Thread by @DrRadchenko

atlanticcouncil.org/content-series…. Have read the new Mister X on China. Problematic. The very first page proclaims that Xi Jinping has "returned to classical Marxism Leninism," which inter alia show the author has no clue about what Marxism Leninism is.

Or here. What risk-averse post-Mao predecessors? Meaning, "invading Vietnam in 1979 risk-averse"? Or perhaps "Shooting missiles at Taiwan in 1996 risk-averse"? I have no patience with historical backgrounds that are start out by getting historical facts completely wrong.

Or this. How was China a status quo power under Xi's predecessors? I think the author is trying to say that it was not trying to overturn the international order. But this was less a matter of intention than of capabilities. If you are powerful enough to set the rules, you do.

From my recollection, for years the problem in China's strategic community was precisely that there was not a clear-cut strategy for handling the United States. It's questionable that China even has a grand strategy. If it does, the author doesn't explain what this "strategy" is.

This we heard from David Shambaugh ages ago, and here's my problem with the thesis. It's not that Xi doesn't have internal opposition - of course he does. The problem is what good does it do to exploit this assumed fault lines?

In general - historically - the United States proved equally inept at trying to divine internal contradictions in China as in the Soviet Union, or, after such divination, exploiting them. But I guess no one has died trying.

Ah, there's Sun Tzu. Wondered how long it would take for him to appear.

Oh now we are getting somewhere. The author is saying the US should mend fences with Russia in order to undercut China. Sort of Nixon in reverse. Here's my take on this. Of course, the Kremlin would be thrilled if the US reappraised Russia in view of China.

However, the bottom line is that China and Russia have been neighbours for longer than the United States has existed. And they have every reason to build close relations. They remember from recent history that their conflict only benefited third party adversaries.

I wrote about it in this oped if anyone is interested: nytimes.com/2019/03/02/opi…. Also, in my book "Unwanted Visionaries" [Oxford UP], which looks at the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the 1980s.

That's why there has been a consistent line in China to seek rapprochement with Moscow since the early 1980s, and the Soviets and later the Russians reciprocated this - for reason that have little to do with what the West did or failed to do.

I have no idea where this comes from. What is the evidence for a leader in China being overthrown because he failed to decisively win in a foreign war. I think we'd sooner all die in a nuclear armageddon than see this scenario play out.

Hmmm. Counting on China to solve the North Korea problem for the US is a long-standing illusion, and it has persistently failed to deliver.

I could go on and on. I should not say that the article is not thought-provoking. It's a pretty good read. But I would just conclude by criticising this central tenet. There's too much here about Xi Jinping. A strategy built for one person is not a strategy at all.

Because suppose Xi Jinping drops dead tomorrow - what, the underlying factors of Sino-US rivalry will just disappear? That's just unthinkable. And what then?