

A lil' exaggeration there as the dual purpose ability of 75mm was key, but Firefly suddenly gives them this massive boost.

Most Regts adopt it on the basis of one per Troop of 4 tanks but only have a few weeks for familiarisation. /26

The story of the Sherman Vc's development is amazing (and look I've fixed the meme for you)... but they arrive at units with a shitty No. 43 Telescope with 3x magnification.

It's marginally better than the standard offering, but isn't really even remotely suitable. /27

This means most gunnery is really done by dead reckoning, and the sight doesn't even cater for SABOT rounds which have a near-flat trajectory.

Ekins' claims he only fired the gun four or so times before his famous engagement. This is probs true with 17 Pdr, but... /28

he must have frequently used a simulator or been very experienced on 75mm to pull it off. Always suspected he was a whizz at advanced trig as well.

Anyway, off to Normandy they go! /29

It's clear that independent armoured brigades swiftly adapt their operating methods, but continue to bravely provide close infantry support. In some cases (such as during Op Pomegranate) near an entire Regt is KOed by mines alone.

Limitations become increasingly apparent. /30

Part of this is due to the savage nature of fighting in Normandy.

Most engagements are <1,000 yards range and if you hit the target first. They're KOed. First hit wins and German AFV crews prioritise static gunnery to get this kill.

This broadly favours defenders. /31

Despite a paper materiel advantage in AFVs, the Brits and Americans struggle to even come close to employing it.

A cluttered battlescape greatly limits employment.

Many offensives of corps scale are often actually reduced to the lead 150 - 400 riflemen leading the advance. /32

Attempts to surge armour through a narrow front in what was called 'good tank country' like Goodwood... well they present near-shooting galleries for layered defenses.

This further reduces Allied ability to harness armoured strength, the denser you go - the worse it gets. /33

The Germans discover the same in their few major counter-attacks.

These constraints apply to both sides.

Both sides also use different assessments of what is a 'destroyed' tank so we can't compare like for like & anyone who does is a hack. /34

Just as 'Tiger' becomes shorthand for any German tank.

The Germans adopt 'Sherman' for any Allied AFV, so their data includes dozens (if not hundreds) of Shermans that are actually other AFVs.

Few historians caught onto this. /35

In several situations commanders take about a dozen Shermans and just drive them about for a couple of days on a rough figure of eight to deter German attack and mimic far greater strength. A few miles behind were dozens of Shermans - but no way to get them into action. /36

German AFV kill stats become greatly inflated as a result, and many damaged AFVs are recovered and patched up.

That said... many regiments continue bleeding Shermans being thrown into engagements they are woefully suited to - although commanders adapt their approaches. /37

So how do you know you've killed an enemy tank?

This isn't like WOT or War Thunder, you don't get no pop up.

The best IRL pop up is fire. You want that bastard to burn.

Fire means total write off.

Destruction. Death.

You want your oppo to burn. /38

So both sides just slam round after round into tanks until they burn to confirm kills, with some hapless wrecked tanks being 'destroyed' about a dozen times or more when you crossref stats.

Yes Sherman had an ammo stowage problem, but... the culture of both sides is to burn. /39

Shermans were soon employed providing indirect fire, bolstering attacks and breaking up enemy counter-attacks on fixed lines of fire.

In this role they did prove very effective and helped boost the morale of inf they supported, but couldn't match Churchill for inf support. /40

You know, doing that thing that Parham suggested back in Nov '43.

But by this point it appears Monty stopped giving a damn about what his subordinates was doing and Ricky Richards appears to have had a lot of say in things *another future thread I think...* /41

In conjunction, tactics in Armoured Divisions also evolve - but this is much better covered elsewhere - as we see more infantry attached to tanks in direct close support. Comms problems remain.

We also see Crabs do driveby shootings occasionally. As YOLO. /42

The key thing is that Sherman's dual 75mm remains very competitive at dealing with infantry/anti-tank guns and a lot of German armour - with the 17 Pdr on hand to deal with meatier threats.

More balanced tactics steadily evolve but experience is bloody and costly. /43

Again... German experience is mirrored.

It takes several weeks for SS-Panzer formations to adapt to Normandy and shift mentality from the Eastern Front, leaving many burned out vehicles and dead crew along the way.

Due to rigid doctrine, they struggle to adapt. /44

Due to Shermans' modularity a large percentage are recovered, hosed out and refitted for action again.

This Lego-edge proves itself again and again, and Allied tank crews experience tends to be an upwards curve when it comes to transference. Germany can't replace good crews. /45

Even then a lot of Sherman cas were probably avoidable in the US sector.

Brits prioritise munitions over POL, US prioritise Pol over munitions so lots of offensives run out of steam, probably resulting in higher cas.

So we blast through as US struggles to push through. /46

In many ways neither angle was right or wrong, but had the US had more munitions available... perhaps the infantry and tankers would not have bled anywhere near so much.

Even so, high demand saw SABOT shortages etc curse British formations well into August etc. /47

Sherman's evolution also went hand in hand with Churchill, who equalled (and in some cases exceeded) Sherman reliability by July/August. A remarkable feat for what was an initially basketcase AFV.

/48

And almost all armoured engagements cross-country were conducted at 10-12 MPH.

A handful of vehicles could go faster, Cromwell/Panther stand out, but as a whole it's a pretty sluggish game of back/forth/redeployment/popping smoke.

/49

I know much of this is mostly from a British perspective but US experience broadly mimics it.

So... what can we draw from it?

Sherman was a great AFV but not really suited to such an uncompromising role as infantry support. /50

Churchill was - it's why we developed it - and German StuGs filled a similar roll *future thread I think*

But the only comparable German tanks for the role was Tiger, and even they bled armour in such employment. These tanks were repeatedly patched up and thrown back in... /51

we don't have stats for their crew cas, or recrewing AFVs, but know from stats of canniablised units and retraining that... it was pretty high.

We actually lack a lot of data for German sources, and misinterpret Allied data. /52

So... it's best that we all sit down.

Go back to the fundamental basics.

Discard quite a lot of the study, but embrace new work and start again.

And I encourage you to cast aside assumption, preconception and what you've heard.

Look again, and prepare to be amazed. /53

There is so much to be discovered about the campaign and Sherman.

Due to the failings of past historians and western militaries there has never been a better time to study the campaign.

Get stuck in. Engage.

Educate yourself.

And we'll all do much better for it. /thread

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