China’s strategy vis-à-vis Central Asia’s elites is undergoing an under-appreciated change. Beijing is shifting from working exclusively w/ the region’s incumbent leaders to support for pro🇨🇳 politicians & even making efforts to bring them to power.
THREAD
carnegie.ru/commentary/837…
1/18: In October 2020, Kyrgyz President Sooronbay Jeenbekov was ousted and replaced by Sadyr Japarov, who managed to seize power, schedule elections & become the 6th president of Kyrgyzstan this month. carnegie.ru/commentary/830…
2/ This eyebrow-raising quick jump to the presidency incited many questions from the public. Read @joannalillis piece to learn why he's popular:
economist.com/asia/2021/01/1…

But how did a former convicted criminal muster enough resources to get elected? One of the factors could be 🇨🇳
3/ Japarov initially was associated w/ 🇨🇳 because of his family history. His father was born, raised, and educated in Xinjiang. The family returned to Soviet Kyrgyzstan in 1962, where Japarov was born 6 years later. See @VeneraSagyn remarks at @FPRI event:
4/18: Based on this fact, opponents of Japarov began to spread conspiracy theories that he had been recruited by the Chinese intelligence. "A man who represents the interests of China ... today is running for president," his opponent Kanat Isayev said:
5/18: Conspiracies aside, throughout his career Japarov has been long interacting & cooperating with China in both politics & business.
6/18: In 2007, when Japarov was a member of the Kyrgyz parliament, his brother won a public tender & acquired 71% of Jyrgalan mine for $320K (the price was obviously understated). Soon he handed the mine over to 🇨🇳 Chinese investors. vesti.kg/politika/item/…
7/18: In 2012 there was a large fire at the mine. The media wrote that the Chinese wanted Japarov to pay $7 mln for the damage. Instead of money, he offered to lobby the idea of taking Kumtor (the largest gold mine in the region) away from a 🇨🇦 company: gezitter.org/ushaktar/86322…
8/18: Today Japarov has forgotten about Kumtor. Instead, he considers the possibility of giving up a part of Jetim-Too iron ore deposit to 🇨🇳 in order to reduce external debt. According to Kyrgyz lawmaker @bekeshev, by 2020 🇰🇬 debt to 🇨🇳 exceeded $2.2 bln:
9/18: Interestingly Japarov's close associate, whom he publicly called a friend, a 🇰🇬 lawmaker Adil Zhunus uulu, is also famous for ideas to sell key 🇰🇬 assets to 🇨🇳, e.g. in 2018 he proposed to transfer the national airline Air Kyrgyzstan to 🇨🇳 investors: stanradar.com/news/full/3130…
10/18: What is more interesting is Adil Zhunus uulu's bio. He was born & lived in 🇨🇳. In 2001 he received 🇰🇬 citizenship & was doing business in mining as well as Japarov. In 2015, got elected to parliament through Japarov's Ata Zhurt party & became the 1st 🇰🇬 lawmaker born in 🇨🇳
11/18: Although Adil Zhunus is a public official he de-facto owns several firms. Here on a map is a building that these companies own. Guess where Sadir Japarov's campaign headquarters during the election was located?

Yes, the answer is 100 Ibraimov Street, Bishkek.
12/18: An election campaign is a pricey event. But even though Japarov just came out of prison had a lot of money in his campaign budget. In fact, he spent more than 45 mln Kyrgyz soms (~$560K, which is more than the other 17 candidates combined) for the election campaign.
13/18: Where did he get the money? There is direct evidence that Japarov's election campaign was at least partially funded by the Chinese (even though it's illegal). He received at least 1mln Kyrgyz soms from the Hua-Er company owned by a Chinese national Huang Jianhong. @_24_kg
14/18: Even the buses that brought Japarov's supporters to rallies belong to the company that is owned by Tohutibubi Ouerhalik who was born in Xinjiang & got Kyrgyz citizenship only in 2018: cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru…

Photo: @_24_kg
15/18: If these events are not purely coincidental and China did assist Japarov in taking power, it means Beijing is starting to move beyond economic inroads in the region and starts to become a player in local politics. This is an important milestone.
16/18: In an interview to @FT's @HenryJFoy Japarov said that there are signs that China and Russia compete for assets and influence in Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan, but added that rivalry does not play a huge role. ft.com/content/0c43bf…

Isn't it though?
17/18: 🇨🇳🇷🇺 This new dynamic is shaking the foundation of the power balance between Russia and China in Central Asia. What should Moscow do?

