That is on top of a 10% reduction in total trade between the referendum and the end of the transition period, compared to a doppelganger UK that remained in the EU.
My 2014 gravity model forecast that the loss of total goods trade would be 18%. @thom_sampson and co forecast a hit to total trade (including services) of 13%. The Treasury forecast 10%. It's worse than that so far. cer.eu/publications/a…
The caveats about the January data are important to bear in mind. See @thom_sampson's thread. But over time we will know how much of the Brexit hit to trade is permanent. I will update my model as new data comes in.
Method: I have created two new ‘doppelganger’ UKs using goods trade data, to estimate the size of the impact of Brexit on trade. The doppelgangers are made up of other countries whose trade – and broader economic -performance has been similar to Britain’s.
The first doppelganger did not leave the single market and customs union in January. The second did not vote to leave the EU in January 2016.
I focused on goods trade because it has been less badly affected by the pandemic after the first lockdown. Goods trade in most OECD countries, including Britain, had recovered its pre-pandemic level in December 2020.
And goods trade has been less affected by lockdowns: see France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Stockpiling is a bigger issue, and we will have to wait for more data to see how bad the permanent hit is.
I will update the model as we go.
But so far Brexit has been disastrous for British trade.
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Some initial thoughts on the election result. In sum: Brexit will happen, but the economic risks will make it difficult for Johnson to bounce the country into an FTA. 1/n
This was no endorsement of Johnson’s FTA. He and Corbyn ensured there was no debate in the campaign about what it entailed. The EU will drive a hard bargain, with level playing field provisions and fishing rights being the demand for a quick and narrow agreement. 2/
There is little hope that customs in Northern Ireland or Dover will be ready by end 2020. In all likelihood, neither will the new immigration system. A quick FTA would also mean a hit to the economy. 3/
The CAP consumes 37% of the EU budget. But emissions from farming have been flat since 2005, despite the EU spending 20% of the farm budget on climate action.
To which you might reply, well, maybe farm emissions have been flat but output has gone up, so the sector is improving?
Nope. Emissions 'intensity' - ie, as a ratio of output - has been flat in agriculture since 2008.
People I respect often say that economic and political gravity will force the UK into a close relationship with the EU in time. I've made that point myself in the past. But I'm worried that this may not be true. 1/
This is the share of UK and German exports going to the EU since 1948.
The UK's decision to stay out of European integration was very costly, defying trade gravity - the rule that nearby, rich countries will be biggest trade partners. 2/
The UK made a political choice to prioritise trade with empire and commonwealth over Europe in the post-war period - with a high price for living standards. 3/
1. NI in single market for industrial goods and agri-food 2. NI de facto in EU customs union, with rebates for imported goods from UK that are bought by *consumers* in NI (with supply chain checks to be settled later)
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3. Consent by majority of MLAs in 2024 = 4 more years of protocol. Consent by dual majority = 8 more years. 4. No alternative arrangements references
What does this mean? Time limit by consent is a win for the UK, I thought that wouldn't happen. But consent is structured so that it is likely to be granted, because it is by simple majority.
Quick thread on my latest cost of Brexit estimate. The economy is 2.9% smaller than it would've been if the ref had gone the other way. 1/
The way the estimate works is this - an algorithm takes economic data from 2009 to the referendum from 22 countries. It selects those countries whose economies are most similar to Britain's. 2/
Those countries form the doppelganger.
Germany = 32% of the doppelganger
US = 28%
Australia = 17%
Iceland = 9%
Greece = 6%
Luxembourg and Iceland = 4% each
3/
My latest, thinking through how negotiations between the UK and EU would play out after no deal. cer.eu/insights/how-w… 1/
Any mitigation by the EU will be limited, and will require the UK to sign up to the main provisions of the withdrawal agreement. 2/
There are strict legal constraints about what the EU can offer the UK if it does sign up to those provisions. There could be a fairly quick deal on goods to unblock the Dover-Calais crossing. 3/