I continue to be surprised by the number of people who think the bulk of China's external bank lending has been funded out of China's reported reserves, and thus the reserves aren't liquid.

The balance of payments actually shows substantial non-reserve foreign assets.

1/2
I guess the BoP could be a complete fabrication, but if it is at all accurate, the external loans of Chinese state banks (and their bond purchases) are additional assets that should be added on top of China's reserves (not subtractions from China's reserves)

2/2
p.s. China does have liabilities too -

but the BoP implies that they are still much smaller than China's external assets

(as one would expect given China's long history of current account surpluses)
For better or worse, I do spend a lot time keep track of these things -- and have a pretty clear idea of how things add up (and when they don't)

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More from @Brad_Setser

21 Oct
The rapid increase in the U.S. current account account should be hard to miss.

Yet the IMF missed it, throwing off its global forecast

cfr.org/blog/chinas-su…
The enormous rise in the U.S. trade deficit, the deficit in August was over $200 billion larger than its 2019 average level, has made the U.S. the engine of global demand again ...

(the US current account is likely to be over a percentage point larger than the IMF's forecast)
Rather than shrinking, as the IMF argues, Asian imbalances are growing -- propelled by the rise in the U.S. deficit ...

In effect, strong U.S. demand allowed Asia to recover without doing all that much stimulus of its own (especially of household income)
Read 6 tweets
21 Oct
False analogy.

Asian pegs collapsed back in 1997 because external short-term fx debts exceeded reserves, not because of high m2 to reserves.

I (literally) wrote a book about it

Chinese fx reserves still far exceed its external debt, let alone its short-term external debt
China still has far more more visible fx reserves than it has fx denominated external debt (let alone short-term external debt), and the smart money (I hope) knows that China has some hidden non-reserve assets too
A high M2 ratio is correlated with a big domestic banking system with lots domestic deposits -- a strength, not a weakness as far as I am concerned.

It also tends to correlate with current account surpluses not deficits

(and China still has controls too ... )
Read 4 tweets
21 Oct
I was not impressed by the IMF's analysis of the global balance of payments in the October WEO.

It clearly gets the world's two biggest national economies wrong.

cfr.org/blog/chinas-su…
The IMF has the U.S. current account deficit falling slightly in 2020 ...

Yet we know the deficit rose by almost 1.5 pp of GDP in the second quarter, and the third quarter looks like the second quarter not the first
And the U.S. trade deficit has increased at an incredibly rapid pace in the last few months, and, in dollar terms, is now (more or less) back at its pre-global financial crisis level
Read 7 tweets
20 Oct
Even with the unusually strong (and unlikely to be sustained) September rise in imports, the y/y rise in China's manufacturing surplus in the third quarter looks to be around $150b (~1% of China's GDP)

1/x
That's in line with biggest (in dollar terms) y/y rises before COVID-19 --

But it is striking because it comes at a time when overall trade is down

2/x
I think with hindsight there is a case that China's manufacturing surplus has been on an upswing since 2016 (i.e. after the big CNY depreciation), though the impact of the tariffs masked that upswing in 2019

(and some will argue that 2020 is a one off ...)

3/x
Read 6 tweets
19 Oct
Think the framing on this WSJ story is backwards -- real question is how long can China rely on the (weak) rest of the world to drive its own recovery

Net exports have been supporting Chinese growth in q2 and q3, not the other way around

1/x

wsj.com/articles/china…
China's contribution to global growth is at least in part a function of whether it imports more than it exports.

And right now China is exporting more to the world (i.e. drawing on trading partners demand to support its growth) than it is importing

2/x
The common notion that China's export boom is a function of PPE exports and increased demand for laptops to work from home understates the breadth of China's export recovery ...

3/x
Read 7 tweets
18 Oct
A thread on the euro area's August trade data.

The overall trade surplus (goods only, but the services balance is hugely distorted by Ireland) is almost back to its pre COVID-19 shock levels

That tho misleads, as lower oil imports offset a much lower non-petrol surplus

1/x Image
Excluding oil, overall goods trade hadn't fully recovered in August (Europe here differs from China)

2/x Image
Euro area imports from China have returned to more or less normal (after a huge spike in May, no doubt linked to medical supplies). But China is clearly doing better at selling to Europe than the EA's other trading partners (relative outperformance remains)

3/x Image
Read 6 tweets

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