My answer is here:
carnegie.ru/commentary/837…
18/18: This article is a part of @CarnegieRussia's #PaxSinica project, for more materials about China's growing might in Eurasia visit
carnegie.ru/specialproject…

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More from @TUmarov

16 Oct 20
1/6 Emomali Rahmon managed to get reelected for yet another term without any mass protests or other hitches. The regime in Tajikistan has fused so closely w/ his extensive family that neither a new generation nor the Covid-19 pandemic can dent his power.

carnegie.ru/commentary/829…
2/6 But it'll be difficult for him to complete his 5 term in entirety. It’s impossible to predict what difficulties may arise for the regime, and as he gets older, it will get harder for Rahmon to cling onto power.
3/6 Rahmon will most likely follow the example of his Kazakh counterpart in a few years’ time, and step down from the presidency. Unlike the transition in Kazakhstan, however, in Tajikistan, the succession will be a family affair.
Read 6 tweets
8 Oct 20
1/9 Kyrgyzstan is facing the biggest political crisis in a decade. One of the differences in the current situation from the last 2 revolutions is the reluctance of external powers to get involved. What to expect from 🇨🇳&🇷🇺? @AlexGabuev & I explain it here: carnegie.ru/commentary/829… Image
2/9 First, to understand what's going on the ground there's a great zoom-event by @CarnegieEndow's @pstronski co-organized by @tahirmuh & @OxusSociety w/ awesome speakers @VeneraSagyn, @Ericamarat, @bektour, and @ADoolotkeldieva.

3/9 In a nutshell, the current resident lost much of his authority, his enemy, ex-president Atambayev, is back in the game, as are many other players. The roots of today's battle for power goes back to the last year's scandal I wrote about @Diplomat_APAC:

carnegie.ru/2019/08/23/fai…
Read 9 tweets
7 Sep 20
1/9 🇨🇳🇧🇾 In Belarus, China is neither at odds with Russia nor wedded to Alexander Lukashenko. As unrest spreads following last month’s presidential election, there is little reason to expect China to step in to rescue the embattled president. Here's why:
carnegie.ru/commentary/826…
2/9 Belarus’s cooperation with China has always been informed by its relations with Russia and the West. Hence the original impetus for Minsk’s pursuit of a closer Sino-Belarusian relationship: the 2000s’ oil wars with the Kremlin and EU sanctions.
carnegie.ru/commentary/826…
3/9 Although China’s role in the Belarusian economy has gradually increased since the 2010s, Beijing cannot, and has no intention to, seriously compete with Moscow.
Read 9 tweets
30 Mar 20
1/13: China is gradually laying down the foundations for the construction of a Pax Sinica in Central Asia. This process is not going smoothly, Beijing’s policy has come up against constraints. My take on 🇨🇳 strategy in 🇰🇿🇺🇿🇹🇲🇰🇬🇹🇯 @CarnegieRussia

carnegie.ru/commentary/814… Image
2/13: China adheres to 3 principles in CA: not to interfere in the countries’ internal affairs/problems in their relations with each other; to focus on economic cooperation; to work on improving its reputation. This strategy has been extremely successful so far.
3/13: China’s interests in Central Asia are linked to the region’s 3 main specifics:

1) buffer zone between Afghanistan and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region;

2) natural resources;

3) CA has the potential to become an overland transit hub for the entire continent.
Read 13 tweets
30 Oct 19
This fall will be remembered in #Kazakhstan 🇰🇿 for a wave of anti-China protests there. Why ppl are not happy w/ growing 🇨🇳 influence in the region? Why the leadership of the country cannot solve the problems w/ 🇨🇳? Here's my take for @CarnegieRussia:
carnegie.ru/commentary/802…
At first, while the protests were not political, the authorities dealt with them calmly. But later when the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan party (banned as an extremist group there) and it's leader Mukhtar #Ablyazov took the lead, the rallies were all broken up by police. 1/
Officials tried to deflate the uproar by blaming everything on false information and “certain forces.” Some anonymous sources showed anti-Chinese protests as the sign of frictions within the ruling elite. 2/
t.me/Uzynqulaq/255
Read 11 tweets

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