THREAD: How much of a threat does China’s #PLA pose to Taiwan? We mostly focus on the military balance and challenges for U.S. intervention, but another angle needs more exploring—competing demands on PLA attention and resources. 1/9 inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Art…
Chinese strategists understand the dilemma and discourage over-concentrating on a single contingency. In their parlance, the PLA has to be prepared for war in ALL “strategic directions,” not just the “main strategic direction” (the southeast). 3/9
This has various implications, including a distribution of capabilities around China’s borders, a theater structure optimized for many smaller conflicts, and a distributed logistics network. The personnel system encourages regional specialization, not fungibility. 4/9
These decisions have implications for a future Taiwan conflict; fewer available resources, a convoluted C2 structure, assets that would have to be distributed from other theaters. 5/9
This dilemma provides some options for Washington to think differently about Taiwan’s defense. A competitive strategy would try to ramp up operational headaches in #China’s other border regions to minimize resources allocated toward the Taiwan Strait. 6/9
This coincides with the #Indo-Pacific strategy’s focus on security cooperation, with a stronger focus on higher-end assets that tie up PLA capabilities. Recipients like Vietnam and India are critical. 7/9
In a conflict, a focus of US targeting should be on the tissue that holds the PLA structure together – C2 and logistics nodes, as well as fissures in Chinese civil-military relations. Cyber, EW, and info ops need more attention. 8/9
These are just a few ideas. The goal is to move the competition away from areas where #China has advantages – and to leverage one of its major weaknesses, a disfavorable geostrategic environment, to help promote Taiwan’s defense, alongside arms sales. 9/9
