Over the recent past Russian system has nearly completed two complimenting above horizon radar layers for EW (Voronezh-M/VP and DM) as well as pushed the EW space based sensors (and comms) through IOC, with beyond horizon EW radar layer underway. 2/10
In addition to this there are some programs that appear to be BMD related in terms of sensors, those are:
Voronezh-SM (L-band)
MRIK-VKO/80P6 (S-band)
Volga modernisation
Multiband Yakhroma radar set (Crimea, possibly Chukotka) 3/10
Those sensors could support the missile defence shooters deeper inside of Russia and for 80P6 can be relatively quickly deployed on new threat axis. 4/10
In terms of those shooters we may be looking at a two tier system by 2030, with the upper tier being formed by Nudol&co (there is a good deal of confusion there) and lower by S-500. 5/10
While the former is likely to stay within the same scale as the current Moscow BMD system in terms of interceptors (under 100) the later, if say ~25 S-400 regiments are hybridized with Abakan-likes could provide 150 (or more) engagement channels across the country. 6/10
With, again the focus on Moscow.
The drivers of those programs do not even need to be found in UK strategic programs, they could be explained by ballistic missile proliferation, ie in the MENA region. 7/10
And last but not least yes, it appears that there are some efforts in the "silo APS" direction, as this would improve silo survivability and compliment existing counter measure (jammer/obscurant) sets up already in place (as seen on YaRS silos) against the PGM threat 8/10
I doubt however that the silo APS is the big concern for the UK, as, atleast to my best knowledge, UK is either value or leadership focussed. 9/10
Which leads me to the final idea - the growth if indeed the targetting did not change may be explained... by the Russian COG/COOP/civil defence development, of new command posts, dispersal areas, various leadership (including normal non hardened ie on the Black Sea) sites. 10/10
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Otherwise a decent take on the challenges in optimising the security posture.
My 50 cents would be that scale matters, being able to deploy an Army Group (or atleast strong Corps) is different to the ability to deploy a mass of brigades such force would be composed out of.
And this devolution in scale can also lead to a dangerous devolution in training and skills of military leaders and staffs.
If Yahroma is a meter band radar on the lines of Voronezh-M/VP it would make sense for it to be built in Sevastopol as well as in Chukotka (KMZ courtesy of @russianforces) as the coverage there for that band is nonexistant. 1/
Same would apply to the "high potential dm-band" site announced for Murmansk area - that is where the gap in Voronezh-DM radar coverage happens to be.
As such those two new sites (M/VP-like in Sevastopol and DM in Murmansk) would complete dual band EW coverage. 2/
So far Yahroma appears to be an improved stand alone Voronezh-M/VP based on the recent interview (tass.ru/interviews/106… courtesy of @KomissarWhipla) rather than a missile defence specific radar as previously speculated. 3/
TASS source allege that Yakhroma radar to be planned for deployement in Chukotka.
Previously radar of this type was reported to be planned for construction in Crimea and speculated to be related to missile defence.
Such a radar forward deployed in Chukotka, with 270 degree sector may be there to provide coverage for the region, possibly for US BMD interceptors as other radars are deployed to south-west.
A short refresher thread on the legacy Russian NC3.
First, there was a supporting system for the NCA, which allowed the President (and the MoD) to communicate with the military and to release the unlocker codes for the launches.
Unlocker codes are then pushed down to launchers.
Proprietary ownership by civilians was/is important because it ensured that only the relevant civilian authorities can order the launches, military authority would not have the unlocker codes.
My understanding is that Perimeter also receives them as a part of pre-delegation.
Then the orders would go through the service specific NC3 systems, Signal-A and Vyuga for the SMFs, the former was a hierarchical system to support the standard chain of command from the Central CP of SMFs onwards mainly.
Food for thought, over 2020s we may see a trend of existing S400 regiments (30+ of them) being reinforced with S500 divizions, which would lead to addition of ~180+ engagement channels focussed on MRBMs, IRBMs and possibly with some ICBM capability. 1/6
This force may provide not only a system for strategic defence against sub-ICBM BMs (ie from Middle East and elsewhere, as those proliferate), but also some capability against the potential HGV and other similar threats.
But I would expect this to be overshadowed... 2/6
In the discussions by their potential to form a second echelon in terms of strategic defence against ICBM threats, together with new EW means and exo-atmospheric interceptors.
But all three would probably be one of the drivers behind marketing it as an S400 upgrade package. 3/6