Thread by @BenDoBrown

This grim video surfaced online on Jan 4, 2020, just after 9pm. It shows a group of young cadets in #Libya hit by a strike for which no one has ever claimed responsibility.

#BBCAfricaEye & @BBCArabic investigated this case for months, and this is what we found. [THREAD]

The strike happened in Libya's capital Tripoli, the base for Libya’s Govt of National Accord (GNA).

At the time of this attack, it was under siege from the Libyan National Army (LNA), which fights for a rival government based in the east.

An LNA spokesman claimed the cadets had been killed by local shelling, or perhaps by an attack from inside the academy.

But we can show this is not true, and we’re going to start with the box of shrapnel seen at the end of this clip.

This video from Jan 5, shows someone collecting fragments of metal from the parade ground.

Images later filmed by the BBC show the same shrapnel laid out on a table, and there’s enough information here for us to piece together this weapon.

These fins, these bolt mechanisms, and this connection system all match the components of a missile called the Blue Arrow 7.

The Blue Arrow 7 is a Chinese-made air-to-surface missile. And our analysis found only one aircraft, active in the attack on Tripoli in January 2020, that is capable of firing this weapon: a drone called the Wing Loong.

A UN report from Dec 2019 also confirms this conclusion.

So where did it come from?

These are all the known Libyan air bases within striking range of the academy. But Wing Loong drones have only ever been documented at two of these bases: Al Jufra and Khadim, both in LNA territory.

Let’s take a closer look at Al Jufra.

Satellite imagery shows Wing Loong drones were operating from Al Jufra in August 2019. But by September, the drones had vanished from Al Jufra.

They have never reappeared, and were not flying from here at the time of the strike that killed the cadets in Tripoli.

That leaves us with Al Khadim.

Starting in 2014, satellite imagery shows a major redevelopment of this base.

So who’s paying for all this construction? Where have these aircraft come from? Which foreign power was backing the LNA’s drone war on Tripoli?

The details give us a clue.

This is the first version of the Wing Loong drone, visible at Al Khadim in 2016.

We also see a UH-60 helicopter—what the Americans call a Black Hawk, AT-802 Air Tractors, and what looks like a Hawk air defence system.

When this image was taken, there was only one foreign player active in this war that owned all four of these weapons: the United Arab Emirates.

We also found an arms registry that lists the weapons bought by the UAE in 2017. It records the purchase of 15 Wing Loong II drones and 350 Blue Arrow 7 missiles.

In 2019 the UN found that, by sending Wing Loong drones and Blue Arrow 7 missiles into Libya, the UAE had violated the UN arms embargo, which exists to bring an end to this conflict and which has been in force since 2011.

At a summit in Berlin in January this year, the UAE, along with other world powers, agreed to refrain from intervention in Libya’s war.

But in the months leading up to the Berlin meeting, the Wing Loong drones were taking off from this runway at Al Khadim.

And all the evidence suggests that among them was the drone which, on January 4, fired a missile into the unarmed cadets in Tripoli.

We have shown you the evidence of what hit these cadets, where it came from, and which foreign power operates from this base.

But in early February 2020, the Wing Loong drones vanished from Al Khadim…

Where did they go?

Here’s a clue. It’s a Chinese TV report from 2012 showing the control centre for Wing Loongs.

We located the exact place this was filmed, and found satellite imagery taken in the same week. This shows us what a Wing Loong command centre looks like from the air.

The presenter shows us the satellite data link centre and the control room. If we look closely at Al Khadim, we see buildings that match the dimensions of both rooms.

The satellite dish gives this building a unique profile, seen in imagery from Al Khadim.

We can also see these boxes, which look like shipping containers. What are they?

This video gives us a clue. It’s a Chinese promotional film, showing how a Wing Loong II is packed and transported.
The wings are laid lengthways along the body of the aircraft. And the boxes visible at Al Khadim are exactly the right size to accommodate the flat-packed drone.

On 31 Jan, 11 of these containers were visible at Al Khadim. But in the first week of Feb, they disappeared from the base.

At exactly the same time—between Feb 4 & Feb 7—an identical configuration of containers appeared at an airbase near Siwa, over the border, in Egypt.

This is what vanished from Al Khadim, and this is what appeared at Siwa. 11 boxes, identical in size & colour. The same control rooms. The same data link centres.

The drones now stationed at Siwa appear to be the same UAE drones that were previously stationed at Al Khadim, safe in the Egyptian desert, but still within striking range of Libya’s capital, Tripoli. H/T @sbreakintl for 📸

And this is not the only evidence of Egypt’s support for the UAE.

We also found evidence that another Egyptian air base, Sidi Barrani, less than 80km from the Libyan border, is the destination for military aircraft sent by the UAE.

These are Mirage 2000 fighter jets that we see on satellite imagery.

They’re painted in colours that are not used by Egypt’s air force, but they exactly match the jets flown by the UAE.

This is the same model of plane implicated by the UN in the bombing of a migrant centre east of Tripoli in July 2019 in which 53 people died.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-afr…

Satellite imagery also reveals the presence of a cargo plane called the Ilyushin 76.

We see these planes on the tarmac at Sidi Barrani again and again—in March, in April, and in June. So what are they doing at a military air base, and where might they have come from?

Flight tracking data from @flightradar24 and @RadarBox24 offers a clue.

This is flight ZAV9511, also an Ilyushin, recorded by radar as it came in to land at Sidi Barrani on 25 June. If we track this flight back, we find that it came from the UAE.

It’s not the only Ilyushin to have made this trip. We tracked multiple flights that leave the UAE & vanish from the radar just past Cairo. We know at least 3 of them landed at Sidi Barrani because the radar picked up the Ilyushins as they left the base & headed back East.

We don’t know what was in these planes, but these flights suggest an air bridge for equipment or supplies between the UAE and an Egyptian military base on the Libyan border.

Egypt’s President Sisi was also in Berlin, shaking Merkel’s hand & endorsing the UN’s efforts to de-escalate the Libyan war.

Six months later he was here at Sidi Barrani, telling Egypt’s troops to be prepared for action both inside Egypt’s borders and beyond.

We put these findings to the government of the UAE. They did not respond.

We also requested a response from Egypt. They, too, did not reply.

The cadets who died in Tripoli in January were not killed by a short-range mortar shell or by an attack from inside the academy. They were victims of a sophisticated, computer-game war, which the United Nations has been powerless to stop.

Just a few days after this attack, the former head of the UN mission in Libya, Ghassan Salamé, made his exasperation plain.

When Gaddafi was toppled in 2011, the cadets who died here were just 10 or 11 years old, and might have expected to grow up in a country with some measure of peace and freedom.

Instead, they died in a conflict that has now been grinding on for almost a decade.

And the evidence says they were killed by a Chinese-made missile, fired from a drone that took off 750km away, in a base operated by a foreign power.

Full investigation here:

Thank you to all involved who helped tell this important story @BenDoBrown @danielsilas @Nader_SM @effisfor @leone_hadavi @manisha_bot @muskhalili @PolineTchoubar @Gerjon_ @hossamsarhan87 @karima_kouah @timeawford @marcperky