1) Is it wise to deepen our economic dependence from China at a moment when we realise that China is increasingly using economic dependency for geo-strategic gains? Shouldn't we, in light of that new reality, rethink our economic ties to China?
2) Is the new agreement likely to provide Beijing additional opportunities to obtain advanced European technology? Technology that can be used to outcompete Europeans unfairly in the markets (with the help of the Chinese state) or that may strengthen China's military?
3) Is it smart to agree to such a deal even before a conversation about a joint US-European approach to China with the Biden administration has taken place? A dialogue that may lead to a broad alignment of liberal countries (Europe-US-Asia), allowing them ...
...to deal with China from a position of strength -- in order to achieve a deal that leaves China no choice but to accept fair trade on a level playing field?
We're living in an era of geopolitical competition, forced upon us namely by China. Any trade deal with China must be concluded with the aim to at least not worsen our European position in this competition.
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You hear it everywhere: "There's no going back to the good old days of the transatlantic relationship even if Biden wins". But is it true? A thread.
First, the premise is questionable. There are no "good old days" in transatlantic relations. They have never been harmonious. Just like intra-European relations are never harmonious. There have always been clashes between worldviews, interests, personality.
Secondly, what we would see with Biden is a return of Obama people into leading foreign policy positions. The Obama administration was a time when transatlantic relations were good, or very good, when cooperation was largely successful, from the financial crisis to Ukraine.
Putin's view of Germany as an emerging superpower is surprising. He may just want to saw a bit of confusion. Or he may really believe it. If it's the latter, why should he?
He may think that Russia is facing two economic powerhouses limiting expansion and at least indirectly challenging its spheres of influence (or control), China and Germany.
Indeed while it has been cautious not to offend Russia, Germany nevertheless has strongly supported Ukraine and played an important role in NATO's return back to territorial defense and deterrence.
Belarus, Nagorno-Karabakh: The Kremlin seems to loose its iron grip on its neighborhood. This begs the question: How successful has Putin's foreign policy been? A thread.
Starting point: Putin has two major foreign policy goals:
a) Control of the neighborhood, ie Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, parts of Middle East and North Africa. Pretty much like during the times of the Soviet Union.
b) Standing on eye level with the US: be respected globally and have a seat on the table when global issues are being negotiated, one way or the other.
EU foreign policy: ending the unanimity requirement by introducing some sort of majority voting (QMV) on foreign affairs has become the next holy grail in the debate. Quick thread.
Yet we have to get rid of the idea that some sort of institutional arrangement will end the disagreement and produce magically a united, coherent EU capable and will to act like a great power on the world stage.
We have been there before. Once it was the introduction of a Brussels-based diplomatic service and a foreign minister-like figure that would end the „gridlock“. Yet we have both now, and still no broad consensus, rather the opposite.
Germany feels more uncomfortable with NS2 more than ever, but it feels equally uncomfortable with abandoning the project. And the reason for this is geopolitical.
It feels uncomfortable because it is concerned about Navalny and about Belarus, which are seen just the last points in a long list of aggressive acts by Russia. Ukraine was the wake-up call, the gamer-changer, 2020 is the confirmation that Russia is not really a partner.
Yet it's difficult to change course after years of pushing NS2 through against the will and views of EU neighbors. And US pressure doesn't help, as bowing to it would look as if Germany had become a vassal of Trump.
Es gibt einen Konsens der Russland-Kenner, dass die von Deutschland maßgeblich mitinitiierten und immer wieder erneuerten westlichen Sanktionen gegen Russland wegen der russischen Militärintervention im Donbas erheblich dazu beigetragen haben, den russischen Vormarsch zu stoppen.
Wirkung ebenso wie Nichtwirkung von Sanktionen lässt sich im übrigen nie zweifelsfrei nachweisen; beide Vermutungen beruhen auf kontrafaktischen Szenarien, wie der Sanktionierte / Nichtsanktionierte sich verhalten hätte, wenn es keine Sanktionen / Sanktionen gegeben hätte.
Bei den Einlassungen von Altmaier geht es offenbar um eine grundlegendere Frage: lässt sich Wirtschaft im Zeitalter geopolitischen Wettbewerbs abkoppeln von der Gesamtstrategie, oder müssen wirtschaftliche Entscheidungen geopolitisch überprüft werden?