2/ The book pulls together big ideas in a short, accessible package. David and I look at the global experience with carbon pricing — particularly carbon markets — and ask what’s gone wrong. We set out to explain why carbon pricing hasn’t been working, then offer solutions.
David and I take effective carbon pricing as a desirable goal. We then describe a core set of political forces that explain why these policies haven’t been working and aren’t ready to scale.
5/ The book boils down decades of work on these policies (and their politics) into a specific, testable, and easy-to-read narrative. We show that carbon pricing’s political disadvantages are structural, not ephemeral, and won’t diminish with growing demand for climate action.
6/ Our theory explains why carbon pricing has occasionally been used to accelerate coal's demise but does little to clean up transport. We also show how competitiveness concerns blunt the application of carbon prices to trade-exposed firms. qz.com/1192753/a-carb…
7/ Grappling with the details is necessary to get beyond the “carbon pricing good” / “carbon pricing bad” conversation that sometimes dominates #climatetwitter and #energytwitter.
8/ Although our book shows how politics frustrate carbon pricing at nearly every turn, it also offers insights into what’s required to make carbon pricing perform better — and why taxes are politically superior to cap-and-trade.
9/ We offer specific reforms targeted at the political barriers we identify in our critique. Governments that learn these lessons will make progress, as the EU has; those that don’t, like California’s, will get stuck in the mud.
10/ Even those that push hardest will find that prices alone aren’t enough. After identifying strategies to improve carbon pricing, we explain why smart regulations, industrial policy, and public investment will lead the way.
11/ Our bottom line: carbon pricing (especially via taxes) can support, but should not supplant, more ambitious government-led strategies.
12/ Not all government-led strategies work, however. We detail how policy regimes become captured by special interests, particularly when it comes to “green” climate spending — a critical problem for governments relying on public investment models.
13/ Our argument also has major implications for the climate neutrality movement (my current focus @carbonplanorg). Corporate pledges have breathed new life into carbon offsets, but many don’t appreciate how much of that industry started in public policy. carbonplan.org/research
14/ There is no a constituency for quality in policy because polluters rely on offsets to water down mandated carbon prices. Sincere buyers in private markets struggle to find quality projects today precisely because much of the original industry was built for greenwashing.
15/ David and I won’t be making many friends in the offsets business, but we are otherwise looking to unite, not divide. The two of us have distinct personal politics and approached the writing process as an exercise in finding common ground.
16/ Growing divisions between the left and center threaten to undermine climate progress in many countries. We hope our collaboration helps further dialog across ideological camps and develops an empirical record to test what works. grist.org/climate/the-bi…
17/ It’s important to add that the book is not a jeremiad against economists. If anything, our theory of politics is a full employment act for economists who seek to fine-tune climate policy portfolios because we think carbon prices won’t do that on their own.
18/ We hope to convince more of our friends in economics to inform their work with grounded, empirical views of climate politics — and to persuade those who reject markets to listen to feedback from economists who take politics seriously.
Thanks to @jtemple for including me in his story on the big news from Governor Newsom's new executive order, which sets a goal of 100% zero emission new car and truck sales by 2035.
I'll do a deeper dive on the legal situation below.
I'm cautiously optimistic that at least some companies will set a high bar and demand better outcomes than we see in the public sector.
(Other firms are looking to greenwash instead, as are some governments that fail to follow through on bold climate announcements.)
The problem is that the constituency for quality in climate policy is weak, so both public and private leaders can satisfy public demands with hollow pledges.
Opt-outs looked legally unnecessary in FERC orders after the SCOTUS opinion in FERC v. EPSA, and now with today's DC Cir decision in NARUC v. FERC there's a path open for FERC to close opt-outs in future rules concerning ISO/RTO access.
For FERC rules addressing something broader than ISO/RTO market access, however, there's not a lot to point to in today's decision. I expect to see a lot of debate over the implications in the months ahead.
In plain English:
Some states block demand response (DR) and distributed energy resources (DERs) from participating in FERC's wholesale electricity markets. But today's decision suggests FERC can require open access to its wholesale markets without any state-level opt-outs.
Thanks to my fellow IEMAC members, Chair @DallasBurtraw, Vice Chair Ann Carlson, Meredith Fowlie, Ross Brown, and our newest member, @TheKropke, for a great conversation. (Welcome, Jennifer!) 2/18
One of my priorities for this year is to better engage the public in the Committee's work advising on California's cap-and-trade program and other state climate policies. 3/18
Over the years, many of my best students have been leaders in the divestment movement. I've focused, instead, on the design and implementation of government climate policies. But those two worlds are crashing together. 2/20
If I've learned one thing, it's that the story university elites tell about their relationship with incumbent industries bears almost no relationship to what those companies do in the real world. Behind every high-minded energy seminar is a torrent of lobbying money. 3/20
Your main disagreement lies not with me but with @AirResources, which designated cap-and-trade as responsible for half of California's 2030 climate policy. There's no way this market is going to do that.
To the extent you and I differ, it's on the potential space for reform. You are 100% right that the politics aren't there for cap-and-trade to make this heavy of a lift. But to stabilize the market—or even turn it into a tax at today's prices? I guess I'm more optimistic.