Thanks for sharing 🙏. Loved it. Much to learn from both camps.
Reminds me of an anecdote which happened recently. Wanted to share some knowledge on how I value #lauruslabs #Valuations by their nature are subjective so some of these will be opinions.
Someone recently asked me following: #lauruslabs has publicly stated guidance of doing 1B$ revenue in Fy23, with 30% EBITDA margins. They calculated profits to be 2340cr in Fy23. So P/E based on Fy23 earnings would be 14.
Question: Is this cheap?
My Answer (Rest of the thread):
Philosophical: Valuations lie in the eyes of the beholder & are most difficult part of any investment thesis; personally. There is no single “valuation”. Each investor must make their own decision on how to value, what's cheap, what is expensive.
My understanding:
I personally think valuations are completely driven by narratives/perceptions around (growth & unit economics) & (opportunity cost).
If as a collective, market thinks a company will grow topline at 10-12% for 10-20 years with high and stable or improving unit economics and with some operating leverage higher bottomline growth, then valuations would remain elevated.
However, P/E of 100 is elevated. P/E of 50 is also elevated (to most investors). Why I added opportunity cost is that some growth hungry investors would decide to sell off their 12-15% #asianpaints compounder and rather go after economy facing stocks like #princepipes, acrysil
As long as the narrative around growth and unit economics remains, valuations would remain elevated (but can reduce due to opportunistic investors moving out) as price discounts decades of growing stable profits and improving unit economics.
Does the market believe that #lauruslabs earnings are as predictable as some of high P/E companies (Asian Paints)? No.
Hence, looking at Fy23 earnings, whether 14 P/E is expensive or cheap would depend on **Laurus’s growth prospects and unit economics in Fy24 and beyond**.
For understanding this, one needs to have a clear and in-depth understanding of the management credibility, industry structure, #lauruslabs business and all management commentary about future (specially FY24 and beyond).
At this point, I request the reader to take a step back and ponder over that previous tweet and its implications.
What this implies is that business, industry and management understanding are **prerequisites** for valuation analysis.
Business (including industry and management) analysis always, always comes before valuation analysis.
Always.
Always.
Stop calculating the P/E which is just a number, start reading concalls. Start reading Investor presentations. Then, and only then the P/E might make sense
Coming back to #lauruslabs key questions to ponder over: All for FY24 beyond timeframe: What would the growth prospects be? What would the unit economics be? Are both trending down or trending up. How stable or sustainable are they versus lumpy or one-off.
Are there going to be far superior opportunities to Pharma/Laurus in Fy23 which cause opportunistic investors to jump ship depressing valuations?
Answers to these Qs & experience based on studying evolution of valuations of companies over market cycles can help an investor answer
Whether a P/E of 14 based on FY23 profits is cheap, or not.
Practically, for someone to answer these questions for #lauruslabs , I can recommend the following excellent sources. To the hard working investor, the answer will definitely come.
4. Recent management interviews such as this one: where Dr chava talks about richcore and the CMS business strategic outlook. 5. Obvious suspect places like latest concalls, ARs and investor presentations. 1st two, you can conveniently find on screener.
In short we have to consume all publicly available direct evidence/sources (interviews, concalls, ARs, Investor Presentations) as well as read/watch industry reports/seminars & understand broader trends to figure out the growth & unit economics, business mix directions.
lastly, there is another interesting aspect to valuations. I quote roughly verbatim from @soicfinance astral video "One does not need a weighing scale to tell whether someone is fat or not."
Similarly we do not need exact estimates of FY23 beyond growth and product mix changes and unit economics to tell whether a P/E of 14 is expensive or cheap.
We only need to evaluate whether there are enough growth & unit economics triggers to sustain or improve P/E of 14 :)
If you read the thread till here and liked it, please retweet so maximum investors specially new/inexperienced ones can benefit.
#Garware#HiTechFilms Search this company on twitter, all you see is news of @LuckyInvest_AK Ashish sir investing in it. This thread adds some fundamental research about this company, to demystify it. If you like the thread, please retweet so max investors can gain the knowledge
Primary business of GHTF is manufacturing polyester (PET) films. These are transparent plastic films used for a variety of purposes. Packaging of items. The tint you see on windows (not in India, but abroad) is a PET film. The tint you see on buildings (yes, in India); PET Film.
Not all polyester films were made equal though. The basic PET film is a commodity. Primary use is packaging. There are 11 manufacturers in India. Most PET manufacturers are thus commodity producers. Not GHTF though.
#angelbroking so many UC. 🤣
This thread is to understand the biz & what excites me about it. A bit about the #broking industry too. This is going to be a long thread, so please don't hold your breath. As always retweet if you like, so max people can benefit. 🙏
#Brokers provide the UI/UX to the end participant to execute their trades. Traditionally, brokers have made money through couple of major sources:
1. Brokerage: In the olden days, brokers used to have “packs” (say X trades in Y days for Z rupees) and also provide custom plans to their clients with a focus on driving volume. This got disrupted with the advent of discount brokers like Zerodha.
A rising tide lifts all boats. I would caution all investors to read the VP thread for #shaktipumps. In 2014, Management had guided for 400 cr revenue in 2015. Actual revenues were 292, 296, 264 cr in 2014, 2015, 2016.
Not to take anything away from the business setup and Industry tailwinds but company's guidance and statements have been slightly less than truthful in the past. forum.valuepickr.com/t/shakti-pumps…
Warren Buffett only have 2 rules for investing: 1. Don't lose money. 2. Don't forget rule 1.
#tips industries My key takeaways from latest (Q3FY21) concall and investor presentation. If you like the thread, please retweet so that others can also benefit. 1. Management confident of growing topline at 25-30%. Claims industry is growing at 30-40%.
In b/w lines: Personally, I felt some of the numbers were pulled out of thin air. Management seems a bit less professional than #saregama. Having said that, as tips inks more deals with music licencing platforms (eg:telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/tips-indu…) it can meet its revenue growth guidance
2. If they buy a song for X, they make that money back in 1 year. Maximum of 2 years.
In b/w lines: This is extremely high ROICs. It must be understood why the content they acquire is selling so cheap that they are able to make an ROIC of 50%-100%.
@NAVofNav this is a very important question and deserves some clarification.
Music producers like #SAREGAMA and #tips acquire 2 types of IP rights/sources of revenue when they acquire the music:
1. Master Recording rights: (the song) which is for 60 years from the time song was released. 2. Publishing rights: These are for 60 years from the time of death of the writer/composer of the song.
The first ones go away, 60 years after the song was released. But the second ones enable #saregama to use the lyrics and re-record the song (60 more years for this song).
The 1st rights going away is definitely a blow, but the blow is softened by the 2nd set of rights.
#princepipes great conference call after amazing Q4 results. My key takeaways: 1. While industry degrew by 15% in FY21, prince had 4% volume growth.
In b/w lines:
Prince is consistently gaining market share for 7-8 quarters. Only 5% market share currently. Industry is fragmented.
Larger players have distribution and logistics cost advantages. Can invest in brand building (Prince did ~4.5% of sales in branding in Q4 due to 1 off inventory gains, generally does 2.5-3%). Over long term, prince can compound topline faster than Industry growth of 12-14%.
2. Three drivers of high Ebitda margins in Q4: inventory gains, product mix change, superior pricing power. Long term guidance of 14% margins.
In b/w lines: CPVC pipes were 20% of topline before lubrizol tie-up. Astral has much higher (30% market share to prince's 10% of cpvc)