HW Sinn hat es wieder getan: In seiner "Weihnachtsvorlesung" warnt er vor Hyperinflation. Er zieht direkte Linie von Hyperinflation 1923 zu Aufstieg der Nazis, erwähnt nicht, dass Nazi-Aufstieg Deflation vorausging, verstärkt durch Sparpolitik. Thread /1

Sinn hat das gleiche schon in einem langen NZZ-Interview gemacht. Ich habe das in einem Kommentar kritisiert, zumal HWS nicht nur die Geschichte verzerrt darstellt, sondern daraus auch noch verfehlte wirtschaftspolitische Schlussfolgerungen ableitet. /2

In seiner Replik hatte Sinn behauptet, er sehe die Rolle der Brüning'schen Sparpolitik ähnlich wie ich, aber könne in einem Interview eben nicht alles erwähnen. In 73 Minuten "Weihnachtsvorlesung" hat er Deflation und Sparpolitik wieder nicht erwähnt. /3

handelsblatt.com/meinung/kolumn…
Von seinen wirtschaftspolitischen Schlussfolgerungen für heute ("engere Budgetbeschränkungen", "nicht mehr aus Druckerpresse leben") war Sinn nicht abgerückt - auch wenn diese sich nicht damit vertragen, wenn er wirklich wesentliche Rolle für Sparpolitik bei Naziaufstieg sähe /4
In seiner "Weihnachtsvorlesung" warnt Sinn wieder mit schrillen Worten vor Hyperinflation: „Geldflut“; „dramatische Aufblähung der Geldmenge“; "EZB als Goldesel".

Ist das eine angemessene Beschäftigung mit dem Thema - auch wenn an Nichtökonomen gerichtet? /5
HW Sinns historische Exkurse sind analytisch ausbaufähig, aber stark auf das Wecken von Emotionen gerichtet. Da spricht Sinn darüber, dass das Geld wie Papier nichts mehr wert war im Jahr 1923. Und zeigt ein Mädchen, das sich aus wertlosen Geldscheinen ein Kleid gemacht hatte. /6
Fachunkundige ZuhörerInnen sind potential verleitet, sich vor Hyperinflation zu fürchten, so wie Sinn die Dinge rhetorisch dreht. Natürlich, die Hyperinflation werde nicht gleich kommen - aber "was, wenn der Kutscher die Zügel nicht mehr findet", wenn sie einmal in Gang kommt? /7
„Die €zone ist auch nichts anderes als die Geldsysteme früherer Zeiten. Die Potentaten erliegen der Verlockung, sich der Druckerpresse zu bedienen.“ - So schließt HWS die Vorlesung.

Oder ist HWS der Verlockung des Warnens mit Verdrehungen und dünner Sachlage erlegen? /end
Am Ende der Diskussion dankt übrigens ifo-Chef Fuest dem Vortragenden HW Sinn für dessen historische Beispiele, die Fuest sehr gut gefallen haben. Scheinbar verfängt Sinns selektive Verwendung der Hyperinflationsgeschichte also auch bei Ökonomen.

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More from @heimbergecon

22 Dec
One of Germany’s most prominent economists, Hans-Werner Sinn, warns of hyperinflation; he links it directly to Hitler's rise to power. A distortion of history: the rise of the Nazis was preceded by deflation, exacerbated by fiscal austerity. Thread /1

braveneweurope.com/philipp-heimbe…
Sinn says hyperinflation after WW1 impoverished the German middle class in the Weimar Republic: "Ten years later they elected Adolf Hitler as Reich Chancellor." Policy recommendation today against hyperinflation: "tighter budget constraints" /2

nzz.ch/finanzen/hans-…
Sinn thus feeds a widespread misinterpretation. Mass poverty when the Nazis came to power in 1933 was not the result of hyperinflation, which at that time was ten years in the past; it was primarily a consequence of mass unemployment due to the recession in the early 1930s. /3
Read 12 tweets
30 Nov
Does employment protection affect unemployment? My meta-analysis on this question is now published in "Oxford Economic Papers". The average (precision-weighted) effect is zero, but data and specification choices matter for reported effects. A thread: /1

academic.oup.com/oep/advance-ar…
In theory, the effect of employment protection on unemployment is ambiguous. Reported empirical findings are mixed. Qualitative surveys are potentially misleading, but using meta-analysis can help. /2
I construct a novel data set consisting of 881 observations on the effect of employment protection (EPL) on unemployment from 75 studies. Once we correct for (mild) publication selection bias, the average effect cannot be distinguished from zero. /3
Read 6 tweets
27 Nov
The Economist argues: the fiscal stance should depend on the unemployment rate: "pledge not to tighten fiscal policy actively until the economy has crossed a defined threshold". Implementing this in the EU would be revolutionary. A thread: /1

economist.com/leaders/2020/1…
Interestingly, the origins of cycle-sensitive budgeting lie in a Keynesian approach to fiscal policy. In its original sense, cycle-sensitive budgeting was tailored to contribute to the engineering of full employment /2

ineteconomics.org/research/resea…
The concept was first proposed by Gunnar Myrdal, who wanted to allow the Swedish government to balance the budget over the entire business cycle, which was supposed to promote a fiscal policy capable of smoothening cyclical swings in the economy /3
Read 11 tweets
26 Nov
Update output gap nonsense: My new column shows rising fiscal consolidation pressures in 🇩🇪 caused by new Commission estimates. Data thread: according to the Commission, German potential output will fall by €77 billion in 2021 compared to pre-Corona /1

wiiw.ac.at/n-470.html
This results in a downward revision in estimates of economic slack in 🇩🇪: The output gap in 2021 falls in the official Commission forecast to -2.7% in 2021. In view of the strong corona downturn this is implausible! Without the downward revision, the output gap would be -4.9% /2
As a result, the estimate of the "structural" budget deficit for the coming year increases by 1.2 % of GDP. About €42 billion of the fiscal deficit forecast is suddenly no longer attributed to economic weakness, but is considered "structural" /3
Read 12 tweets
6 Nov
Output gap nonsense: European Commission is doing it again in its most recent forecast: producing crisis-driven, pro-cyclical downward estimates in economic slack (measured in terms of output gaps). This will reduce fiscal space once the fiscal rules are reactivated. A thread: /1
How does the COVID-19 shock affect the European Commission’s potential output estimates? In its Autumn 2020 forecast, the Commission systematically reduced its potential output forecast to a larger extent in countries that are predicted to suffer from a larger drop in GDP. /2
One additional percentage point in predicted losses of actual output is associated with a loss in potential output of about 0.6 percentage points (on average), suggesting that the revisions in PO-model estimates are again strongly related to changes in economic activity. /3
Read 8 tweets
5 Oct
Last week, ECB president Lagarde acknowledged mismeasurement of output gaps. This seems a technical side note. In fact, it has huge implications for monetary and fiscal policy. Here is a thread on what it implies for EU fiscal policy-making and assessing the fiscal stance: /1
Lagarde: “revisions to potential output mistook cyclical changes for structural trends”. Implication: official estimates of what €Z economies should be able to produce without generating inflationary pressures have been systematically too pessimistic. /2

ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date…
Output gaps were large before Corona, implying severe underutilization of resources. Implication: Policy-makers should have been using more expansionary policy measures to stimulate production and employment to reduce big output gaps. /3
Read 17 tweets

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