Western liberal democracies do not have to chose between naive China engagement or blind confrontation.
Western politicians and policymakers have repeated this false dichotomy ad nauseam.
Let me explain why this *binary and reductionist approach to China policy* is flawed /1
Unconditional China engagement is naive since under the conditions of increasing CCP censorship western dialogue with China is no longer free & open-ended. Cooperation with China does not deserve this name when Europeans cannot select their cooperation partners & topics freely /2
That does not mean that the only alternative is blind confrontation and interventionism aimed at regime change, Steve Bannon-style. Chinese citizens have to decide themselves what kind of political system they want to live in. This is not a decision outsiders can make for them /3
When dealing with 'official China' - the party-state and its affiliated institutions - liberal democracies around the world should provide
- incentives for good behaviour,
- deterrence of bad behaviour, and
- Magnitsky sanctions on senior CCP officials when deterrence fails /5
A key requirement is that the West needs to incur penalties for authoritarian transgressions by the Chinese Communist Party (h/t @_JakubJanda).
To avoid any misunderstanding: This *does not* mean an eye for an eye but it should also not mean simply turning the other cheek /6
While turning the other cheek is a noble sentiment, Western politicians and policy makers should not simply respond to injury without mounting a robust defence and thus accepting more injury. To borrow a sports metaphor: to win one has to play both offence *and* defence /7
In order to develop such a sensible & middle-of-the-road Western China policy politicians and diplomats need to become more *conflict capable*.
They also need to draw clear *red lines* which the Chinese Communist Party must not cross (e.g. an annexation of Taiwan by force) /End
This was rather predictable. Following the publication of @edwardlucas Weekend Essay in @thetimes colleagues of mine have received malicious email communications which attempt to smear my professional reputation. 1/10
The malicious email was sent from a spoofed email account in @lukedepulford's name. It states “Please keep an eye on Professor Fulda. over the next few weeks. He’s been showing sign of psychological issues that are symptomatic of delusional negative repetitive thoughts”. 2/10
So what is happening here? State agents and/or non-state agents acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) incur penalties for public statements which they consider hostile to the interests of the Chinese party-state. 3/10
The Times has published a thought-provoking editorial titled 'Safeguarding Scholarship'. It references the guidelines 'Managing risks in Internationalisation: Security related issues', which were published by @UUKIntl today 1/10
While there is much to like about this timely and important @UUKIntl initiative, there are also shortcomings which need to be addressed. Let me highlight the strengths of the report and then point out areas for improvement 2/10
The report is country agnostic and calls for 1. Protecting your reputation and values, 2. Protecting your people, 3. Protecting your campuses, and 4. Protecting your partnerships. This is a comprehensive list of activity areas 3/10
Over 100 leading scholars have called for a united front in defence of academic freedoms amid increasing pressure from the Chinese government since the passing of Hong Kong’s National Security Law. 1/32
The group of international signatories includes some of the world’s leading authorities on Chinese politics, law, and modern history. The statement notes that the universal jurisdiction claimed by Article 38 of the National Security Law ... 2/32
... raises the unsettling prospect of students travelling through Hong Kong and China facing the possibility of being handed lengthy prison sentences on the basis of academic work deemed to be ‘subversive’ by Chinese authorities. 3/32
Why is it taking so long for the German government to abandon its failed China policy of 'change through trade'? A thread 1/11
When it comes to the People's Republic of China (henceforth #China), the German government has largely engaged in foreign trade promotion (Außenwirtschaftsförderung) 2/11
In his PhD thesis Norbert Schultes has pointed out that in foreign trade promotion the German government has let the private sector take the lead, which explains the highly corporatist approach 3/11
Germany's new policy paper on the Indo-Pacific region has led to speculation that Berlin may be about to change its traditionally Beijing-friendly foreign policy approach.
Not so fast. Here are the key takeaways from my @RUSI_org Commentary 1/13
While paying lip service to security matters, a more active German role is not aimed at strengthening the US-led security architecture in East & Southeast Asia.
In the guidelines' preface Foreign Minister Maas seeks to distance Germany from the increasing US–China rivalry 2/13
The new policy announcement also offers no critical self-reflection about Germany's failed 'change through trade' policy vis-a-vis China 3/13
An "Interim Statement on the Implications of China’s New National Security Law for UK Universities" has been published by the British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS) @bacs_china. What follows is the statement as a thread. 1/22
"China’s new National Security Law of 1st July 2020 brings forth new considerations and challenges for employees in UK Universities as line-managers, mentors and teachers" 2/22
"BACS has signed the (US) Association for Asian Studies statement on the National Security Law, joining over twenty other scholarly societies." 3/22