In addition to updating economy-wide emissions goals for the first time since 2008, the new law: codifies environmental justice rules, directs the utility commission to prioritize equity & emissions cuts, sets EV goals, requires more renewable energy, and much more.
To be fair to @CharlieBakerMA, @MassEEA developed & published in Dec a detailed roadmap for the Massachusetts to get to Net-Zero by 2050, acting under authority from 2008 Global Warming Solutions Act. I served on technical advisory committee for the study. mass.gov/info-details/m…
The Roadmap Act pushes that goal to 50%. Along with sector-specific targets in the law, that was one source of tension between Baker & Legislature that led to initial veto.
🧵New paper in @NatureEnergyJnl evaluating long-duration energy storage technologies.
Innovative, low-cost storage could make a decarbonized electricity system more affordable and reliable, and partially substitute for clean firm generation.
Sally Benson, Rob Jackson, David Victor & @colvin round out team.
This major effort was assembled after California passed the landmark SB100 legislation in late 2018, setting a requirement to reach 100% carbon-free electricity by 2045.
Our question: how can California decarbonize by 2045 without sacrificing reliability or affordability?
Since rebound effects came up in my Voltscast chat w/ @drvolts' intro, a new paper by @steve_r_sorrell is timely! carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why…
"economy-wide impact of these effects and find they may erode more than half of the potential energy savings from improved energy efficiency."
Rebound effects describes phenomena where energy efficiency makes energy services (lighting, heating, industrial process) cheaper, inducing greater demand for those services (direct rebound), spending of savings on other energy using activities (indirect) + macroeconomic effects
The outages reported for wind in this report are based on reductions from the "Seasonal Max MW," which is the maxim rated capacity of the wind farm in the winter. But ERCOT wisely does NOT count on wind farms to produce 100% of their output (the wind is inconstant. Duh).
As the Winter "Seasonal Assessment of Resource Adequacy for the ERCOT Region" report details, ERCOT 'de-rates' wind during winter peak load events to account for its variability. The derate differs for wind in different regions, but the average derate is ~25% of the max capacity.
No cause of outage information included though, so still requires some real guess-work as to what went wrong.
Focus on ~12:00am-2:00am February 15th period. That's when mass generator outages sent the Texas grid dangerously close to full system blackout. ercot.com/content/wcm/ke…
Like, what the heck was going on here with all of these natural gas plants failing over the course of two hours? Many correlated failures at multiple plants at about the same times (12:23-12:27am; 1:00am; 1:23-1:35am).
Wow, this graphic from a new @ERCOT_ISO report on the #TexasBlackouts shows how close the ERCOT grid was to a cascading failure that could have easily blacked out the whole system. ercot.com/content/wcm/ke… 1/
Going into the night of Valentine's Day, February 14th, a new winter peak demand of 69,222 MW was set at 7:06pm. By 1:23am in the middle of the night on February 15th, frigid temps had left more than 35,000 MW of generating capacity offline. 2/
Faced with greater demand & diminished generation capacity, ERCOT, the grid operator, ordered transmission utilities to start disconnecting millions of customers. The initial order was to shed 10,500 MW of demand. This grew to a height of 20,000 MW by the end of Feb 15th. 3/