“Trump was not involved in that decision. It was Mike Pence...Trump would be in the chain of command” (not Pence).
2. New York Times now too:
“Defense and administration officials said it was Vice President Mike Pence, not President Trump, who approved the order to deploy the D.C. National Guard. It was unclear why the president...who is still the commander in chief, did not give the order.”
On Trump’s potential criminal liability for sedition etc, 18 USC 2383-85:
Exhibit 1:
In real time, Republican House Minority Leader McCarthy demanded that Trump release a statement denouncing the mob as they were attacking the Capitol. Initially Trump would not agree.
2. "As supporters stormed into the Capitol on Wednesday, Mr. Trump was initially pleased, officials said, and disregarded aides pleading with him to intercede."
“Officials said it was Vice President Mike Pence, not President Trump, who approved the order to deploy the DC National Guard. It was unclear why the president…who is still the commander in chief, did not give the order.” nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/…
What may #Manafort be hiding in exchange for pardon?
Recall this nugget in Sen. @RonWyden's note accompanying Senate Intelligence Committee report:
Wyden: The unredacted version of the report includes “indications of Manafort’s own connections to [the hack and leak] operations”
2. @howardfineman reported (in 2018) that Trump “decided that a key witness in the Russia probe, Paul Manafort, isn’t going to ‘flip’ and sell him out, friends and aides say” — another indication Manafort has derogatory info about Trump and Trump knows it. nbcnews.com/storyline/2018…
3. As Trump Campaign Chairman, Manafort shared internal polling data and campaign's strategy with a Russian intelligence officer (Konstantin Kilimnik).
The Senate also obtained evidence Kilimnik was involved in hack and leak operation.
But I disagree with some of his analysis, which conflates espionage with far more malicious cyber operations. Vital distinctions in thinking about reciprocity and deterrence in cyberspace.
a) It's wrong to suggest this hack is like an act of war.
b) It's wrong to suggest USG could lawfully use military force in response.
c) Public officials/commentators should react with awareness that USG hacks foreign govts' networks on a huge scale.
3. On reciprocity: Jack argues that USG's aggressive disruption of Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) in 2018 opens door to other countries' engaging in similar disruptive actions against US for espionage.👇
But that erroneously conflates IRA’s actions with espionage.
“The actual and perceived control...could easily be used to undermine public and consumer trust in data, written communications and services. In the networks that the Russians control, they have the power to destroy or alter data, and impersonate legitimate people.”
“According to SolarWinds SEC filings, the malware was on the software from March to June. The number of orgs. that downloaded the corrupted update could be as many as 18,000, which includes most federal government unclassified networks and more than 425 Fortune 500 companies.”
2. News via @Militarydotcom: "At least eight former service members and Blackwater security guards convicted of war crimes have filed petitions seeking pardons...including a former Army staff sergeant [Robert Bales] who pleaded guilty to killing 16 Afghan men, women and children"
I'm thankful to work with professionals at @just_security who have such excellence in judgment, analysis, and intellect and who also happen to be wonderful people: