Thread by @ulrichspeck

Key questions about the EU-China investment agreement (CAI) have not yet been discussed. Quick thread.

Is the conclusion of CAI a strategic move by EU governments, led on this issue by German chancellor Angela Merkel, or is it just path-dependent “business as usual”?

What are the strategic implications?

Will the CAI increase Europe’s (Germany’s) considerable economic dependency on China, making it even harder in the future to say “no” to China? Will it move Europe further towards the position where Beijing wants to see it -- politically neutral between the US and China?

Could the CAI derail the transatlantic effort to build a joint strategy? Will it drive a wedge between the EU and the US, making it harder to deal jointly with China's distortions of the market economy and its effort “to make the world safe for autocracy”?

Will the CAI live up to its promises: will it change the behaviour of the CCP with regard to forced transfer of intellectual property, “level playing field” etc? Can the agreement be credibly enforced by the EU alone? Is the EU in a position of strength vis-à-vis China?

How does the CAI affect the "tech race" -- will it provide China with additional opportunities in the race for technological leadership, allowing it to become even more dominant economically and politically?

The EU has stated in March 2019 that China is a “systemic rival” and an “economic competitor”, besides being a “partner”. It is unclear how the CAI fits into this framework.

Conclusion: A proper debate of the CAI must focus on the impact of the agreement on the systemic competition between market economy and state-led economy, and between the liberal and autocratic order.