There are several important elements to disentangle here. And imo, biggest long-term problem for City is not EU's onshoring of EU trade but UK's loss of influence over EU banking regulation. Short thread
1. Onshoring not surprising: as soon as it was clear UK banks wouldn't retain passporting, banks started to plan. They started to move some activity/personnel to EU. EU not granting UK equivalence decision also not helping.
2) Power of regulation: story here isn't really abt economic damage to City/UK in short-term (that's still tbd) or damage to City "brand". What *is* noteworthy is that EU regulation can and does impact the way banks (even those not in EU) operate. This has long-term implications.
3) Influence matters: Out of EU, Treasury has no say over EU banking regulation. That matters if, for eg, EU regs make it harder for City to trade certain things. UK needs a dialogue of FS with EU (EU has 1 with Canada and Japan, but not UK). Can't rely on BoE influence only..
4) Influence is (still) key: UK must also remain (much more) active in global financial bodies - many of which influence EU banking rules. FSB, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, @IOSCOPress, etc. Our @instituteforgov paper on influencing the EU after Brexit looked at this.
Extending the transition period is a lovely idea - in theory. But in practice, it's a total minefield and not clear it can be done in time. Why? Thread.
1. Several ways to buy more time for talks:
(i) Extend transition period (TP) before July 2020: missed that deadline
(ii) Extend TP by amending withdrawal agreement (WA): legally v complicated for EU
(iii) Create a brand new TP: politically v complicated
2. Different beasts: transition period (TP) ≠ art 50 talks. EU uses a legal basis for every treaty it strikes. For withdrawal agreement (& TP), it used article 50. Problem is: art 50 designed for a member state *that is on its way out* - *not* one that has already left.
1. Several ways to buy more time for talks:
(i) Extend transition period (TP) before July 2020: missed that deadline
(ii) Extend TP by amending withdrawal agreement (WA): legally v complicated for EU
(iii) Create a brand new TP: politically v complicated
1. Different beasts: transition period (TP) ≠ art 50 talks. EU uses a legal basis for every treaty it strikes. For withdrawal agreement (& TP), it used article 50. Problem is: art 50 designed for a member state *that is on its way out* - *not* one that has already left.
So.. I've been thinking a lot about this. Possible but wd be unprecedented for 2 reasons: 1) First time (to my knowledge) that an EU-only deal wd require provisional application (PA) 2) First time (to my knowledge) Council wd authorise PA before EU Parliament has voted.
1. Cd a UK-EU FTA be provisionally applied if EU cannot complete ratification by the end of the year? Yes. Article 25 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) allows for it. As @StevePeers notes, political declaration also mentions it.
2. But PA wd not be straightforward for 3 reasons:
a. Timing: Can only happen after legal scrubbing & translation
b. Legal call: EU only vs. “mixed agreement”
c. EU Parliament ratification
Lots of talk (& confusion) today about EU ratification & #Brexit. All you need to know in this short thread.
1. Should you care about EU ratification? Yes. Brexit talks ongoing – but they're only part of the challenge. UK & EU also need time to vote & get ready for change.
2. Who in EU votes on UK-EU FTA? Depends on content of the deal. If:
(i) “EU-only” (areas of EU law only): then approval is needed at EU level (Council & EU Parliament)
(ii) “mixed agreement” (areas of EU & member-state law, like aviation): then approval at EU level *and* in MS
How will #EU react to Cumming’s departure? My hunch: status quo & caution. Short thread:
1. Status quo: Cumming’s departure won’t suddenly lead to a softening of EU state aid position in favour of the UK’s. EU wants a state aid compromise that stands the test of time - not just now but in 5/10 years time. Tonight’s development do not change that.
2. Caution: Cumming’s departure only matters if it gives PM more room for manoeuvre to find a Brexit compromise. But PM makes that call & there is no guarantee of that yet. END.
1. Stable foreign policy outlook: Biden will want to break with an America first foreign policy. Recommit US to multilateral system, fight against climate change & building resilience. UK shares all these priorities.
2. *But* UK must present US with a plan: Biden’s immediate focus will be domestic (bring US together, tackle Covid). Many in Washington have been surprised at how “internally-focused” the UK has been for past 4 yrs with Brexit. They now want to know what Britain will do globally