Places with brighter future economic prospects swung toward Biden. Higher college attainment, higher median household income, faster projected job growth, and fewer routine jobs were all correlated with a bigger Democratic margin in 2020 than 2016.
Places with better economic outcomes swung toward Biden in 2020. Faster job growth and lower unemployment pre-pandemic -- as well as pandemic-era milder job losses and smaller unemployment increases -- went hand-in-hand with bigger Democratic margins.
America continues to pull apart economically. The 2020 vote widened red-blue gaps in education, income, and future job-growth prospects -- gaps that were wide to begin with.
Places whose economies have suffered more in the pandemic voted more strongly for Biden: that's where the hardest-hit sectors are concentrated. And, from election to election, local voting patterns change little (county-level correlation = 0.99!)
But the swing to Biden was bigger in counties whose economies:
* did better under Trump before the pandemic
* have done better during the pandemic
* are likely to do better in the future.
America's partisan economic divide is wide and widening.
From the methodological basement and the cutting-room floor ...
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Votes are still being reported. I included only counties with at least 98% reporting as of this morning, but the correlations and pattern are very similar using counties with at least 90% reporting.
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Other kinds of analyses could be more sensitive to the vote-reporting threshold. Bluer places (based on complete 2016 results) are less complete. The population-weighted correlation between Trump's margin and % expected 2020 votes reported is 0.3. So, beware.
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It's not just New York State and California that have reported less than 98%. Some of the places driving the news, like Miami-Dade county and many Texas border counties, are also still below 98% reporting. Again, beware.
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Places that swung toward Trump in 2020 (vs 2016) tended to have swung toward Trump in 2016 (vs 2012) -- the swing correlation is 0.28. On average, places continued moving in the same direction as last time rather than reversing course.
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Thanks, as always, to @MonkovicNYT and the rest of the @UpshotNYT team -- especially in the midst of so much news and so many data updates.
Core unemployment remained high in October -- falling just slightly from Sept.
Core unemployment excludes temporary layoffs and remains near its pandemic high.
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Although the headline unemployment rate is far down from its peak, core unemployment remains near its pandemic high. Temporary layoffs are fading. Permanent unemployment is not.
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The temporary share of unemployment is down to 29% in October, from a high of 78% in April. Normal is in the 10-15% range.
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Some preliminary and incomplete thoughts about preliminary and incomplete data.
Let's not over-generalize about Hispanic/Latino vote patterns. Yes, there was a big shift toward Trump between 2016 and 2020 in Miami and the Texas border. But, details ...
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In the Texas counties where a majority of the population is of Mexican origin (Census definition), Trump did 6.6 points better in 2020 than in 2016. But outside of Texas, majority-Mexican-origin counties (mostly California) actually swung about half a point away from Trump.
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Another way to see this:
county-level correlation between % Hispanic/Latino and swing toward Trump (excl clearly incomplete counties):
0.32 overall
0.16 without Miami-Dade
0.01 without Miami-Dade or Texas
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New employment data show widely shared labor-market pain. I think the K-shaped recovery story -- that the top third or quarter is just fine -- is too simplistic.
Short thread focusing on education levels, using new Sept CPS microdata.
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In general, unemployment has risen more for people with less education. Older workers with college degrees have seen the smallest rise.
But unemployment is up several points for younger people with college degrees, too.
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Core unemployment -- which strips out temporary layoffs -- is up similarly across all three education levels. Headline unemployment shows a bigger gap by education, but some of that is temporary.
Employment has fallen significantly more for mothers than for fathers. Big gender gap for parents, regardless of marital status.
New CPS microdata for Sept.
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Prime-age EPOP (employment-population ratio for age 25-54) has fallen several more points for women with kids than for men with kids. The gender gap in EPOP decline is bigger for people with kids than for people without kids.
(repeating same graph)
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This parent gender gap in the labor market started early. In February, prime-age EPOP was 19.5 points lower for mothers than for fathers. Employment fell more for mothers than for fathers from February to May, and the gap widened. Gap has persisted since May.