Orban's departure from @EPPGroup@EPP is a BIG deal & a big strategic loss for him in Europe - he'll now lose both the influence & protection the group provided him 1/
As biggest, most influential political family in Europe, EPP has strongest tradition of policy co-ordination, esp pre European Council's. Afforded Orban huge influence with Heads of State & ability to build alliances across centre-right. No longer 2/
He'll also lose protection. Rule of law issues obviously stink to high heaven in Hungary, but exposing them wd simply have made EPP look bad - or so the logic went. Also no longer 3/
There's a parallel here with Brexit (I'm not obsessed): offer lots of concessions to keep a member in; much tougher, little need to compromise, once you're out. Suspect EPP will now want to fully wash its hands of Orban - prove why Fidesz should never have been a member 4/
This at same time as Orban joins a more extreme grouping in Bxl - @ecrgroup maybe? With Brothers of Italy, PiS in Poland. Crikey. All the crazies. Will further radicalise Orban - & with no love from EPP any longer - surely lead to more conflict between Budapest & Bxl 😬🇭🇺🇪🇺
ENDS
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.@EmmanuelMacron Govt has lost control of its message on Islam & Islamism & his reputation is taking a massive battering abroad - esp in US (@nytimes@washingtonpost). But his approach - not without errors & misjudgements - is far more balanced than critics claim Thread 1/
Macron’s recent troubles stem from recent, stupid remarks made by his higher education minister, Frédérique Vidal, who announced an investigation into so-called “Islamo-gauchiste” (Islamo-leftist) influence at French universities 2/
“Islamo-gauchisme” has long been an issue in France. It means, in essence, an alleged alliance between parts of the French hard left (anti-capitalist & often anti-Semitic) with extreme & sometimes violent forms of Islamist ideology 3/
I've been of view for some time that TCA represents high point in what's likely to be a difficult & deteriorating UK/EU relationship. Despite public pronouncements to contrary, in private, officials on both sides now acknowledge that this seems likely 1/5
For EU - Because HMG continues to misrepresent deal it struck to public & blame EU for its consequences. EU finds gap between Govt's rhetoric & reality unreal. This is killing trust. Reduces influence of more moderate member states that are open to addressing problems in TCA 2/5
For UK - Because Tory strategists continue to see electoral benefit - with red wall voters & constraining Labour - of a hard line on EU. Crystallised by Frost appointment, who as a believer in EU divergence, will now sit in Cabinet & advise on domestic regulation & reform 3/5
Was good to speak to @MarkUrban01@BBCNewsnight last night on UK/EU deal. In case you missed it, I think TCA will basically be as good as it gets - for quite some time. Four reasons in this mini-thread 1/
1: Govt wants to diverge. Whether symbolic or substantive is yet to be resolved between pragmatic & ideological Tory €sceptics. But only q is how far/fast. 3 March budget cd provide some clues. Sunak likely to say something about divergence agenda in context of Covid recovery 2/
1b: Good eg is equivalence for financial services, which remains unlikely. Govt doesn't want to be rule-taker from Bxl; thinks sector will be better regulated by HMT/BoE. EU also not keen; believes trust & stable relations are pre-requisites, both of which are lacking with HMG 3/
A lot has been written about what Mario Draghi's arrival in Italy means for Italy. But little has been said about what he could mean for Europe. I think Draghi could be a game changer for EU; he could even turn its toxic North-South dynamic on its head. Thread 1/
Why? The @EU_Commission is currently reviewing (quietly) member states reform plans. These are basis upon which EU capitals hope to begin receiving their allocation, in transfers & loans, from the €750 billion Recovery Fund, starting later this year 2/
Remember the numbers are unprecedented. Italy is eligible for ~€188bn (roughly €65.5bn in grants; €123bn in loans). Spain a €144bn, roughly €59bn in grants & €85bn in loans etc etc. The amounts for all member states are unprecedented 3/
The snail-like first 10 days of French vaccine roll-out means Fr is still behind other countries – only 1.44% of the 66mn population vaccinated as of last night. As of today, France would still not yet appear on this FT chart. BUT that will soon change 1/ ig.ft.com/coronavirus-va…
The French vaccine programme has exploded into life in the last four or five days, with an average of well over 100,000 jabs a day. As a result France is now jabbing faster (pro rata) than Germany or Italy 2/
It has vaccinated a total of 963,139 people (139,572 yesterday alone) and will today hit – 8 days early - its initial, modest target of 1,000,000 by the end of January. This is only four days longer than the UK took to reach its “first million jabs.” 3/
However, I personally don’t buy the idea that the great key to the Macronist world view (if such a thing exists) is his one-time mentor, the Eurosceptic former Socialist minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement 2/6
Chevènement was and is a fierce French nationalist. Macron’s view of “sovereignty” may be fluid at times but it is mostly defined in a European context: the need for a European strategic sovereignty – economic, political & military. I think this would be repugnant to Chevènement