1. Several ways to buy more time for talks:
(i) Extend transition period (TP) before July 2020: missed that deadline
(ii) Extend TP by amending withdrawal agreement (WA): legally v complicated for EU
(iii) Create a brand new TP: politically v complicated
1. Different beasts: transition period (TP) ≠ art 50 talks. EU uses a legal basis for every treaty it strikes. For withdrawal agreement (& TP), it used article 50. Problem is: art 50 designed for a member state *that is on its way out* - *not* one that has already left.
2. 30 June deadline: that's why the UK & EU included a provision in the withdrawal agreement to extend the transition period. Problem is: there was a deadline. That deadline (30 June) has been missed. WA also prevents joint committee from amending end date of transition period.
3. Changing end date of TP in WA is complicated for EU: EU wd need to find a new legal basis in EU treaty (not clear there is one). Also requires UK & EU to agree terms of extension (UK ££ contribution to EU budget, abiding by EU law). Too little, too late.
4. Creating a brand new TP is also complicated: EU cd use article 207 (& 217/218). UK wd probably need act of parliament. UK & EU wd need to agree terms (£ contribution to EU budget, following EU rules, etc). Negotiators wd almost certainly need to drop FTA talks to focus.
5. EU has already introduced contingency measures in case of no deal: finally, @EU_Commission has already introduced contingency planning if talks break down. EU feels as prepared as it cd be. Not clear what more it would or could introduce to minimise disruption.
6. Deal vs no deal: time has always been true enemy of Brexit. It is still possible to reach a deal and provisionally apply it before end of yr. That seems - at this point in time - easier than trying to extend transition period. END.
Extending the transition period is a lovely idea - in theory. But in practice, it's a total minefield and not clear it can be done in time. Why? Thread.
1. Several ways to buy more time for talks:
(i) Extend transition period (TP) before July 2020: missed that deadline
(ii) Extend TP by amending withdrawal agreement (WA): legally v complicated for EU
(iii) Create a brand new TP: politically v complicated
2. Different beasts: transition period (TP) ≠ art 50 talks. EU uses a legal basis for every treaty it strikes. For withdrawal agreement (& TP), it used article 50. Problem is: art 50 designed for a member state *that is on its way out* - *not* one that has already left.
So.. I've been thinking a lot about this. Possible but wd be unprecedented for 2 reasons: 1) First time (to my knowledge) that an EU-only deal wd require provisional application (PA) 2) First time (to my knowledge) Council wd authorise PA before EU Parliament has voted.
1. Cd a UK-EU FTA be provisionally applied if EU cannot complete ratification by the end of the year? Yes. Article 25 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) allows for it. As @StevePeers notes, political declaration also mentions it.
2. But PA wd not be straightforward for 3 reasons:
a. Timing: Can only happen after legal scrubbing & translation
b. Legal call: EU only vs. “mixed agreement”
c. EU Parliament ratification
Lots of talk (& confusion) today about EU ratification & #Brexit. All you need to know in this short thread.
1. Should you care about EU ratification? Yes. Brexit talks ongoing – but they're only part of the challenge. UK & EU also need time to vote & get ready for change.
2. Who in EU votes on UK-EU FTA? Depends on content of the deal. If:
(i) “EU-only” (areas of EU law only): then approval is needed at EU level (Council & EU Parliament)
(ii) “mixed agreement” (areas of EU & member-state law, like aviation): then approval at EU level *and* in MS
How will #EU react to Cumming’s departure? My hunch: status quo & caution. Short thread:
1. Status quo: Cumming’s departure won’t suddenly lead to a softening of EU state aid position in favour of the UK’s. EU wants a state aid compromise that stands the test of time - not just now but in 5/10 years time. Tonight’s development do not change that.
2. Caution: Cumming’s departure only matters if it gives PM more room for manoeuvre to find a Brexit compromise. But PM makes that call & there is no guarantee of that yet. END.
1. Stable foreign policy outlook: Biden will want to break with an America first foreign policy. Recommit US to multilateral system, fight against climate change & building resilience. UK shares all these priorities.
2. *But* UK must present US with a plan: Biden’s immediate focus will be domestic (bring US together, tackle Covid). Many in Washington have been surprised at how “internally-focused” the UK has been for past 4 yrs with Brexit. They now want to know what Britain will do globally
1. Purpose: protocol designed to prevent a hard border between Ireland and NI: the only way to do that was to agree a UK-wide backstop (which PM rejected) OR ensure greater alignment between NI and Ireland & move admin procedures to the Irish Sea. PM negotiated the latter
2. Length: The protocol will apply even if there is an FTA – it’s just that certain provisions could be superseded (i.e. improved) by FTA. This is why FTA talks are so important. And why any attempt to unpick WA cd seriously jeopardise them.