1/n We ended 2020 with the news that India's power demand cross 180 GW for the first time. Unusually, this occurred in December, when power demand usually peaks is in summer?
What is going on here? Is it sign of the economic recovery?
Short thread.
2/n Firstly, as I have been repeating, we need to look carefully at both base effect and time period when looking at demand growth.
Monthly demand smooths out daily fluctuations, and comparing 2020 against both 2019 and 2018 shows the importance of the base effect. 👇
3/n Compared against 2018, 2020 monthly demand has registered only a few months of growth since the lockdown effectively ended in June.
Because of the collapse in demand in the second half of 2019, the picture looks more optimistic if we compare against 2019 (low base effect)
4/n Secondly, instantaneous demand (peak) is clearly not the same thing as energy demand across time.
The relationship between daily December demand and daily December peak appears to be getting steeper 👇.
5/n In other words, for every increase in daily December demand, daily peak has been increasing further (the slope of the relationship has been increasing).
So, December demand appears to be getting more peaky. This may be because of heating loads.
6/n In addition, daily variability in December demand and peak also appears to be increasing 👇.
In particular, the distribution of daily values in 2020 appears to be skewed. The median daily peak and daily energy requirement are far lower than the upper quartile.
7/n In simpler terms, there were a few days of high energy requirement and high peak, and the bulk of days with lower values. This explains why 2020 monthly aggregate energy requirement was not substantially above the 2019 or 2018 value, while the peak values were.
8/n So a few take-aways:
- peak demand is not a good indicator because it's impacted by both intraday and interday variability.
- both intraday (peakiness) and interday variability appear to be increasing.
- we need to look at longer time periods, like monthly totals.
9/n - the picture that emerges from a longer period and more comprehensive assessment is still of pretty tepid demand growth.
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At 140 pages, I can't summarize the whole thing in a single thread, but I can do a series of threads.
Today's: H2 in the Indian power sector.
2/n We do a bottom up assessment to 2050 of power demand across all sectors, including direct and indirect electrification (for electrolytic H2 production).
In the low carbon scenario, power demand reaches as much as 6200 TWh by 2050, with almost 1000 TWh of that for H2. 👇
3/n This would consume a very substantial chunk of India's maximum estimated technical potential for onshore wind and solar PV. 👇
The required rate of supply growth and land footprint may be challenging!
This reinforces the message: direct electrification wherever possible.
1/n In today's thread, I want to take a look at India's NDC target of reducing the GHG intensity of GDP by 33-35% by 2030, compared to 2005.
I argue that this target is essentially BAU, because India's GHG intensity of GDP is declining as a natural part of development.
Thread
2/n If we take a long run view of the GHG intensity of India's economy since 1947, it can be seen that GHG intensity peaked in about 1985 and has been declining ever since.
Why is this?
3/n Firstly, this pattern is common to developing countries across the long-run development trajectory:
- China
- South Korea
- Thailand
- Japan
All experienced this kind of peak and decline structure (Japan and Thailand somewhat early than I graph here).
1/n Yesterday Xi Jinping announced that China would peak its emissions and work towards net zero emissions by 2060.
What does this mean for India?
A short thread on why India is fundamentally different from China, and how it could respond in its climate diplomacy.
2/n India is, simply put, a much poorer country than China. Its GDP at PPP is 57% below that of China. But I think this actually understates how far India is behind China.
Another way of looking: India's final energy consumption per capita is 70% below that of China.
3/n Even at PPP, China's final energy intensity of GDP is 30% higher than India's.
Why is this? Essentially, it boils down to economic structure 👇. China's industry share in GDP is much higher than India, and China's industry sector is more energy intensive.
1/n @KanitkarT@tjayaraman
Thank you for clarifying that the source of your claim that developed country patenting in climate mitigation technologies has collapsed from 2009-10 to 2017.
This allowed me to go back and look through the data.
A (long) thread on innovation.
2/n Firstly, as per your article, I don't think that you can use 2017 as the cut off for the analysis, because as noted in the OECD metadata "figures for the later years may be decreasing because of legal delays for publishing patent information."
3/n Taking 'priority date' as the best reference date for the patenting (described in the metadata as "closest to the invention date ... To measure inventive activity, patent should be counted according to the priority date"), then data completeness is described as follows :
@KanitkarT @tjayaraman 1/8 In my thread on their article in the Hindu, I wrongly concluded that @KanitkarT and @tjayaraman had got India's and world per capita emissions wrong, as I didn't spot that they used tons C not tons CO2.
I've taken that tweet down and I'm sorry.
2/8 In my defense, no units were mentioned only 'emissions', and tons C is an odd unit to use in a newspaper article.
Adding units would have been good.
I think the rest of @KanitkarT responses to me miss the point. I'll respond to that here again.
3/8 On Germany, I was responding using it as a counterexample to a very specific claim in your piece, which you have sidestepped in your response to me.
You state "renewables at best can meet residential consumption and some part of the demand from the service sector".
1/n Yesterday BP released its 2020 World Energy Outlook, which got a lot of press for saying that global oil demand has already peaked.
In this thread, I want to unpick a little bit what the BP 2020 WEO says about India.
Lots of interesting stuff here.
2/n The fig below shows primary consumption by fuel in the outlook's three scenarios.
You may be struck by high huge growth of coal in the BAU scenario (1.8 x between 2018 and 2050). I'll come back to this.
But more striking to me is the modest oil demand growth in the BAU.
3/n Oil product demand grows less than 2x between 2018 and 2050. This is far lower than other comparable energy scenarios.
For example, the apparently transformative Shell Sky Scenario has India's oil product demand growing >3x between 2015-2050.