NEW Institute satellite imagery analysis: Update on Natanz: Construction Progresses Towards Large-scale Tunnel Complex isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1/
Since our October 30, 2020, report on the construction of a new centrifuge assembly facility in the mountains near the Natanz enrichment plant, construction has progressed and tunnel entrance locations can now be identified with certainty. 2/
Most importantly, newly available high resolution satellite imagery confirms that construction is progressing rapidly at the largest mountain in the area, the most likely future location for the new underground assembly facility. 3/
A high-resolution January 5, 2021, satellite image we acquired shows the layout of the monitored area, which includes the current construction staging area and future engineering support site, a small mountain south of the support site, and a large mountain south-west of it. 4/
The entrances can be accessed from the support site by following a road leading south and a road leading west, respectively, and are referred to as eastern tunnel entrance and western tunnel entrance areas herein. 6/
Electric powerlines now connect the staging area and eastern tunnel area to the main power grid (the western tunnel area is still in the process of being connected) and there is a new security perimeter that is being installed near the staging area. 7/
Further figures show a close-up of the current construction staging area and future engineering support site; eastern entrances in detail; western tunnel entrance area; and remnants of the destroyed assembly facility at the Natanz enrichment site: 8/
In addition to construction equipment, the construction staging area features several buildings and a partly-established security perimeter. 9/
The eastern tunnel entrances in detail. An expanding spoil pile nearby indicates continued excavation. Storage for construction explosives nearby. 10/
The western tunnel entrance area. An expanding spoil pile nearby indicates continued excavation here as well. More explosives storage buildings. 11/
Lastly, the remains of the original Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center (ICAC), destroyed by an explosion in early July 2020, are now secured by a perimeter fence. 12/
Conclusion: The construction progress to date indicates a large-scale tunnel facility, connecting a small mountain ridge with a large mountain ridge, with enough room to harbor a facility larger in size than the original centrifuge assembly facility. 13/
We assess the most likely location for the new assembly facility is best-protected, centered underneath the large mountain, far away from tunnel entrances. 14/
The tunnel will likely host addtl security structures & blast traps, but could also include additional facilities, labs, storage, etc. 15/15 END
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A few tweets in response to breakout questions now that Iran is enriching uranium to near 20 %. (Side note: The law does not require the production of 120 kg within two months, it requires an annual production of 120 kg.) 1/
We do not know how many centrifuges at Fordow are currently dedicated to 20 % enrichment, although reports are that its approximately 1000 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades connected as tandem cascades will be used, at least initially. 2/
The law includes a requirement to install one cascade of IR-6 centrifuges, which is reportedly slated for Fordow, followed by the installation of a total of 1000 IR-6's over a year. 3/
IMPORTANT UPDATE: 1. As we are looking further into the reporting of a possible yellowcake production facility near Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, we keep in mind lessons were learned from Syria, both Al Kibar and Marj as Sultan.
2. The former, a nuclear reactor in a nondescript box, with minimum visible security barriers; the latter, a uranium conversion facility with no outward signatures.
3. Two days ago, we identified a suspect site south of Al Ula as a follow-up to a WSJ report. This morning, we discovered an identical site, constructed about the same time, that appears to be associated with bulk waste disposal.
1. US media should not jump on the recent, false claims by Iranian news agencies on Iran's Nour-1 satellite imaging capabilities. The images circulating in Iranian media provide no basis to claim that Nour-1 has the capability to take high resolution electro-optical spy images.
2. The electro-optical images as published by Tasnim News and others were not taken by the Nour-1 satellite, but are commercially available satellite images as shown in our own analysis and others, @AuroraIntel, @inbarspace.
2 (cont'd) In fact, at least some of the electro-optical images claimed to be Nour-1 satellite imagery is datable to PRIOR the Nour-1 launch of 22 April 2020.
As of Feb 19, 2020, Iran's enriched uranium stockpile of up to 4.5 % is 1020.9 kg in uranium mass, or 1510 kg in uranium hexafluoride mass. This is up significantly from 372.3 kg uranium mass ( 550.7 kg UF6 mass) on Nov 3, 2019.
However, a relatively large quantity of that amount is enriched to less than 2%. 268.5 kg uranium mass (397.2 hex mass) out of the total 1020.9 kg (1510 kg hex mass) is enriched to less than 2 %.
The 3.67 % stock remained constant, while the 4.5 % LEU stock went up from to 129.2 kg to 537.8 kg uranium mass ( from 191 to 796 kg hex mass).
NEW from @TheGoodISIS: Conversion of Fordow: Another Unfulfilled Hope of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Fordow now includes semi-indigenous nuclear equipment production
1) The Fordow uranium enrichment facility has never been repurposed, as promised in the JCPOA. Everything required to enrich uranium to weapons grade could be quickly reconstituted in the underground portion of the facility.
2) Fordow is potentially part of Iran’s current threats to progressively go to higher enrichment levels and increase its stocks of enriched uranium, and if conducted there, Fordow’s underground tunnel complex is fortified to withstand aerial bombardment.
1. A thread on the administration's consideration of terminating or suspending waivers for civilian nuclear work at Iran's Fordow, Arak, & Bushehr sites. In short: people are blowing this way out of proportion as far as killing the deal.
2. Fordow is now revealed with certainty to have been a military enrichment facility designed to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Iran should be required to shut it down. isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
3. If the JCPOA member states are worried about stable isotope separation, Iran should move it to Natanz. This is a small project and can easily be moved.