If Yahroma is a meter band radar on the lines of Voronezh-M/VP it would make sense for it to be built in Sevastopol as well as in Chukotka (KMZ courtesy of @russianforces) as the coverage there for that band is nonexistant. 1/
Same would apply to the "high potential dm-band" site announced for Murmansk area - that is where the gap in Voronezh-DM radar coverage happens to be.
As such those two new sites (M/VP-like in Sevastopol and DM in Murmansk) would complete dual band EW coverage. 2/
So far Yahroma appears to be an improved stand alone Voronezh-M/VP based on the recent interview (tass.ru/interviews/106… courtesy of @KomissarWhipla) rather than a missile defence specific radar as previously speculated. 3/
However maybe some advances in processing capability may be the key there, or co-locating a Voronezh-SM on site, much like it was done with Voronezh-VP in Vorkuta.
But please share your thoughts in the comments, both on the dual band nature of EW network and the BMD aspect. 4/
p.s. forgot to mention that this is happening at the same time as the other aspects of the early system, such as EKS-Kupol space based system (currently 4 sats on HEO) and Kontainer OTHR network (mostly for stealth bombers and cruise missiles) is being developed and deployed.
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TASS source allege that Yakhroma radar to be planned for deployement in Chukotka.
Previously radar of this type was reported to be planned for construction in Crimea and speculated to be related to missile defence.
Such a radar forward deployed in Chukotka, with 270 degree sector may be there to provide coverage for the region, possibly for US BMD interceptors as other radars are deployed to south-west.
A short refresher thread on the legacy Russian NC3.
First, there was a supporting system for the NCA, which allowed the President (and the MoD) to communicate with the military and to release the unlocker codes for the launches.
Unlocker codes are then pushed down to launchers.
Proprietary ownership by civilians was/is important because it ensured that only the relevant civilian authorities can order the launches, military authority would not have the unlocker codes.
My understanding is that Perimeter also receives them as a part of pre-delegation.
Then the orders would go through the service specific NC3 systems, Signal-A and Vyuga for the SMFs, the former was a hierarchical system to support the standard chain of command from the Central CP of SMFs onwards mainly.
Food for thought, over 2020s we may see a trend of existing S400 regiments (30+ of them) being reinforced with S500 divizions, which would lead to addition of ~180+ engagement channels focussed on MRBMs, IRBMs and possibly with some ICBM capability. 1/6
This force may provide not only a system for strategic defence against sub-ICBM BMs (ie from Middle East and elsewhere, as those proliferate), but also some capability against the potential HGV and other similar threats.
But I would expect this to be overshadowed... 2/6
In the discussions by their potential to form a second echelon in terms of strategic defence against ICBM threats, together with new EW means and exo-atmospheric interceptors.
But all three would probably be one of the drivers behind marketing it as an S400 upgrade package. 3/6
On the topic of arms control, de-alerting and the like.
As we prepare for possible extension of NST specifically and some sort of future arms control in general I would caution against mirror immaging and copypasting exact approaches across the board. 1/7
This is not only true due to different concerns the parties may have and thus seek to adress but also due to technical, doctrinal and geographical differences between the parties.
So lets look at the de-alerting as one of the common ideas floating around. 2/7
The main argument seems to be that the (US) silo based ICBM force is non survivable and must be used in a LoW style strike, which can lead to launches on false warning, etc.
This leads to the conclusion that SSBNs and other mobile platforms are inherently better 3/7
In the light of the soon demise of the NST, some long term trends for the Russian triad, in a short thread.
Overall the triad seems to be stable in terms of numbers, with modernisation being focussed on the like for like replacements and development of new capabilities. 1/10
First of all, what kinds of new technical capabilities can we expect? In addition to the Avanguard HGV that sort of went through IOC already there is a smaller HGV for the Sarmat (for MIRV) and what appears to likely be a powered HGV (Anchar-RV), most likely on light ICBMs. 2/10
There is also the concept of parallel staging comming about in the form of likely parallel RV dispersal on Yars and possibly other ICBMs (ie Sarmat).
This is there in anticipation of space based weapons systems as allows faster (earlier?) deployement. 3/10