So diplomacy on how to revive the #IranDeal seems to have hit a roadblock even before it began. Iran & the US are publically dueling about who has to take the first step.
But we have been here before though, so there are good reasons to remain calm.
Here’s why >>
Both the US and Iran have accepted a compliance-for-compliance mechanism. Both sides simply go back into the deal with no preconditions. Then, whatever needs to be renegotiated, will be addressed when both are in compliance.
But that doesn't resolve who should go first. >>
Without providing any particular argument, Biden and Secr of State Blinken have stated that the US will go into full compliance once the Iranians have done the same. That is, Iran has to take the first step. >>
The Iranians argue that it was the US that breached and left the deal (Iran has remained inside the deal all this time) and as a result, logic dictates that the US that must take the first step.
A week into Biden’s presidency and they are already stuck. Or are they?
>>
This is could likely be posturing rather than substance. The Biden team is not yet fully staffed, it may not even be in a position to take the first step. But presenting the “delay” as a tough negotiation position may make Biden look good to domestic audiences. >>
Indeed, neither side wants to look too eager to go back into the deal - even though both recognize how much they need the JCPOA. Thus, as part of the public negotiation, posturing and playing hard to get may be useful. >>
The firm responses from Tehran may make Iran look overeager, but it also signals domestic audiences that they aren’t naive negotiators. Due to Trump’s betrayal of the deal, coming across as soft or trustful of the US will not help the Iranian negotiators. >>
If, however, this is more than posturing, optimism is still warranted. There was a lot of “Who goes first” in the JCPOA as well.
Every time, the challenge was resolved because of two factors: The political will existed and there was sufficient time available to work out creative solutions.
This time around, the political will exists as well. But time, may not.>>
Both the US & Iran have the political will because rejoining the deal so squarely is in their respective national interests.
For the US, it not only blocks Iran’s pathways to a bomb, it’s also a necessary step to significantly limit America’s military footprint in the MidEast >>
Moreover, diplomacy on regional issues - from Syria to Yemen - can not begin in earnest until the JCPOA is restored and this major point of tension between the US and Iran is neutralized.
>>
For Iran, the JCPOA doesn’t just lift sanctions on Iran, it was its pathway for political and economic rehabilitation regionally and globally. An end to 40 years of US efforts to contain and exclude Iran.>>
So political will is not a problem. Time, however, might be. Rouhani’s political opponents in the Parliament have passed a bill that mandates Iran to begin 20% enrichment if the US hasn’t lifted sanctions on Iran by end of February. >>
Moreover, the Iranian Presidential elections take place in mid-June this year. This means that Iran enters its political season sometime in March, after which it likely won’t be able to engage in serious negotiations. >>
So while the political will exist, the time to find creative solutions is short.
Ultimately, however, I am optimistic. Too much is simply at stake for either side to risk losing arguably the last opportunity to revive an agreement that so squarely advances their interests. //
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Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, one of Iran's most important nuclear officials, has been assassinated in Tehran. This is what we know /THREAD/:
1. Israel has assassinated numerous Iranian nuclear scientists in the past but have never been able to get to the highly protected Fakhrizadeh.
>>
2. Some Iranian reports claim it was a suicide attack, but the bullet holes in Fakhrizadeh’s car cast some doubt on that.
3. If it was a suicide bomb, then that reduces the likelihood of Israeli operatives carrying out the attack.
4. Israel has, however, used operatives from the Iranian terrorist organization the MEK in the past to conduct attacks in Iran. The MEK is the group that introduced suicide assassinations to Iran.
/THREAD/
Hate to rain on Pompeo, Bibi and MBZ’s parade, but here’s why this “deal” will intensify tensions and give another lease on life for America’s counterproductive military presence in the Middle East. >>
2. Contrary to Pompeo's talking points, this will not create peace or make it easier to bring home US troops from the region. The focus on the “Iran threat” is designed to lock the US into a Cold/Hot War in the Middle East for decades to come. >>
(newrepublic.com/article/159010…)
3. We will be hearing endless arguments going forward - from many different sides - that now that the Israelis and the "Arabs" (though its only UAE and Bahrain) - have united, the US is obligated to support them against the “Iranian menace.” >>
So Trump & Pompeo just massively embarrassed the US on the world stage with a humiliating loss at the UNSC. Passionately fighting losing battles has become the hallmark of Trump and Pompeo's Iran policy, but this takes it to an entirely new level. >>
Only two votes in favor, two against and 11 abstentions.
It would be a mistake to solely look at this as yet another example of Trump's diplomatic vandalism as it misses the real point: The structural stupidity of US Middle East policy that long predates Trump. >>
From embarrassing the U.S. at the Council, Trump and Pompeo will now move on to create an existential crisis for the Council. Even if the US manages to trigger snapback, other P5 states will challenge the legitimacy of the move and leave the Council in an unprecedented crisis.>>
1. Zarif unexpectedly attending the G7 meeting may lead to a much-needed deescalation. If the reporting on Macron's proposal is correct, it would also be signal an abysmal failure of Bolton's maximum pressure strategy.
>>
2. Macron reportedly proposes that Iran returns to full compliance to the JCPOA in return for Trump reissuing sanctions waivers and thus removing his illegal sanctions against purchasing Iranian oil.
3. This would bring the situation back to the status quo pre-May 2019. The US will continue to violate the deal and sanction Iran, Tehran will continue to adhere to the deal but will also sell its oil. It's a status quo no one is happy with, but one that is relatively stable.
With the seizing of the British ship, the Iranians are clearly signaling: The countries who succumb to Trump's pressure and agree to become tools in his maximum pressure policy on Iran will pay a price for targetting Iran.
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2. The UK seized an Iranian tanker 2 weeks ago, now Iran has seized a UK tanker. No one should be surprised by Iran's response. The more intriguing question is: Why did the UK agree to become a party to Trump's lose-lose game?
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3. I am a bit surprised by the surprise. Some have called this a bold move by Iran. Perhaps that's a conclusion one could have reached if one assumed that Iran was a push-over. That's a perilous assumption.
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/THREAD/ Iran's counter-escalation comes across as making a bad situation worse. But there may be a sound logic behind it. Here's what I think the Iranian game plan is:
2. Tehran’s strategy is predicated on two assumptions:
A. There is an important — but not yet determinate — wedge between Trump and Bolton. As long as this wedge is limited, Trump’s pressure on Iran is costly to Iran but carries no cost to Trump. >>
3.
B. This wedge is rooted in Trump’s lack of interest in Bolton's desired war with Iran. Trump genuinely believes that maximum pressure will force Iran to capitulate and give him an easy victory (a highly unlikely turn of events.) >>